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An Exchange on Norman O. Brown—Arthur Efron and Lionel Abel

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1968 $1

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Czechoslovakia

The Deepening Communist Schism

Izak Hruska

IT WILL BE many weeks before details are leaked to the world press about the agreement between the Czechs and Russians in early August. No sensible person, remembering Hungary, will feel anything but relief at the thought that the threat of Russian intervention has been temporarily averted. We may well be skeptical about Dubcek's claim that he made no major concession to the Russians. Given the political-military realities, concessions were probably unavoidable. Even the "liberal" forces in Prague, those still within the CP and those grouped into amorphous political clubs, will agree that some concessions had to be made. The question is: which concessions? how far did they go?

Together with the good news, there are disquieting signs. Editors of *Literarni Listi* and *Student,* leading "liberal" weeklies, have been called in by Dubcek's Central Committee and urged to abandon polemics against the East Germans and Russians. (In itself the idea of restraint may be appropriate; what is bad is the possible beginning of a new *informal* system of censorship.) At public gatherings in Prague, thousands of people show themselves understandably skeptical of their leaders' vague reassurances. And Paul Hoffman, reporting from Bucharest in the August 5 *New York Times,* adds an ominous note: "The prevailing opinion here is that the Bratislava parley marked only the first round of what may be a long battle between Mr. Dubcek, . . . and hard-line Communists in the Soviet bloc."

Whatever else, that seems certain. The struggle will continue for a long time.

Within Czechoslovakia the emerging political forces which rallied behind Dubcek to offset the Russians will now feel a little freer to express their views. This means new disagreements. The "liberals," actually democratic socialists pledged to a multi-party regime, will pressure Dubcek from the Left; the old *apparatchiks,* reconciled to Novotny's defeat but hoping for a Gomulka-type authoritarianism, will pressure Dubcek from the Right. Within the regime there will appear parallel divergences, though the exact alignment of forces and personnel it is too soon to anticipate.

For the Russians, the concessions wrung out of them by the skill and unity of the Czechs—also because of the pressure of the West European Communist parties and the severe disagreements within the Russian leadership itself—can be tolerable only if Czechoslovakia remains within the Warsaw Pact and halts its development toward democracy. The first of these is probable: whatever economic advantages can accrue to Prague from dealings with West Germany may be manageable without formal political realignments. In any case, the Czechs will not give Brezhnev the pretext for intervention which leaving the Warsaw pact might entail. Within the Communist world, the Czechs also have support from Belgrade and Bucharest, neither of which shows any taste for democracy in their own countries but which share a mutual interest in clipping the paws of the Russian bear. ("Proletarian internationalism," runs a joke in Prague, "is the new name of Ivan the Terrible.")

But the matter of Czechoslovakia's political future is *in the long run* beyond compromise. For the Party bureaucrats in Moscow the Czech events represent a profoundly serious threat—the threat of a gathering revolutionary-democratic force to remove the single-party dictatorship. Why Brezhnev and Kosygin should react with fear and fury to the Czech events is dramatically underscored in the remarkable document of the Russian physicist Andrei Sakharov,

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A Slight Price Increase

DISSENT has tried to hold the line on prices, but we now have to announce a small rise.

Beginning September 1, 1968, the cost of an annual subscription will be $6; a biannual subscription $10.

The price of individual copies will remain the same. So too will the price of student subscriptions.

We know that our readers will understand the reasons for this slight increase and will rally, as in the past, to the support of DISSENT.

THE EDITORS

reprinted in the July 22 *New York Times*. This historic essay, which has been privately circulated in Russia, constitutes in effect a program for a democratic socialist alternative in Russia. Such sentiments are encouraged by what has been happening in Prague, and Communist leaders see both as a threat to their hegemony. They are right.

IN THE LONG RUN, splintered into more and more divergent blocs and factions, unable to resolve its pervasive socio-economic difficulties, and haunted by the problem of how to relax totalitarian bonds without being engulfed by genuine democracy, the Communist world faces an ever-deepening crisis. In the short run, however, there can be improvisations and compromises, perhaps unavoidable in view of Czechoslovakia's geography. There could be a slow degeneration à la Poland. There could be a temporary stabilization, as in Yugoslavia, where some political discussion is possible as long as it does not threaten the control of the Titoist party-state. There may even be an interval in which freedom of the press will be allowed, but not freedom of political action. Here we should underscore the words of Ivan Svitak [the Czech writer whose article in *Student* is reprinted on p. 442]:

> . . . with the exception of the temporary lapse of censorship no structural changes have taken place in the mechanism of the totalitarian dictatorship . . . one party still has a monopoly in political life, and at present, there exist no procedures, such as are common in a democracy, to express the political will of the people.

What content or meaning can freedom of the press have—indeed, how can it survive—if men are not free to act politically on what they write and read? Right now it appears that the Dubcek regime has agreed to "the leading role of the Communist Party," the Russian euphemism for a one-party state. In an August 4 dispatch to the *New York Times* Henry Kamm goes to the heart of the matter:

> Liberal Communists fear that the Dubcek party leadership needs no Soviet reminder not to let these organizations ["groups of non-Communist liberals"] grow out of hand. For the liberal Communists who will not believe that democratization has really arrived until there are true opposition parties, need not be told that the leadership will not permit such groups.
>
> This remains the real question of Czechoslovak democratization: What should be done, if anything, to assure the "leading role" of the Communist Party? The liberal Communists feel that their leaders have an answer that Moscow would easily approve: Ban the opposition.
>
> But the liberals ask . . . can one talk of democracy if effective opposition is outlawed?

For our co-thinkers in Czechoslovakia the coming months will be difficult. They understand it would be folly to provoke a struggle to the point where Moscow would intervene or arrange a *coup d'état* in Prague. Yet they know that unless they keep publicly pressing the Dubcek leadership, it is likely to consolidate itself as a more-or-less benevolent authoritarianism and thereby thwart the yearning for a popular democratic resurrection. Every socialist will feel the strongest solidarity for our comrades in Czechoslovakia who must face this dilemma, men whose names we do not even know but who share our humanist imperatives.

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DISSENT

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1968

DISSENT is a journal devoted to radical ideas and the values of socialism and democracy. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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Voices from Czechoslovakia

We print below excerpts from articles written by Czech writers during the recent revolutionary events. For us it is enormously encouraging and exciting to see that, as soon as a measure of liberty becomes possible in an East European country, leading political voices speak in behalf of concepts of democratic socialism closely aligned to those which have appeared in our pages. This was true in Poland and in Hungary; it is now true in Czechoslovakia. It is as if simultaneously, and without the benefit of discussion, there has been arising throughout the world a recognition that socialism is meaningless, indeed inconceivable without full democracy, and that democracy cannot fulfill its promise without steps toward socialism.—ED.

Vaclav Havel

Why We Need A Second Party

IF SOME ideas about the possible form of a political opposition in present-day Czechoslovakia give the impression of a desire "to have your cake and eat it, too," we cannot be surprised. That the more progressive and democratically minded in the Party seem to have won over the conservatives within a few weeks by no means signifies that the latter agree to a shift which has never been tried—changing the single-party system. Are they capable of confronting seriously the idea of an opposition, until recently anathema to them?

If, nevertheless, they go so far as to permit public discussion of this subject—until recently taboo—it would seem that those with anything to say about it should seize this opportunity to discuss the matter. What is it, then, that makes the ideas advanced up to now sound so half-hearted? We hear quite often that, because of our present and future freedom of speech (said to be the essence of democracy), the natural function of opposition will be exercised merely by public opinion having access to mass communications media.

Such a concept presupposes a *faith* that the government will draw all the necessary inferences from public criticism—but democracy is a matter not of faith but of *guarantees*. Even if we admit that public "competition of views" is the first, most important factor in democracy, its very essence—and the true source of our guarantees—is something else: public and legal "competition for power. . . ."

When all has been said, power respects power; a government can only be made to improve itself when its existence, and not just its good name, is at stake. Indeed, the ability of a government to use its authority to influence public opinion by "freely" limiting the freedom of that opinion—either illegally or by changing the laws—grows as the capacity of public opinion to exert authority over the government diminishes.

If, moreover, the "competition of views" only supplements "competition for power," the door is indeed open to undemocratic processes (as, for example, if ministers are dismissed not by parliament but by television or public meetings —leaving the citizen no legal control over the executive power and hence, no prophylaxis against its misuse). I also consider illusory the assumption that internal democratization of the ruling party—readiness to tolerate something

(continued on page 441)

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William Connolly and Arnold S. Kaufman

Between Exaltation & Despair

This issue of DISSENT *has been made up before the two major political conventions; hence it is impossible to discuss here the candidates and programs, whom to vote for, if anyone, etc. Our next issue (November-December) will appear* before *the election and, in addition to a report by Bernard Rosenberg on the Democratic convention and campaign, there will be a number of brief articles from our editors and contributors expressing various opinions as to the course of political events and what response to take. In this issue we present a comment by two writers who have been active in the McCarthy campaign; they discuss both short-range campaign issues and the long-range problems of the democratic Left in America beyond the party conventions and the election.*

A YEAR AGO John Bailey wrote to all county chairmen in the Democratic party informing them that President Johnson was going to be renominated, and that they should ignore those "doubters and cussers" who would "rather be heard than helpful." With the exception of Zolton Ferency, the state chairman of Michigan's Democratic party, key party officials publicly went along with Bailey. And many antiwar liberals in the party gloomily but "realistically" adjusted to the inevitability of Johnson's renomination.

A year ago the New Left convened its New Politics Convention in Chicago and refused to adjust to the "realities" of electoral politics. The Johnson Administration, it was said, could not be dislodged by conventional political means; only co-optation and ideological softening awaited those who would try. A New Party was needed to provide a base for the New Politics. In the interim, Herbert Marcuse charted the course for the New Politicians: authentic militants must remain aloof and "negative . . . , loyal to those who, without hope, have given and give their life to the Great Refusal."

Thus an unlikely coalition emerged. While the liberals adjusted to "necessity" and the New Leftists defied it, they converged upon the same dismal premise: the Johnson Administration could not be dislodged from its dominant position; electoral politics was irrelevant to the overriding issue of Vietnam. Millions of Americans were infected with this self-defeating pessimism.

Happily, events shattered these somber certainties. The sequence of successes that started with the "Dump Johnson" movement and culminated in the primary victories achieved by McCarthy and Kennedy reinvigorated the established political processes. Johnson withdrew. Peace negotiations began. Millions of Americans moved back into the political arena.

The potentialities generated by this new insurgency may yet be squandered. Paradoxically, this is partly due to the exaggerated optimism that followed Johnson's withdrawal, and partly to an unwillingness by some radicals to use leverage already achieved.

When Johnson withdrew, jubilant insurgents throughout the country decided that the only contest that remained was between McCarthy and Kennedy. Humphrey was nothing, Wallace of no consequence. An established power that only months before had been viewed impenetrable and unbeatable was discounted.

Thousands of office-holders' tenacious will to remain in power could be ignored. And so,

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while Kennedy and McCarthy enthusiasts hacked each other to pieces, Humphrey moved into a commanding lead in his quest for delegates. One wonders whether the only sustaining thread in the political thought of some militants is a certain mindlessness about tactics. For, from the moment McCarthy entered the race, everything depended on cooperation between his forces and those that eventually rallied around Kennedy. Our only reasonable prospect for electoral success depended on joining their separate political strengths when the time was ripe.

In any event, it was not to be. The young Senator's terrible assassination destroyed all such calculations. The bitterness of the primary fights left the opposition unnecessarily divided. (It must be said that Kennedy himself never participated in the reckless expansion of personal attacks.)

Now, faced with the prospect of a Nixon-Humphrey race, New Leftists and liberal "realists" are again converging upon their dismal premise. Our main purpose here is to try to knife through the prevailing mood of anger and gloom. For, in our view, this mood threatens to suffocate the movement so spectacularly started last fall. Regardless of the outcome in August or in November, opportunities remain to exploit our real achievements and to build a new coalition. And if, unfortunately, these opportunities will not be available to us in the Presidential race, they will surely and significantly be available in many Congressional contests.

CONSIDER our accomplishments against the background of the pessimism that went before. The direction of the War has been reversed. Every major candidate now feels obliged to speak of de-escalation and negotiations.

More important, the ideology of the cold war is dying. The more militant segments of the anti-war movement first exposed its faulty logic, but, following classic form, electoral effort has deepened the impact of those criticisms on the general population. Thus the *New York Times* columnist Max Frankel, who attended the Illinois Republican and Democratic state conventions and heard Daley, Dirksen, and other party hacks, suddenly realized that no one indulged in the usual anti-Communism or called for new military crusades. And Humphrey, who said in April, 1966, "I want to be tolerant, but I can't see the difference between containment in Europe and Asia," now proclaims new priorities in American policy; the waning of the cold war demands, he says, "a shift from policies of confrontation and containment to policies of reconciliation and peaceful engagement." Between the first and the second utterance little has changed — *except the country's political climate!*

Even if Humphrey gains the nomination, established leaders of the Democratic party face severe challenge from millions of insurgents politically activated by the candidacies of McCarthy and Kennedy. There may be substantial fall-out; but by the same token many will stick because the taste of partial victory, the access to centers of party power, has provided reinforcement for those whose earlier despair was rooted in a lack of political experience. If these newly politicized radicals do not lose nerve, they can have much to say about the future of the Democratic party—and more important, American political life—regardless of the November outcome.

These achievements have also helped to vindicate nonviolent forms of direct action. For the legitimacy of such tactics depends on the existence of a widespread belief, not always justified, that they yield significant political gains. The judicious use of unconventional tactics can drive wedges into established structures; and these initial gains can be converted by conventional political action into more substantial accomplishments. But there is a tendency on the part of the press, a wider public, and radicals themselves greatly to overestimate the efficacy of militant, nonviolent methods—an overestimation that is quite understandable given prevailing criteria of what is newsworthy. Consequently, while strategic options expand on the Left, the prevailing exaggerations threaten to frustrate efforts to consolidate what has been achieved.

An illustration will help fix this point. Three and a half years of relentless, but undramatic effort led to the frustration of Humphrey's search for delegates in Colorado. A mix of political education, electoral activity, and nonviolent direct action went forward without much attention from the press. During this same period all one had to do was urinate on the steps of the Pentagon to gain front-page cov-

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erage in the *New York Times*. It is only to be expected that millions who remained ignorant of the imagination and intelligence that went into the Colorado success tend to attribute it, and many local victories like it, to the flamboyant tactics they have constantly heard about. But the fact that events are conjoined does not guarantee that there is a casual connection.

In any event, myths acquire reality. The more unconventional forms of political action have been legitimized by apparent success in a way that gives them a future potential they lacked before. At the same time those of us not deluded by press reports will perceive that the future potency of unconventional tactics depends heavily upon our ability to employ them intelligently, and in combination with more conventional forms of political action.

PERHAPS the most hopeful accomplishment of the Left in the last three and a half years is the shift it has forced in the rhetoric of political discourse, a shift in the nature of the ideals and programs under active discussion. The implications of this shift are systematically underrated by many radicals who understand well the function of rhetoric as a tool to delude the masses, but who fail to appreciate its role in generating new aspirations and new pressures for change.

Suddenly the "new politics" is reflected "within" the established parties! Political candidates speak of expanding "participation"; they debate "black power" and the "guaranteed annual income"; they espouse "reconciliation" and "disarmament"; they are even concerned about "alienation" amongst the poor and the young, the unemployed, and the routinized employees. Expectations are enlarged. Accomplishment *or* bitter disappointment and disorder must follow.

The new rhetoric is used by Nixon and Humphrey. However hypocritical they may be, they unwittingly help set into motion the dialectic by which problems and possibilities, formerly submerged, are seen by a wider public which then transforms them into political demands. Promises are made and not kept, and a new militancy emerges to press for implementation of the unkept promises. The new rhetoric thereby moves the policy focus of discussion and political conflict to the Left. An incipient coalition on the Left begins to recognize its common objectives.

Many signs point to the emergence of such a coalition, the group that Michael Harrington has called "the first party." Walter Reuther's challenge to George Meany is reverberating through the entire trade union movement. Roy Wilkins's days seem numbered as the insurgency within the NAACP grows. The ADA first split, then rallied behind the McCarthy candidacy, while ardent Johnson-Humphrey spokesmen such as John Roche and Leon Keyserling lost their influence within liberal circles. Within academic communities the same fissures are opening. Unions in colleges and public schools are challenging the AAUP and NEA. Increasing numbers of younger faculty ally themselves with sensible student insurgency. Public employees' unions are growing rapidly and helping to politicize a previously untapped force of change. And, as an outgrowth of the political challenge mounted on behalf of insurgent candidacies, the Coalition for an Open Convention was formed. These are among the symptoms of a general reconstitution of American liberalism as a more radical force in American politics.

The new coalition from among the poor, militant blacks, Hispanos, American Indians, liberal intellectuals, young radicals, radicalized businessmen and professional people, artists and writers, militant—often newly organized—trade unionists, disaffected veterans, and even retired bankers and generals, provide a solid *social* base for a new program of radical liberalism—if we don't lose our *political* nerve in a fit of despair over the possible or likely candidacies of Humphrey and Nixon.

"Realists" and New Leftists will together complain that the successes we have catalogued are fragile, the promise of a new coalition overdrawn; no real change has occurred in the distribution of wealth, the nature of American foreign policy, the ghettos, the arms race, the organization of work life, the quality of our penal institutions, the basic direction of the welfare state, and so on. There is no reason for the leaders of the new coalition to cheer. There is every reason for them to be pessimistic about the prospects for their new insurgency.

It is just this response we seek to counter. For our achievements to date are substantial and, more important, even the symbolic gains were totally unexpected by those who now write them off. Intelligence in political life depends at least

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in part on one's ability to detach himself from the hurly-burly of activity—to ask whether anticipations square with events. It seems to us undeniable that radical liberals have called the shots more accurately than anyone else since the fight against the Vietnam War began in the spring of 1965.

The forces of the liberal Left have a rich opportunity to capitalize on their achievements, to translate symbolic victories into future gains. But they also face the danger of calamitous reversals if they lose nerve. We must support the long-range efforts to build new constituencies among the blacks, the poor, the unorganized, the students, and many others. But we must also relentlessly employ our new leverage within the Democratic party, especially at local and state levels, to solidify what we have gained.

If we build the new coalition well, national offices and policies will yield sooner or later. And meanwhile we can hedge those who have power by means of a system of political constraints that they can ignore only at peril to their own political ambitions and to the stability of the nation.

Remember. There is in this society, as in the world, a balance of terror; a precarious standoff between two kinds of men of violence: those who threaten unbridled use of illegal violence, and those who threaten unbridled use of official violence. They champ at the bit. The moderate middle cowers—but *grows;* disagreeing amongst themselves only when to use the carrot (concessions to the former) and when to use the stick (acquiescence in the latter).

Our ability to create a stable social order based on justice depends on making the most of the opportunities inherent in the present situation and on the skill with which radical liberals practice a politics of radical pressure.

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Irving Howe

Politics In France: Phantom and Charade

POLITICS in France has always been conducted as a branch of the drama: that was one reason Marx found it so rich a subject for historical narrative. Writing about the French Revolution, he remarked upon the regularity with which the revolutionists, to give themselves an aura of historic legitimacy, employed the imagery of the Roman Republic. If he were alive today and writing about the French events of this past spring, he might be remarking that, as new possibilities emerged under old masks and classes seemed to be reenacting discarded roles in order to break past the phantoms of the past, the French rebels employed the imagery of Marxism.

But just as the Jacobins were not Romans, so the recent French rebels, whatever they may have been, were not able to act out the drama of Marxism. They wished to but could not. For the essence of these recent, astonishing events is that nothing was what it appeared to be.

Let us be honest. Was there not, this past spring, a certain thrill in the surmise that perhaps, after all, the Marxist categories might yet be vindicated—and vindicated in the streets of Paris? And if vindicated, where better than in Paris? And if we, in distant America, felt this, must not our political friends in France have felt it all the more?

Students raising red and black flags . . . workers spontaneously engaging in a mass general strike, occupying factories and rejecting settlements made "for them" by Communist and reformist trade union leaders . . . old slogans breathing new life: workers' power, perhaps even All Power to the Soviets (not yet present, but still . . .) And then the Stalinist and reformist leaders betray the revolution once more, fail to take advantage of a strike that leaves the regime helpless . . . Who could, or should, resist this view of things?

We.

Not because of our desires, which heaven knows were entirely directed toward the fulfillment of the great Marxist myth, but because of

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our comprehension, which should soon have made clear to us that while the French situation *seemed* to be following the classic Marxist pattern of a revolutionary situation, it was in reality something else. It encompassed some elements of the traditional "revolutionary situation," but thereby was not the same.

II

THE STUDENTS electrified the country. They proved themselves to be a power. They raised issues legitimate in their own right (the university, etc.) and relevant to the nation as a whole (extension of democracy, etc.). All of which is true and, to some extent, encouraging.

But there were grave drawbacks. Insofar as the student leaders identified themselves with one or another traditional politics—Stalinism, Trotskyism, Maoism, anarchism—they deluded themselves. By their courage they could set off a spark that might ignite working-class action; but whatever their sacrifice, they could not act out, in behalf of the working class, the revolutionary role which Marxism had assigned to it. The students could set the society on its ear, but could not put it on its feet.

If France showed the possibilities, it showed still more the limitations of student power. It is a power significant only when the major social classes or forces are quiescent. It is a power that makes itself felt mainly in the absence of other powers. Once the bourgeois government began to prepare for action against the students, once the workers began to occupy the factories and thereby threaten the stability of the regime, the students were all but brushed aside. Mostly, the workers reacted to them impatiently, even contemptuously, treating them like middle-class kids who talked a great revolution but didn't know much about the problem of bringing home a paycheck. You can say this represents an unfortunate empiricism on the part of the workers, but if you say it, then you had better add that it also embodies some hard-headed experience.

The regime was able to cordon off the students, isolating their ultra-Left elements at the Sorbonne, and no doubt prepare—together with university reforms—punitive measures for the fall. In a measure, then, traditional Marxism can be said to be vindicated: the workers showed themselves still one of the basic contending forces in the society, and the students, whether "revolutionary" or not, were thrust into a subordinate role at the crucial moment.

Insofar, however, as the students represented a new sort of politics, in which, for lack of anything better, they kept using the old Marxist vocabulary to grope toward new ideas and aspirations, then, I think, they behaved both as marvellous and heroic catalysts of social change *and* as dangerous and provocative impediments to social change. Through the politics of the street, they were able to turn France around—for a few minutes. Until, that is, the other France—which, in their willfulness they had refused to acknowledge as remaining an enormous force—the France of the shopkeepers and petty bourgeois, turned against them. Revolutionists without revolutionary ideas, calculating on the virtues of their contempt for calculation, they not only lacked any tactical sense, they refused the very idea of tactical sense. And thereby they suffered. More, they unwittingly enabled de Gaulle to extricate both himself and bourgeois France from extreme danger.

The students talked up a revolutionary storm and (almost absent-mindedly) raised the specter of civil war, but were never in a position to follow through in reality what they had induced by rhetoric. They could throw the fear of Soviets into the hearts of the French bourgeoisie, no small achievement; but were never in a position to establish them. Like Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown in the U.S., but on a greatly magnified scale, they soon proved to be of value to the forces of repression—the very forces which only yesterday they had so brilliantly brought to social fright and paralysis. Heroic fools, foolish heroes: some of them. They pushed aside, as mere "Establishment" diversions, the tactical considerations of everyone from Lenin to the crustiest Social Democrat—and then these tactical considerations came to haunt them:

When is there really a revolutionary situation? Are the workers really prepared to go into the streets? Is this general strike really the kind foreseen in syndicalist theories?

III

THE WORKING CLASS came into action. A general strike, we all remember from our classes in Marxism, signifies a fundamental threat to the existing order: one side or the other must gain

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the power that is called into question. In the France of 1968 that was, however, both true and false. By its very nature, the general strike did call into question the power of the French state. It showed immediately the difference in social weight between students and workers, the difference between shutting down the Sorbonne and shutting down the economy of France. Yet, just as clearly, the French working class was not prepared for insurrection or civil war. Some of its veterans may have fallen back with pleasure on the vocabulary of the barricades, but it is notable that nowhere did the French workers put up any barricades. That form of action, or acting-out, was left to the students.

What did the workers want? First, a portion of the fruits of French prosperity, precisely the portion the Gaullist regime had, in its fatuous notions of "grandeur," stolen from the workers. Or, in other language, they wanted a large share of the product of the welfare state. Yet through the pressures of the still-urgent old politics and the not-yet-clear new politics, which is to say, because of its own Marxist tradition and the example of what had just happened in Paris, the workers went on a spontaneous general strike. They saw, in the turmoil created by student demonstrations, an opportunity for themselves. But this general strike, for all that it challenged power, was not a strategy for taking power.

Wasn't there more to it? Did not workers in some factories release slogans of revolutionary conquest? Yes, that is true. From all we can gather, there is a new stratum of younger workers, not yet very numerous and largely unmarred by the Left parties, which aspires toward a greater share not merely in economic rewards but also in social power. It wants to play a role in factory management and planning. And partly, it expressed these inchoate desires through the slogans of the past: which is entirely to be expected and, indeed, the way political life usually develops. Besides, these slogans can still alarm men in power, and the workers were clearly in a mood to scare the hell out of men in power.

But wasn't there still more involved in the action of the workers? Probably. They were willing to see the general strike politicized to the extent that it would force the Pompidou government to resign and de Gaulle, with a trivial shift of votes in the Chamber, to appoint Mendès-France as Premier, probably in preparation for a new election. But here, evidently, the Communists stuck their feet out. They were not quite so eager for Mendès-France to take office; they retained kindly feelings for de Gaulle's foreign policy; they were put off, even frightened by the students.

IV

SINCE the spring events it has become fashionable in some "Left" circles to say that the CP betrayed the French revolution.* But before acquiescing in this notion, let us try to think clearly.

The very existence of the CP as a party to which the bulk of the French working class gives its allegiance is a political disaster. The CP immobilizes the workers for either traditional revolutionary or traditional reformist activity, since the CP is unable to realize either perspective.

Yet when people say the French CP "betrayed the revolution," they usually mean something else, something that raises phantoms of insurrection and charades of civil war. Precisely at this point we ought to be especially careful.

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*One also hears these days that the French CP has become "an Establishment party." This is slipshod thinking. The term "Establishment" is too vague for serious discussion: it signifies no more than an all-purpose put-down. But insofar as it is meant to point to the ruling classes or groups in a country like France, then it must be said that the CP is not an "Establishment" party. It is a party that collaborates with the "Establishment" on occasion, but is not part of the "Establishment." It is not in power.

What then is the CP? There is no shorthand designation. It is a totalitarian or authoritarian party; it derives its politics and authority mainly from a totalitarian state, the Soviet Union; it draws its vocabulary mainly from an appropriated Marxist tradition; and it gains its major support from the French working class. It is not a revolutionary party in the traditional Leninist sense, or perhaps in any other sense, for it does not aspire to power through insurrection. It is not a Social Democratic party in the usual sense, since its tradition, external connections, and vocabulary keep it from accepting the limitations of reformism. It is approaching a state of affairs where in many respects it resembles, or is *like*, an old-fashioned reformist party, but before it can become one it will have to undergo major convulsions.

Now all this may be less lively than screaming "Establishment," but it has the advantage, I think, of a somewhat more precise description.

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Did the CP betray the French workers by failing to opt for insurrection, by its decision not to transform the general strike into an open violent battle for power? There was a moment when de Gaulle was preparing to use the army, the workers remained locked in the factories, the students were racing through the streets. If the major parties of the French Left had now decided to force a showdown, there might well have been the beginnings of civil war.

V

ONLY ABSOLUTE CHILDREN would simply declare without qualification that the path of insurrection should have been taken. Suppose, after all, that the CP—or any other party—made a hard-headed calculation which led to these conclusions:

a) *the working class was not physically and politically prepared for battle;*
b) *the students talked about revolution but were not a serious force to be counted on;*
c) *the Gaullist regime had sufficient power at its disposal (the army, the police) to suppress an uprising;*
d) *there was a large segment of the population, perhaps even a majority, that would rally to the support of the regime in case of a showdown.*

Who is prepared to say that such a calculation was wrong? Leaving aside the problem of democratic norms for a moment, and leaving further aside the problem of a revolution in which, if it occurred at all, the CP would almost surely emerge as the dominant force, these are considerations that serious political people, as distinct from mini-Chés, ought to reflect upon.

There remains the trickiest problem of all. It has been argued by friends in Europe whose judgment I respect that if the workers had been urged by the Left parties to remain in the factories, de Gaulle would have had to accede. He could not have driven 11 million workers back to work; he would have had no choice but to turn to Mendès-France. *Perhaps!* But remember that the capacity of workers with families to remain on strike is much more limited than that of students receiving checks from their middle-class parents to keep occupying the Sorbonne. And remember, too, that de Gaulle did not need to remove every last worker from the factories; he could have tried to destroy the general strike by assaulting some of its main centers, such as the Renault factories; and then a confrontation might have occurred that would have created a show-down of force.

It is true that the CP was a major factor in preventing this kind of showdown. Whether it could indeed have succeeded no one with good sense is going to say from a distance. But what can be said is that such an outcome would not, in any traditional sense, have been an old-style "revolution" at all. At most, it would have been a way of forcing new elections—that is, of forcing de Gaulle to abandon his authoritarian methods—*on terms advantageous to the Left.*

At this point, for precisely opposite reasons, both the CP and the students are open to sharp criticism. The CP stalled and, according to some reports, engaged in surreptitious negotiations with Pompidou; it was caught up in a wave of rebellion, but it wanted to keep that wave within manageable limits. The students had helped frighten the French bourgeoisie with the specter of revolution, they had evoked the enormous counter-response of the 350,000 Gaullist demonstrators in Paris, but they had no idea whatever as to what followed upon the turmoil they had set into motion. Socerers' apprentices, they were in danger of being destroyed by their own work. They helped create the Gaullist victory.

The crisis of France is not over. Precisely to the extent that the politics of the traditional Left fails, either in its Communist or Social Democratic variants, there will be new quasi-anarchic outbursts employing a wild rhetoric and bringing together concrete aspirations for a greater share of economic and social goods with vague aspirations for a greater share of political power. As Jean Bloch-Michel remarks in his dispatch from Paris (p. 384), this has some positive potentialities. The welfare state, in France as in the U.S., is not at all the static crystallization of apathy which the theories of Marcuse make it out to be; on the contrary, it carries within itself unavoidable social conflicts. But as Bloch-Michel also indicates, the possibility of further outbursts has threatening elements—it gives rise to adventurism by middle-class students whose ultimatistic notions make them ultimately irresponsible, and thereby enables the Right to assault not only the students but the whole range of radical movements.

All this does not leave one with feelings of assurance. For the democratic Left of France,

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bruised by a severe defeat in the elections, the immediate prospect is difficult. Nor will it do to rant about "the bankruptcy of the Left, of all the parties," etc. What the French are discovering, in their own special context, are those problems of politics in advanced capitalist society which we have all been experiencing. And anyone who says he has quick and ready answers to those problems is a charlatan or a fool, maybe both.

J. Kirk Sale

Biafra—Hunger, Politics, Inhumanity

BY THE END of this summer, whether or not the relief missions are successful, the breakaway nation of Biafra and fully a third of its 15 million citizens may both be dead. The political tragedy of this prolonged and agonizing death is overshadowed only by the human.

Biafra, the former eastern region of an obviously unworkable and disintegrating Federation of Nigeria, proclaimed its independence a little over a year ago, on May 30, 1967. Since then it has been in an increasingly vicious and hopeless battle with Federal forces, and there is no doubt now that the end for the 11 million Ibos and their satellite tribes is at hand. The only real question is how many of these people will be slaughtered by triumphant Federal troops and how many will curl up and die of starvation or disease. Either way, with each disemboweled soldier, each writhing child, there dies a nation and a hope.

NO ONE knows how many have died so far on the military front alone, but the recent press estimate of 150,000 from both sides seems reasonable. We know that the fighting has been ugly and brutal, the Federals trained and equipped for modern war, the Biafrans ill-supplied but committed to survival or death.

• In Asaba in April, 700 Biafran civilians were lined up along the main street, the men facing their wives and children, and all of them were shot by Federal soldiers. Nigerian authorities, acknowledging the slaughter, called it "a mistake."

• A Federal aide from Biafra reported to the abortive Kampala peace talks in June: "In Ikot Epenyong, three miles from my home town, the Ibo soldiers rang the church bell one Sunday afternoon and forced everybody in the village at gun point to assemble in the church building. . . . When all were assembled, the Ibo soldiers surrounded the church, set it on fire, burning down the villagers, and shot those who tried to escape. It is estimated that more than 300 men, women and children were massacred."

• In Awgu in January, Egyptian-piloted Russian planes dropped incendiary bombs on an apparently nonmilitary village, killing 90 civilians and hospitalizing 400 more for whom there was no available medicine. The International Red Cross protested the wanton slaughter.

• In Port Harcourt in late May, according to a Federal Ijaw spokesman, some 40 of his tribesmen were indiscriminately murdered by Biafran soldiers fleeing town before Federal troops, and 60 per cent of the civilian homes were sacked. The next day several hundred Biafran soldiers, hospitalized in the city and unable to evacuate, were massacred in their cots by the incoming Federal soldiers.

The last two months have seen growing viciousness, as Federal troops, knowing they have the Biafrans surrounded, have pressed their advance. There is no reason whatsoever to expect the Federal troops, the majority of whom are Northerners, to show the slightest mercy toward the surviving Ibos. Some 50,000 Ibos died at the hands of rampaging Northerners in the 1966 massacres that initiated the whole process of secession.

THE LAST two months have also seen growing starvation, and it is this that has finally gripped the conscience of the world and turned international attention to this *other* dirty little war. The International Red Cross estimated in July that 13,000 Biafrans were dying every day, and perhaps 2 million would be dead by mid-September. Dr. Herman Middelkoop, of the World Council of Churches, says flatly: "I have no doubt that 6 million people will die in the next six month, without a cease-fire and massive help."

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• In Umuchu in July, Father Sean Guina reported that he saw "four little children lying on a bed. One was dead and I couldn't tell the difference. I saw a child sucking her mother's breast, and the mother was dead."

• In Umuawa-Ude, a medical team distributed ears of corn that were soon exhausted; children who had received nothing scrambled on the ground picking up single kernels in the dust. One emaciated girl licked powdered milk off the smock of her younger sister where it had spilled.

• In Ikot-Ekpene, reported John Birch of the Save the Children Foundation, Biafrans in prison last month when the Federals marched in were "too weak to run—some too weak even to speak. An occasional hoarse croak came from the parched lips of the babies, sucking on the wizened, dry breasts of their mothers. Vultures moved from wall to wall in great numbers, ready to descend."

A NUMBER of world agencies—Oxfam, the International Red Cross, Caritas (a Catholic organization), governments including the U.S. and Britain—have tried to feed supplies into the Biafran-held areas. But the whole relief question has become sticky, dripping with local and international politics.

As of late July food supplies have come in only by air—mercifully fast but pathetically inadequate—since the Biafrans regard any goods passing overland through Federal-held territory as probably poisoned and certainly compromising their sovereignty. The Federals are unwilling to allow a full-scale airlift without minute inspection since they claim to be afraid of mortars mixed with the milk. But even when the immediate problem of relief transportation is settled, as it no doubt will be eventually, starvation will continue as long as the war continues and as long as food distribution has to be carried on under chaotic conditions.

The international cooperation in the supply of food to Biafra is the first instance of outside concern for the cruel Nigerian war and the first time that the Biafran cause has received anything near the attention it deserves. The Biafrans can reflect wryly on the irony that it is only after they are near defeat that the world should know of their battle.

The Biafrans originally believed their revolution would be treated sympathetically, especially by what their schoolbooks had told them was a revolutionary United States. After all, the Nigerian Federation had undergone two disintegratory coups, and all its history of corruption, chaos, and collapse suggested that secession was only rational. The Ibos, the most adaptable and educated tribe in the country and the dominant tribe in the East, were historically united, egalitarian, progressive, and efficient—all qualities necessary to a modern nation that Nigeria itself lacked. Political organization was solid, oil provided a new economic base, and socially the people were homogenous—so why not nationhood?

But the world either scorned or ignored the Biafrans. They were, after all, black and far away; Vietnam was a more vivid problem for Americans, who had decided anyway that foreign intervention might have its sorry side; the West had deceived itself with the fiction of a democratic, unified, happy Nigeria that it couldn't quite give up; it was hard for financial interests to decide who was going to win and thus control the oil, so noninterference seemed most expeditious; and it was a decidedly difficult war to report on, which is especially unfortunate in this modern world where an event scarcely exists until it receives saturation press coverage.

IS THERE a way out? At this point, probably not. The Federals haven't much interest in a political solution with a population they can either slaughter or starve to submission; the Biafrans, truly fearing genocide, have pledged to fight to the last man unless they get such a solution. Foreign governments are heavily committed by now—notably Britain, unable to relinquish its colonial role when it comes to the crunch, and Russia, unable to resist trying to create one; they are little use as dispassionate negotiators or peace finders (unlike Russia at Kashmir or America over West Irian). The O.A.U. has diddled and dawdled, most African states unable to figure whether their interests lie in preserving the fiction of colonially-drawn boundaries or in restructuring the continent along truly ethnic/national lines.

The hope for international intervention in the legitimate if difficult cause of Biafra is forlorn and futile. Sadly, another chance for Africa

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really to modernize, to throw off colonialism, for its units to become rational and strong instead of arbitrary and manipulable, has faded—and the massacred Biafran soldiers and the starving Ibo children are the sorry testament to that hope.

Gordon Haskell

The Spock Conviction: What Comes Next?

A FEDERAL district court in Boston has found Dr. Benjamin Spock and three of his codefendants guilty of conspiring to "hinder and interfere . . . with the administration" of the Selective Service Act, and to "counsel, aid and abet . . . the registrants to unlawfully . . . refuse and evade service in the armed forces . . ." They have been sentenced to two years in prison and fined from $5,000 to $10,000 each.

What had been billed as one of the great free-speech cases of our era went off only as a limited drama. Once the court had ruled it would take no evidence on the legality or constitutionality of the war in Vietnam, or on the draft as a means of prosecuting that war, the issues became relatively narrow:

Had the defendants confined themselves to advocating their views on the war and the draft, and to advising young people of all the rights and procedures available to them under the law —or had they conspired to urge young people to violate the law in a context in which their urging or "counseling" created a clear and present danger to the administration of the law?

The decision will be appealed. One ground will be that in denying the defendants an opportunity to prove the illegality or unconstitutionality of the war and/or draft, the court had denied them a basic element in their defense. An analogy comes to mind: if the police are enforcing an illegal ordinance banning a public assembly, or are interpreting a valid regulatory ordinance in a clearly discriminatory (and hence illegal) manner; and if the demonstrators have exhausted all legal remedies in an effort to have these restrictions set aside, people who demonstrate and get arrested and convicted in a local court will, almost certainly, have their convictions reversed on appeal. It is hardly likely, under such circumstances, that the organizers of the demonstration would be found guilty of an illegal conspiracy because they urged their followers to do things which were later found to have been legal. Thus, if the draft is illegal, violating it, or successfully inciting others to violate it, is hardly a crime.

We can only guess how likely it is that a majority of the Supreme Court will be willing to review the case on such broad political grounds or, having agreed to review it, will remand it for a new trial at which the defendants will be allowed to prove their charges against the war and the draft. The chances seem very poor. Only two members of the Court have indicated any inclination to lock horns with Congress and the Administration on a matter so fraught with political passion as the war in Vietnam.

The other grounds which will, no doubt, be pressed in the appeal are that the "conspiracy doctrine" was much too broadly applied; and that what the defendants did here was confined to speech — speech protected by the First Amendment.

The vice that attends so many conspiracy indictments (especially in the political field) is not the one lambasted in most comments on this case. It has been amply demonstrated that these defendants had not "conspired" in any ordinary sense of the word. But the danger in the conspiracy count is that people can be found guilty of conspiracy to violate a law *even if there is no evidence that they succeeded in violating it!* All the government needs prove is that they took some steps *in furtherance* of a conspiracy.

THUS, while the advocacy of revolution, like the advocacy of vivisection, is protected, the law has permitted convictions for conspiracies to advocate revolution. In this case, while Dr. Spock could safely denounce the draft law, or expound the virtue of civil disobedience to it, the introduction of the "conspiracy" charge makes the same conduct far more easily punishable. For all the government really sought to prove was not that these defendants had been successful in interfering with the draft, but that

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they had taken steps in concert which were calculated to do so.

It was in respect to the conspiracy and free-speech charges that the trial in Boston took an unexpected turn. Prior to their indictment, it had seemed to some that at least the most prominent among the defendants had tried to do everything they could to persuade young people to defy and violate the draft law. Michael Ferber's sermon delivered in October in the Arlington Street Church in Boston (quoted in the indictment) used the following words:

> But let us be certain that we have thought through the consequences of our actions in the outside world, and that these consequences are what we want to bring about. Let us make sure we are ready to work hard and long with each other in the months to come, working to make it difficult and politically dangerous for the government to prosecute us, working to help anyone and everyone to find ways of avoiding the draft, to help disrupt the workings of the draft and the armed forces until the war is over. Let us make sure we can let others depend on us."

At their trial, however, the defendants all claimed that they had *not* sought to persuade draftees to defy the law, let alone disrupt the workings of the armed forces. They insisted that they had merely expressed their own opinions, and had urged those who had already decided to defy the law to act only upon a full understanding of the consequences of such actions. The government sought to make heavy capital out of the pre-indictment insistence by some of the defendants that they were in fact violating the draft law and should be considered in precisely the same category, legally, as draftees who refused to be inducted.

At trial, the defendants sought to prove that this had been neither the intent nor consequence of their actions. They had urged no one to violate the law; and no one had violated the law pursuant to their urging. Thus they claimed that what they had done was merely to express opinions by word and symbolic action, not to create any clear and present danger that the draft or the army would be disrupted or avoided by persons acting in response to their urgings.

The jury found against them. It is possible that the higher courts will find for them on the ground that what they had actually done (make speeches, sign statements, and transport some discarded draft cards to the Department of Justice) was clearly protected by the First Amendment. Or the courts could find that their acts were so ineffectually related to their declared intentions that the government had failed to sustain the very light burden of proof required in a conspiracy case—namely that *some* act must have been performed to effectuate the alleged aims of the conspiracy. Should they find for the defendants on the latter ground, it would appear that claims by individuals that they are violating and intend to violate the law, however vociferously broadcast, are insufficient grounds on which to base a criminal prosecution.

Should the higher courts sustain the convictions, this alone would not necessarily open the door to wholesale prosecutions of persons urging the illegality of the war or the draft, or a different course for U.S. foreign policy. It might, however, have a further chilling effect on such acts as draft-card burning, which had been popular before the Court refused to sustain them as symbolic speech.

The rather narrow legalistic stance assumed by the defense in the Spock trial changed it a good deal from what many had been led to expect, either by their own wishes or by the colorful language employed by some of the defendants before their indictment. Yet, should they gain a reversal on the narrow grounds that what they said and did was, indeed, within the ambit of the First Amendment's protection of free speech, all opponents of this dirty war will feel free to step up political and ideological attacks on it.

The article by Allen Graubard, "One-Dimensional Pessimism: A Critique of Herbert Marcuse," which appeared in our May–June 1968 issue, should have carried the notation that an earlier version of it had been printed in Mosaic, *the journal of the Harvard Hillel Society. We regret this oversight.*

THE EDITORS

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Jean Bloch-Michel

A Major Defeat for the French Left

A Letter from Paris

PIERRE MENDÈS-FRANCE was beaten at Grenoble by the former Gaullist minister Jean-Marcel Jeanneney.

Out of an electorate of about 40,000, Jeanneney's plurality was 130. In beginning with such an example, I do not wish to pretend that all the Gaullist gains were produced by such feeble margins. But the defeat of Mendès-France underlines the long-known fact of the French system's particular sensitivity to minor shifts in the electorate. The most important fact that was brought out, last June 23 and June 30, was not so much that a certain percentage of votes from the Center, the Left, and even in certain circumstances from the far Left moved toward Gaullism, but that this movement took place everywhere in the same proportions. It was this phenomenon that gave the Gaullists a majority in parliament proportionally much greater than that which they have in the country.

But they do have a majority in the country. And it is said that from now on they will have it almost everywhere in France. The old citadels of the Left and Center—the southeast and the southwest—have given way. Departments like Vaucluse, which had never sent anyone to the Chamber except Radicals, Socialists, and Communists, are represented there today by Gaullists. The once-strong Socialist positions in the mining country—in the Departments of the North—also have been largely broken up. On the electoral level the Left has not known so bitter a defeat since the "Blue Horizon" Chamber of 1919.

A reaction against the insurrection of May and June? No doubt. France was afraid, and the Right did everything to make use of that fear. But it is not enough to limit analysis to this assertion. One must look further.

One of the first, and seemingly most surprising, characteristics of these elections is that the Gaullists won in the regions where the strike was particularly severe. Hence the winners argue that the workers voted Gaullist because they had been made to strike against their will. But that is not at all certain. It must not be forgotten that the female vote is in the majority in France—13 million women voters as against 11 million men. And it is highly probable that, where the strike was severe, women, who had up to then voted like their husbands, now voted in some sense against them. It was not the strikers who disavowed the strikes, but probably their wives.

But that does not explain everything. Communist losses were serious. And, in the run-off elections, it often happened that the single Left candidate, whether he belonged to the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left or to the Communist party, did not get all the votes that had been given, the first time round, to the several candidates of the Left. This fact can only be explained by one of the characteristics of the French Communist electorate, a characteristic, in some sense psychological, which everyone had suspected and which has now become clear: the Communist electorate is not Communist. When they vote for CP candidates, they vote "against the bosses," the regime, the Right. But this time they were persuaded that their votes were needed to *prevent* the Communists from coming to power. And since they never had any intention of putting them in power, the Communist voters simply passed over to the Right. They voted Gaullist as much when the Left candidate was a full-fledged Communist as when he was a Federation candidate who was merely allied with the Communists.

But that was only possible because of the bankruptcy of the Left. In fact, aside from its

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opposition to the "regime of personal power," the Left no longer originates anything in France, exactly as it no longer originates anything in Germany and England. The European Left, in its traditional parliamentary form, is on the way to disappearing.

The Communist party has changed neither its program, its vocabulary, nor its personnel for 20 years. It has long since abandoned its internationalism: in one of his campaign speeches, M. Waldek Rochet reminded his listeners that the Communist party was strongly attached to the French flag. Chauvinism for chauvinism, why choose the Communist one? After all, one general, or a group of generals and colonels, represents the flag better than a party of the Left. The Communist party is on the side of order and legality, it does not wish to discuss structural reforms— and keeps putting off, to a greater and greater distance, the day when it will take power. If it is a question of conservatism, that of the true conservatives is much, much better. Besides, I know some people who have tranquilly told me that they voted Gaullist, but that they would not have hesitated to vote Communist if it had been necessary to do so to defeat a candidate of the non-Communist Left. These voters are being perfectly consistent. In one case as in the other, they would have been voting for the established order.

As for the non-Communist Left, it seems that the institution of the welfare state has somehow paralyzed them. To a society that offers most people not only access to material goods, but also greater and greater security and increasing possibilities of *embourgeoisement,* the Left looks like a spoiled child complaining because he has nothing more to ask for. Because, at bottom, the Left is asking itself if there is still anything more to ask for, it clings to the most backward sectors of the society and the least favored categories of workers. But it seems incapable of presenting any analysis of the whole society, or of problems of the future.

In sum, while the Left paid for its incapacity in the elections, it had given proof of it in the course of the days of riot. The student revolt, the violent strikes, the demands for "student power" and "worker power" had taken the Left as much by surprise as the Right. And if the Right was present at the riots, in the forces of order who wielded the bludgeons and the tear-gas bombs, the classic Left, that of the parties and the parliament, was completely absent. I am not saying that their presence on the side of the insurgents would have bettered their electoral chances. But it is not impossible that one of the causes of the riots might be that they expressed a will for changes of a kind that no party of the Left tried to conceive of.

There is nothing unjust about the fact that in this situation the Left lost. Was the Right surprised as well? But the Right has no need of imagination. One asks of the Right, on the contrary, that it have none. It represents power, force, the state, order. And it is enough that it is what it is. On the other hand, a Left without imagination, remaining attached to political formulas which date from the last century, incapable of suspecting that demands can change not only their form but their content—that Left is doomed. So much so that the rightward trend in France, now evident for more than 10 years, has arisen out of social causes (the increased income and *embourgeoisement* of a larger and larger part of the population) and purely political ones (the resignation of the Left before new problems for which they not only had no solutions but which they were often incapable even of formulating).

It is not easy to predict what the Gaullists will do with this parliamentary majority, because one does not yet know what resistance they will run up against. In the aftermath of the days of May, the government will have to try to win over to its side a part of the revolutionary spirit. But they cannot win it over without taking away its revolutionary character. That means that there will be reforms at the university, but there is no way of knowing what form or what dimensions those reforms will have. It is hardly likely that the government will accept open discussions with the students, and it is possible that the organizations which more or less represent the students will refuse such discussions, if they are offered to them. The reopening of the universities will be difficult.

As for the great outburst of democratic demands which call for new forms often at odds with those of parliamentary democracy, Gaullist plans for "participation" try to respond to them. But, here also, the government will run up against a double obstacle. The first is its own

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following, which did not vote for reform but on the contrary for order and things as they are. It is not even necessary to discuss the role that small businessmen can play, hostile as they clearly are to serious change. But the second obstacle will be still more serious: it is that Gaullism only envisions reforms that are bestowed from above, not the sort arrived at by free discussion. If things are done this way, whatever reforms are made will never inspire confidence in those with whom they ought to have been discussed. Besides, the reformers are themselves divided. Neither the Communist party nor the CGT are in favor of structural reforms conceived and effected within a system that remains capitalist.

On the other hand, it seems certain that from now on, Gaullism will have neither the same appearance nor the same possibilities it formerly had. This is true as much in domestic politics, where it will have to tackle a continuously explosive situation, as in foreign policy, where it can no longer play its former role. Greater unemployment, a shaky economic and financial situation, students in constant turmoil will oblige the Gaullists to choose between reform and repression, or at least—and most probably—to steer between the one and the other. The delays in the achievement of *"la force de frappe,"* the impossibility of continuing to lead the underdeveloped countries of the old empire by means of a politics of assistance, because it costs too much, and finally, a loss of prestige owing to the simple fact that Gaullism has been so violently contested, will inevitably modify both its role and its image in France.

To come back to what, for many, seems most serious in the present situation: it is clear that the risks of a progressive deterioration in the political situation are very great, if the French Left does not make an enormous effort at reassessment and rejuvenation. During the riots, Cohn-Bendit said that politics are made in the streets. That is correct—if and when no one can make politics elsewhere. From now on, the French Left must formulate in a new way the problems which society poses and which the revolution of May 1968 had the merit of boldly exposing. If it succeeds in nothing else, the new Left which has just revealed itself will continue to "make politics in the streets." And the old Right will respond to it in ways that are not difficult to imagine.

Translated by BEATRICE HOFSTADTER

Insulted But Not Injured!

Editor:

Your translator (page 291, July–August DISSENT) makes it appear as if Daniel Cohn-Bendit "injured" a cabinet minister last December by some kind of bodily assault. (Pushing him into the dry swimming pool referred to?)

Heavens, no! Cohn-Bendit, whatever his politics, is too nice a chap to attack anyone violently. The meaning, of course, is that he *insulted* the minister (he probably deserved it, too).

Stanley Plastrik

Leonard Charbrowe

Letter from Paris

Stirrings & Fears Among Czech Writers

PRAGUE, July 15, 1968, seems different from before. While there are more shops and restaurants, more scaffoldings on the old houses in need of restoration, and more cars in the streets, these changes say little. In fact, their insignificance is what has given the major thrust to the developments of the last half year. No, the difference is in mood. There is a lightness, even gaiety in the air. Hopes are up, everything is tinged with promise.

One already intuits this at the border points. Perhaps it is in the customs officials who are giving so casual a salute. Or in an art historian, at the complex of Hradcany Castle, from where the Stalinists ruled so arbitrarily for two decades, talking with as much pleasure about the politics of the present as about the art of the Baroque. Or in a young girl singer at the Reduta jazz club downtown, belting out in a low strong voice "There'll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight," "Nobody Knows You When You're Down and Out," and "I Want That Old Time Religion." Perhaps one saw and heard similar things a year or two ago, yet not with the same

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élan. Yet perhaps the lift is only in the visitor's mind. Is one just imagining it all?

The intelligentsia is still wary, even pessimistic. There is little confidence that fundamental changes will be made from the top, and its own power (a thin, though inflammatory, layer in the middle) is limited. At the same time the pessimism is balanced by hope. For the economic situation may force the "Party liberals" under Alexander Dubcek to go further than they really want to. The economic situation is the key.

Behind the liberalization process, which so far comprises the lifting of travel restrictions and of censorship in all matters except military security, has been the material stagnation of the last 20 years. The New Economic Model or NEM, calling for a full-scale reform that would make the system dynamic by making it competitive, has been the crucial issue. On every level of the Party the Stalinist faction, trying to keep its power and privileges, has been resisting a full-scale reform, and this myopic resistance has pushed the liberal faction into an alliance with those in and out of the Party who want real political and cultural freedom. From the start the "Party liberals" have been pragmatists. For them the restoration of civil rights has been a means to restoring the economy, not the fulfillment of a political ideal. The lifting of travel restrictions was primarily aimed at making more commercial contacts with the West, contacts that would free the economy of its subjection to Russia. And the lifting of the censorship was primarily aimed at exposing the failures, if not the crimes, of the Stalinists, in order to enlist popular support in the intraparty struggle.

That a full implementation of the NEM will now entail a genuine political reform is doubtful. Since Novotny's ouster the liberalization process has remained fluid enough for further reforms; but it will probably be solidified and brought to at least a momentary halt during the Special CP Congress in September.

At least such is the opinion of Vladimir Neff, one of Czechoslovakia's foremost novelists and a leading figure in the Writers' Union. Speaking over coffee at the Writers' Club on Narodni Street near the Moldau, this active man of letters, now in his sixties, expressed the fear that the new party leaders would succeed in damming up all nonparty opposition. He was pessimistic because "*democracy without opposition is nonsense . . . and there is no chance for an opposition party.*" Needless to say, the other "parties" in the government are only shadows of the CP and offer anything but opposition. On the other hand there is a small chance for elections to be reorganized so that some choice is given within the framework of the present system. Any choice at all, if only between personalities, would be better than nothing and might lay the basis for larger victories later.

The extent to which opposition is contained and institutionalized at the Party Congress depends on the extent to which the forces demanding it are mobilized. Dubcek, though a sincere nationalist and a shrewd politician, cannot be relied on to make an electoral reform himself. For one thing, the "liberal" faction in the Party is Communist first and democratic second. It will probably try to institute economic competition without political competition. For another, Russian military and financial pressures are still intimidating. Though Dubcek and his colleagues have largely resisted these pressures, there is a suspicion they welcome the leverage the Russians give them against the intelligentsia. Further, the liberals aren't that strong. The old guard is not only still strong in the Central Committee, it is even more so in the lower echelons. And many of those currently on the liberal side are mere opportunists waiting for the wind to change again. So where does the power lie for carrying the democratization forward?

Partly it is in the mass media. As Vladimir Neff puts it, the power lies in the Word. With five daily papers, a TV channel, and a radio station in Czechoslovakia, the end of censorship means one can read two papers in the same day without dying of boredom. High officials who for years abused the public with impunity have apologized, resigned, and even committed suicide in the face of exposure. But these officials have merely been replaced by others. Something more is needed. A dictatorship cannot be changed to a social democracy without the support and agitation of the workers. As always, the real revolutionary power is at the bottom.

THROUGH last winter and most of the spring the workers were noncommittal. The trade union leaders had long been Party functionaries of the Novotny stamp while the workers themselves

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seemed to care about bread alone. The intelligentsia assumed the proletariat to be indifferent, if not hostile, to both economic and political changes. But the two "workers' resolutions" protesting Novotny's dismissal from power turned out to be frauds drafted by CP officials. And more recently legitimate workers' resolutions supporting freedom of expression have been passed. The writers have been agreeably surprised, even elated. Vladimir Neff could say, "The workers are on our side of the barricades!"

In the same vein these legitimate resolutions are letters received from workers by *Literarni Listi,* the Writers' Union weekly. With gratitude Vladimir Neff took out one which had arrived just that morning, a handwritten letter filled with errors in spelling but also with anxiety that the democratization movement would be stopped short of its goals. Several hundred letters of like sentiment (as against almost none opposing the movement) have come in from workers. The writers' newspaper is too sophisticated for the average proletarian, but the idea of free expression has been getting through.

Yet the workers, especially in the coal fields where mines have been shut down over the last year, are also suspicious of the NEM. And while economic competion could be institutionalized without political competition, political competition could never be institutionalized without economic competition. Despite the average wage being only about 1500 korunas or $60 a month, many workers are afraid of economic competion after two decades of a collective economy. Moreover, a good number are moonlighters who already enjoy private enterprise on top of their security.

In any case, the workers have moved closer. But the farmers remain silent. Of all the economic groups in the country they are in the best position and most reluctant to risk anything. They already enjoy the cooperative form of enterprise that the NEM would extend through the rest of the economy. More important than the farmers, however, are the army and police. If Novotny failed to bring off an army coup under General Segna, the army cannot be relied on to crush an alliance of workers and intellectuals. Nor can the police, which is not backed by the army. Only—is there such an alliance of groups outside the Party ready to resist a suppression once the intraparty struggle is over?

This question is crucial. All Vladimir Neff could say was that the various nonparty groups, more of which were being formed all the time, exchanged opinions. They conferred with each other. And if the writers' newspaper were ever censored again, publication would cease altogether. There would be passive resistance.

Now that the danger of another Hungary has faded (thanks partly to the Kadar leadership in Budapest supporting the liberalization because it wants to implement an NEM of its own) the fear is of another Poland. Vladimir Neff tells the joke—"What has changed in Poland since Gomulka? Only Gomulka!" In Czechoslovakia there will at least be an economic reform.

So the most likely immediate result is something like another Yugoslavia, where economic competition exists among units of a statified economy, but without political choice or competition. Still, Czechoslovakia has a stronger democratic tradition than any other East European country, and the popular ferment that has swept through the country, as well as the sophisticated expositions in behalf of social democracy which have appeared in the journals, will surely make it more difficult for the CP leadership to reestablish an authoritarian stability.

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Murray Hausknecht

Sources of Student Rebellion

How Shall We Understand the Columbia Uprising?

THE TITLE of these notes conveys their tentative nature. To "understand" is not to explain, for explanation presupposes that we can assign casual weights to factors. But understanding—placing an event in the context of other events, past and present, and showing sensible linkages among them—is a prerequisite for explanation.

What needs to be understood about Columbia is the mobilization of the students. We may assume, at least for the sake of argument, that Mark Rudd and his SDS followers deliberately sought a "confrontation" with the University in order to "radicalize" the students by "disrupting" the University. This program was aided by the tactics of an inept administration; but while the behavior of the administration helped the SDS gain support among the students, it cannot by itself account for that support. We need to understand, first, the factors predisposing students to a positive response to the SDS group, and, second, the Columbia SDS as an extreme manifestation of a more widespread student state of mind.

Presupposing a distinctive "student consciousness" suggests a Marxist perspective as a starting point, and this has the immediate advantage of precluding a psychological definition of student activism as "adolescent rebellion." In very gross terms, college students are caught in a prolonged adolescence, if the latter is conceived of as a stage in which childhood has been left behind but adult roles have not yet been assumed. But if adolescence is thought of in terms of the *Sturm und Drang* associated with psychosexual development and resolution of problems of identity, then, as Kenneth Keniston points out,[1] both kinds of problems may well be on their way to resolution by the time students are in college. I therefore define the students as an emerging "stratum." Yet they are a peculiar "stratum" because they are barred from adult roles; they exist in a kind of social limbo. The term suggests a three-dimensional image of the social structure, within which students float with few and tenuous ties to major social institutions. The very language of the society calls attention to this apartness of the students; their parents speak of them as being "away at college."

We must assume that students are aware of their distinctive position. "Youth" as a social phenomenon and college students in particular are a continuing focus of attention; they are subjects of both academic monographs and TV shows. It is almost impossible for even the most cloddish student to avoid becoming aware that he belongs to a distinctive social group. This awareness is heightened by the high level of interaction among college students in contemporary America. There is, of course, the technology of mass communications that makes student activists almost instantly familiar with each others' activities. But more important is their mobility: not only are more students probably going to school outside their native regions, but the civil-rights movement and the peace movement have brought them together in a common enterprise. Thus the politics of the sixties has helped shape the students as a "stratum."

What is distinctive about contemporary

[1] In *Young Radicals*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968.

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student politics is related to the *relative isolation* of the students as a group—a fact that emerges clearly if we take the thirties as a baseline for comparison. During that period activists on campus were linked to radical politics in the society as a whole by way of the *organized* Left. By contrast, the contemporary student attracted to radical sentiments cannot find the same entrance to the political arena because radical politics has fragmented into a collection of "tendencies."

The disappearance of the organized Left can be traced to World War II; but all one need recall is the late forties and the era of the other McCarthy. During this period there was the vast disillusionment of those who had been caught up in the Stalinoid Left and their subsequent lapse into political apathy. But this is not the whole story. A rereading of the early issues of DISSENT, for example, shows that the anti-Stalinist Left tended to make a virtue out of the necessity of non-organizational existence, and this was allied to a vigorous questioning of the traditional premises of radical politics. For some, one result of the reexamination of radical theory was the notion of "the end of ideology." Another result can be seen again in DISSENT: a focusing of attention on mass culture and a preoccupation with "the quality of life." And during that period there was also a growing emphasis on the values of traditional liberal thought. Reports on the students activists of the sixties agree that they are the children of parents who are liberal to Left in their politics. On the surface it looks as if the students have inherited the views of their parents, but closer examination reveals this is only partially true. They acquired the "core values" (to use Keniston's term), but not the ideologies elaborating the values. The absence of radical organizational life would make the transmission of the ideologies to the young extremely difficult, and the commitment of the parents to these ideologies was itself severely shaken, either as a result of self-questioning or the political climate of the fifties. During the fifties, therefore, there was a break in the process of political socialization; that is, radical parents transmitted basic values that might motivate radical attitudes but did not pass on specific political beliefs and norms. Nor could the parents be used as models for behavior, for they mostly were inactive. (To the extent that some "talked revolution" and remained inactive, they served as "negative models" for their children.) The fragmentation of the Left also meant that those in college had no way of participating in radical politics, and so students had little opportunity for political development away from home. Thus both at home and on the campus there was an interruption of political experience and learning.

What were those "core values" the students learned? Keniston reports there was an absence in his interviews of "articulated interpretations of history and political life, and concrete visions of political objectives," but there was a "strong, if often largely implicit, belief in a set of moral principles: justice, decency, equality, responsibility, nonviolence, and fairness." Some of Richard Flacks's categorizations of "themes of protest" show the same values at play: romanticism; anti-authoritarianism; egalitarianism; moral purity; anti-dogmatism.[2] This divorce of values from "doctrinaire ideological interpretations of events" (Flacks) or from "concrete visions of political objectives" bears an important relation to what I have called the isolation of the students from major institutional involvements and to the political discontinuity of the fifties.

An insistence on moral purity, the hatred of "hypocrisy"—those admirable and exasperating qualities apparent in any encounter with college students—can only be maintained when there is a minimum of institutional involvements. To be entangled in in-

[2] "The Liberated Generation: An Exploration of the Roots of Student Protest," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIII (July 1967), 52-75.

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stitutions, whether as parent, worker, or member of a political organization, means that one must live with the ambiguities of social organization and human motives and self-deceptions. This is most apparent in political life where to pursue power and to use it effectively involves a "compromise" of moral standards. Power and virginity are mortal enemies. To the extent that young people are always relatively uninvolved with institutions, moral purity ("the idealism of youth") is one of their prime traits. In an earlier generation young radicals lost their purity rather quickly, because it was difficult to maintain it as a member of the organized Left. Later, during the fifties, they reacted to their political experience by emphasizing the values they had "lost" and that had motivated them originally.

THERE are ironies here. Some who maintained a radical identity during the political desert of the Eisenhower years gave much thought to the "human values" that were lost sight of in the organized radical life of the thirties. Others talked of "ideology" and traditional radical beliefs as if they were a plague from which we had been mercifully delivered. Is it stretching a point to suggest that the students' contempt for "ideology," their stress on the need for "human relationships," and the breaking of the barriers of "impersonality" have been influenced by the reflections of the adherents of the "old Left"? Is "participatory democracy" what their children see as the implicit political vision of these reflections?

Another irony, remarked upon at tedious length, is that the student radicals are of middle-class origin; a class and style of life they seemingly detest. Again, a contrast with the radicals of the thirties. For the latter, a college education was often a means to middle-class status. During the Depression, to be sure, the uncertainty of achieving this end helped attract many to radical politics. Still, education remained a passport to a different social world. Today the radical student enters college *from* that world; his education is not a path to a new world. Rather, the college is seen as part of a circular track starting and ending at a middle-class suburb. Superficially, it would seem that the rejection of middle-class status means a decline in what sociologists call "mobility orientation." In a sense this is true, because at least among the activists there is a noticeable lack of drive to "get ahead" in traditional American terms. But it may not be wholly true. Obviously, one is motivated to rise in the class system by pecuniary and status rewards. Yet a large number of working-class and lower-middle-class Americans are not highly motivated toward mobility, and they seem easily reconciled to their lack of it. This implies that "mobility orientation" may also entail something else: a desire or need for the sheer challenge and experience of new social worlds, quite apart from the other rewards of mobility. I am suggesting that the rejection of middle-class society and the adoption of a radical politics represents not so much an end to "mobility orientation" as a displacement from its traditional objectives. In any event, the rejection of middle-class status among many college students signals a change in the significance of a college education.

Yet their expectations in regard to education are quite in the American grain, for, if they do not see it as a means of mobility, they do define it instrumentally. In the past the American university has responded to the instrumental orientation by offering training in everything from the classics to viniculture. In their demand for "relevance" the students are being all-too-American: it is a demand that management of revolutions be added to the curriculum along with hotel management. Here again the activists differ from a previous generation of student radicals. The older radical ideologies taught the students (correctly) that the university could not set itself "against the mainstream of American life";

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one changed the world in spite of the university and by virtue of additional experiences gained off campus. Only when there are few opportunities to receive this off-campus education is there a tendency to shift the burden to the university.

It is a mistake, of course, to say that there have been *no* opportunities for political education outside the university. Both the civil-rights movement and the peace movement were such opportunities, but they only served to confirm the beliefs students brought to them. The strength of the movement that culminated in the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 was a moral appeal that relied almost wholly on the "core values." The movement not only brought students together from all parts of the country, but it also reactivated them politically and helped create the public definition of "the students" as a specific group in the political arena. The movement brought victory and defeat: victory because it produced the Civil Rights Acts, defeat because it became apparent that little had changed in the day-to-day life of the Negro. The defeat "proved" to the students that their beliefs about American society were correct.

The end of the movement corresponded to the escalation of the war. It was easy to carry over the moral attitudes of the civil rights movement, and the moral energies of that movement were channeled into the antiwar movement. However, the latter has not resulted in even the partial victory of the earlier movement. It is not really a total defeat, since the movement can take a good part of the credit for whatever changes in public policy and opinion that have occurred. Still, the protest has been a history of frustration, another clear "proof" to the students of the corrupt nature of the society. The experience of both movements has enhanced the students' sense of isolation and reinforced their belief in the essential rightness of their moral commitments. But there has been some change in their beliefs, and to understand the change it is necessary to distinguish between generations of student activists.

A militant SDS member at Columbia entered college in 1964 when the civil-rights movement hit its peak and was being succeeded by Vietnam as the focus of attention. Columbia seniors, then, missed the "early days" when black and white students worked together under the umbrella of SNCC or CORE. They have had little or no experience of organizing communities, of living with their own organizational structure, of dealing with the problems of "participatory democracy." As amorphous as the civil-rights movement was organizationally, the antiwar movement is even more so. In the earlier movement black and white youth could work together in community, but now Black Power has excluded the white students. The present generation of college students has had a more frustrating and limited political experience in terms of organization and range of contact outside the white middle class; in some ways it has been an experience similar to that of the sectarian organizations of the thirties. The point, once again, is that today's student activists are more isolated from the society than were the students of five or six years ago. While the student activists of the civil-rights movement could be committed to nonviolence because they saw its tactical advantages in the South, students today are more susceptible to the appeals of "resistance" and "direct action." These appeals are powerful, because they are psychologically congruent with the frustrations of the students who are also relatively insulated from countervailing ideas and experiences. Though not many belong to the kinds of movements that flourished in the thirties, the students have, as it were, created for themselves or been forced into a situation in which they suffer some of the consequences of the radical sect. It is a sectarian style and outlook without the experience of the sectarian organization.

The students see themselves as suffering political frustrations similar to those of the

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Negroes. The identification increases their receptivity to the rhetoric of Black Power and leads them to apply it to their own situation. The scene of action becomes the university, less because the students are concerned with the university as such than that there is simply no other place for the kind of action they wish. Put another way, the university for the students has almost the same significance as the ghetto for the black militants; both they and the students are isolated from the wider political arena. Yet the students want to escape their isolation, and they seize any opportunity to do so. The assassination of Martin Luther King was one such chance to forge a link with the Negro community. Unfortunately for them, at Columbia and elsewhere, they were again rejected by the black students.

The students' frustration bears an obvious relation to a shift in beliefs. The manifestoes of a Mark Rudd or Tom Hayden strike a responsive chord and help move them to more extreme positions; students now are psychologically prepared by their social situation for a more radical rhetoric and behavior. Yet it is a mistake to concentrate on the psychological elements alone; there are objective components in the situation that make the rhetoric of student power seem persuasive.

SOME aspects of the position of the students within the university are by this time well-known. The *in loco parentis* tradition of the American college results in a crucial restriction on the autonomy of the students; on campus the student is often more confined than if he were living in a "progressive" household. The sheer growth of the university has increased its impersonality; it is only a nominal "community." The impersonality of the college is reflected most acutely in the distance between students and faculty, and a major reason for the changed relationship is the decline of interest in teaching. Martin Duberman has put the matter succinctly: "Teaching is how a scholar makes a living. It is not an integral part of how he justifies his life or gets his kicks." At Columbia at least, the faculty wasn't actively concerned with the university as a community; they were alive and well, but many were not at Columbia in any meaningful sense.

While not particularly new, all these facts are highly salient for today's students. Many do come from "progressive" households and have high expectations that being "away at college" will give them more personal autonomy. Many also have high expectations of the college as an academic experience; they are intelligent and want to learn. The cry of "impersonality" is often a cry about their sense that the faculty cares little about teaching. The students exaggerate when they identify themselves with Negroes, but one can say of the students, as one says of the Negroes in the social structure, that they are *in* the university but not *of* the university. Or, to put it another way, students are promised opportunities which cannot be realized within the university as now structured.

It is easy for the activists to define the situation in current political terms: If the students are "really" Negroes, they must seek power within the community to rectify their conditions. This analysis makes sense to the other students, because, if one takes the notion of the college as a community seriously, there are no institutional channels through which the students can exert influence for change. Like the Southern Negroes they are outside the system, and their voices are heard only by way of the dean of students. The latter, however, often functions like the white man who has some contact with "Negro leaders" and passes on to his fellow whites "the feelings and sentiments of the Negro community."

This is an attractive analysis and makes some superficial sense, but the actuality is much more complex. The students mistake the nature of the college as a community. By definition a college cannot be a democratic

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system in which on matters such as curriculum, for example, one can apply notions like "one man, one vote." Formal education always involves a relationship between unequals in which those with greater learning define what is to be learned. In some parts of the American university this is still axiomatic, because there is relatively little question about knowledge and its relevance to given ends. In the natural sciences or engineering, for example, students are faced with a highly structured curriculum, yet it does not strike them as problematic because its logic is clear. The situation is different in the social sciences. Here choices of curriculum are ambiguous.

In the social sciences and humanities the tradition of teaching in the American university is nonauthoritarian. By contrast to the European model, in which the professor is defined as the sole repository of knowledge that he transmits without interruption to tiers upon tiers of students, the American classroom is often characterized by a give-and-take that blurs the inequality between professor and student. This also allows student interests and needs to feed back upon the curriculum. When there is a commitment to teaching on the part of the instructor and an open classroom situation, the instructor's lecture becomes "adjusted" or more closely "fitted" to the expressed interests of the students. So, for example, Max Weber's abstract discussions of authority become "relevant" through student probing, even if the instructor has other ideas of relevance. This kind of interaction makes it easier to see how the curriculum is working, and thus any modifications are significantly a result of student influence. By the same token, the situation permits influence to run the other way. A relatively easy give-and-take facilitates the communication of the teacher's values; it is easier for students to grasp what the intellectual enterprise is all about when they are in some sort of active relation with someone engaged in it.

Today, however, the university often means massive lecture halls and closed-circuit television. Sheer size makes it more difficult for students and faculty to connect in an intellectually meaningful fashion, and the loss of interest in teaching increases professional insensitivity to the students' needs. Consequently, there is still more disparity of status between faculty and students, which aggravates still more the generational conflict.

The conflict is also present within the faculty. Students are often in the most direct contact with young professors and teaching assistants who are of a different political generation than the senior faculty. Roughly, the older faculty was shaped by the politics of the thirties and their aftermaths. The younger the faculty member, the more his political experience is likely to be that of the sixties. In social science departments there is another, related difference. Older social scientists have a tendency to disengage their purely scholarly concerns from their political commitments. Younger professors are more apt to see themselves as part of a "dissenting academy" in which an individual's politics has an intimate relation to his scholarly work. The conflict, then, revolves about differences in both political and professional orientations. Student attitudes, in turn, tend to be reinforced by the attitudes of a part of the faculty.

These developments in the social sciences are of some relevance to the overall problem. First, both in the United States and elsewhere, the main body of student activists seems to come from these disciplines. Second, since the social sciences focus on political and social problems, some students undoubtedly come to political consciousness through their academic interests—or are drawn to the social sciences through their political interests. Finally, and perhaps most important, it is the social sciences that give the contemporary student radicals their concepts of man and society. Unlike an older generation of radicals whose political vocabulary was drawn from Marxist theory, student radicalism draws its vocabulary from sociol-

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ogy and psychoanalysis. Yet this too can be a source of frustration. If Marxism stressed the "unity of theory and practice," contemporary social science makes an opposite assumption about theory and practice. Students then seek what they cannot find in the classrooms.

The students believe, says Flacks, that the university "*ought* to be moral," and Columbia was an attempt to *make* the institution moral. It is not the first time in history that men, believing their society to be utterly corrupt and isolated from its politics, have set out to make a community and society moral. As might be expected, its course was similar: moral purity in action has rarely served the ends of justice and freedom.

Th university is not "one-dimensional" (as even Herbert Marcuse concedes), but the activists would make it so. One can transform the university into a base for revolution, a guerrilla camp from which to make forays into the surrounding morass of corruption. To exist surrounded by corruption requires strong measures to protect oneself against its influence; a guerrilla camp is pervaded by the purity of dogmatism and the certitudes of authoritarianism. But that means *the end of the university,* for its ruling principles are the necessity for the free play of the mind and the acceptance of uncertainty.

In their attempt at transforming the world, the activists have succeeded in transforming only themselves. What was put up "against the wall" at Columbia was their inherited values. And once these are gone there is no chance for the students to realize their original vision of a moral community.

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Thomas R. Brooks

The Bust at Stony Brook

THE STATE UNIVERSITY of New York at Stony Brook lies on a lightly wooded rise some five miles south of Smithtown Bay on Long Island and roughly 60 miles east of New York City.

Stony Brook has been described as the showplace of the 59-campus State University of New York, reflecting in all its newness a determined effort to create a major educational institution practically overnight. Three years ago, there were 1,789 students; today there are 5,200 on the 640-acre campus; next fall, another 1,000 will be added, and by 1970 there will be 8–10,000. For all that means in added income for local people, the instant university is anything but welcome within the surrounding and conservative communities. As the *Three Village Herald*, a local weekly, once put it: "We believe SUSB is a monster. It overshadows the community. It is a monster that must be restrained by those in charge before it takes charge of all of us."

What prompted the editorial outburst was the great Stony Brook raid of January 17 which bagged 35 alleged drug peddlers and users (24 of them students), 10 pounds of marijuana, one pound of hashish, an unspecified number of "narcotic implements," 2,000 pills (pep pills, prescription drugs, and vitamins), a 38-caliber pistol (actually a toy gun), a kazoo, and three dried prunes. The raid began at 3 A.M. with a briefing of reporters, local government officials and police officers, and with the issuance of a 107-page tactical plan, "Operation Stony Brook." While "the targets" were student pot heads, on the whole a mild lot of criminals, the intelligence sheet on each defendant carried this ominous warning: "It is not known if defendant [a 17-year-old girl, in this instance] carries a weapon, but because of her use of drugs, she should be considered dangerous."

Bolstered by the intelligence sheets and 42 dormitory maps pinpointing room locations, "Operation Stony Brook" contained such tidbits as "Subject in the past has worn an American flag as a cape," "He keeps a rifle and a bullwhip in his bedroom," and "Subject is a member of the SDS [Students for a Democratic Society]." Officers were instructed, "radio silence is to be maintained until raids are in progress at 0500." And, "While searching prisoners, cars, and premises, seize all papers containing names, addresses, and telephone numbers which may later be used for intelligence purposes. . . . Include any and all placards or signs." The orders, it must be said, were properly solicitious of the defendants' civil liberties and person—"Upon arrest prisoners will be advised of rights," and "prisoners *will not* be shackled to the bus, so that in the event of a motor vehicle accident no person will be trapped inside."

Since I was not present during the raid, I have had to piece together what happened from newspaper accounts, interviews with faculty and students, and with several of the busted youngsters. What comes through, naturally enough, is something of a Keystone Kop caper, funny *and* scary, the way it was when you were very young and saw them tumbling out of the station house the first time. It should be filmed grey and granular. Visualize, as an instance, the lighting—headlights boring into the dark night as 27 police cars sweep along the broad curve of Nicoll Road, east of the University; room lights glinting yellowly against the brightening of the day

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as burly cops overturn mattresses, arrange pill bottles, pot packets, and pipes on student desks for photographers; and finally, the file of handcuffed prisoners marching by the dawn's early light to waiting police cars.

Not hilarious, really; though I found some of the things students told me pretty funny. A team of Suffolk County cops did rush into the wrong building, opened the wrong door, and nearly arrested the wrong man: the respective dormitories are so much alike.

"I'm kind of a sound sleeper," a slender youngster told me when I asked him what happened when he got busted, "and my straight roommate—he sleeps in the bottom bunk—kind of looks like me. They took him out into the hall, checked behind his knees for needle marks, you know, the whole bit. Finally, they discovered that people sometimes sleep on the top bunk. . . ." Like most of those arrested, my informant had been indicted by a Suffolk County grand jury for at least one count of selling narcotics, a felony offense that carries a maximum penalty of seven years in prison. The charge was based, in most if not all instances, on a witnessed sale to an undercover agent. The police carried search warrants, and also "probable cause" warrants for individuals who were to be arrested if drugs were found in their possession or on their premises. In this instance, they found no drugs but did confiscate some crystals, a mask, and "a can with a moldy piece of bread"—a quick, shy smile from the boy listing the seizures for my benefit—"you know, waiting for that notorious food growth."

"They really tore the apartment apart," a second boy told me. "They found everything I had—pheno, proluden, and grass . . . even got my roommate with some garbage. They kept asking what I had. They must have asked that question 15 times. They were very hung-up on my naming the amount of grass I had. . . ." He shook his head, "They set up a slew of vitamin pills alongside my pot on the desk for the photographers, made a real nice composition out of it. Beautiful. The police proceedings killed me. I had to go—take a crap—and they insisted on watching me."

As the kids talked—they were 18- and 19-year-olds but seemed a bit younger to me—they kept picking over the funny, intriguing things that happened; with nervous laughter, they made over the scary and the truly frightening into the absurd, involuntarily Pinterizing the painful and the sick, "When they told me, 'You're under arrest,' I asked why. They said, 'Don't worry, we've got everything.'" "They had no warrant for my roommate but they handcuffed him too while they searched the room. He wasn't even arrested. . . ."

A boy laughed, "My straight roommate, they seized his five-dollar pipe." Three hulking uniformed cops, two plainclothesmen, and two pipestem kids, a crowd in any circumstances: "I was in my underwear and they advised me to put something nice on, it might influence the judge. My roommate was in dungarees and a shirt and they allowed him to change into decent clothes. When we left [the dormitory], we walked out the wrong entrance. They forgot where they parked their car. . . ."

THE RAID was a disgrace. One ought not condone law-breaking; like most Americans I don't, particularly. Nor do I believe in the university as a sanctuary or students as privileged persons. Yet I am touched by the sense the youngsters give me of feeling that their privacy had been invaded, a sanctuary violated. "You know," one told me, "I was scared to smoke in the city on weekends. I couldn't wait to get back here and turn on. Here I felt *safe*."

Many students (and I share their view) believe that the arrests at Stony Brook were morally, if not legally, a frame; most, if not all, the charges were based on sales to undercover agents. There are grounds for believing that while the students *are* users they are not sellers, not dealers. As one Stony Brook de-

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fendant told me, "I had some stuff [not pot] I thought I would try but I changed my mind. It was sitting around when one of the guys [an undercover man] made himself available, so I sold it to him. In fact, I lost 50 cents on the deal." If the agent had not "made himself available," it is doubtful that this young man would have become "a seller." Clearly, this amounts to entrapment, which is morally offensive, though it may be legal. Incidentally, the New York law itself is something of a frame: If you give a joint to a friend, you have by law made a sale and committed a felonious act. "Sell" in the penal code "means to sell, exchange, give, to dispose of to another or to offer or agree to do the same." And, from all accounts, the pot heads at Stony Brook are—rather were—a generous lot and the offering of a joint was their most heinous crime.

Moreover, there is something obscene in the energy expended in proportion to the results achieved. A bunch of kids are arrested in a well publicized raid, characterized in the press as deep-dyed villains (alleged drug pushers), thieves (an early press report carried police hopes that they would uncover the proceeds of burglaries), and gun toters (not one paper that carried the news of the capture of a 38 pistol bothered to report later that it was a cap gun). Later, the felony charges in most instances, were reduced to misdemeanors. And, in one case, the prosecution offered to trade the dropping of all felony counts for a plea of guilty on one charge. Typically, this softening of the prosecution's attitude carried with it a little sting—seven years in the penitentiary.

Nonetheless, one senses a legend in the making. At one level, pot smoking, panty-raids, and the eating of goldfish are all differing facets of the same phenomenon—student mania, the nutty side of the identity crisis.

It is tempting to agree with the Stony Brook undergraduate who said, "I think someday we'll look back on this raid like our parents looked back on the police raids of the Prohibition era." But we are, as yet, a long way from being free of the political and psychological hang-ups that prevent us from handling the so-called drug problem with any degree of clarity. Actually, there seems to be a dialectic at work—on one hand, there is fitful pressure for an easing of enforcement as well as liberalization of drug laws, especially when it comes to penalties for marijuana use, and, on the other, a hard thrust toward tougher enforcement policies and stiffer penalties. Marijuana repeal bills, for instance, have been submitted in California and Michigan, and in other states legislators have urged studies to search out nonpunitive approaches to drug addiction. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice last year cautiously concluded, "There . . . appears to be good reason to moderate present punitive legislation so that [marijuana] penalties are more in keeping with what is now known about risks: That is, they are not so great." However, instead of pushing reform, President Johnson called for more narcotic agents and prosecuting attorneys "to stop the sale of slavery to the young." And this appeal drew more applause than pleas for more funds for education.

Curiously, what turned off most adults appears not to be pot smoking on campus so much as sex, the discovery of a young woman in a young man's bed the morning of the raid. As Senator Abraham Bernstein (a Democrat from the Bronx and member of the Joint Legislative Committee on Crime that poked into the Stony Brook affair) put it, "I'm not concerned with the moral aspects. But after this is brought to light, how does a parent feel in sending a daughter to Stony Brook?" About 80 per cent of the parents who called Stony Brook after the raid asked, as a Dean put it, "not what are you letting my baby smoke, but in whose bed are you letting her sleep?" Still, it is pot that brought the cops on campus and students are worried, enough

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so that the U.S. National Student Association now has a "drug desk."

At the universities, professors talk knowingly about "a drug culture," or "subculture," but in the dormitories or student lounges the youngsters play it like the underground, another phase of the youth resistance movement. "Everyone knows it's against the law," a Holden Caulfield type informed me, "and everyone chooses to violate it. The point is, it's a stupid law." Students, however, are not eager to court arrest as much as they would like to flout a bad law. As one Stony Brook co-ed coolly summed up the situation for me, "I guess it [pot smoking before the bust] was too brazen. People would smoke joints, mostly in the middle of the night when not many people are around, but there was a lot of dealing [selling] going on all the time. I think it is all right for us to smoke pot, but we shouldn't blow the smoke in other peoples' faces. That's what brings the law down on us."

THE UNDERGROUND nature of pot use makes it difficult to answer the question, How much of it goes on? The pot heads are eager to make the point that "everyone turns on." Charles "Chuck" Hollander, the young man in charge of the NSA drug desk, says, "Drug use has become so frequent among college students that it has relegated sexual activity to second place in popularity." Doctor Stanley F. Yolles, director of the National Institute of Mental Health, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency on March 7, 1968, that 20 per cent of the college students questioned by his organization reported "some use of marijuana." Dr. Yolles estimates that roughly 2 million high school and college students have smoked pot. LSD users are a still smaller percentage, 5 per cent of those polled with a range of 5 to 9 per cent among the individual colleges. LSD use is tailing off in reaction to growing reports of bad trips and possible genetic damage. Still, that may be only a temporary phenomenon and both figures—those of LSD and of marijuana users—are based on preliminary "pilot surveys" and may be well off the mark.

Pot is a relatively new thing on campus. As a junior pot head at Stony Brook told me, "last year was *the* year. It was easier to get pot than liquor. Time after time, the straightest people would come up to me and say, 'I'm strung out, can you do me a joint?' "

Student estimates of use at Stony Brook ranged from 20 to 80 per cent of all students. John De Francisco, an empathetic associate dean of students, however, warned me against taking such estimates too seriously. "Students tend to exaggerate," he said, "for one thing, it's very 'in' to smoke so even a nonuser may say he does, or that he knows many who do. Users travel in the same limited circle, so naturally 'everyone' they know is turned on." Dr. Anthony F. Phillip, director of counseling at Columbia University, was emphatic: "I don't think anyone knows how many users there are. We have no realistic idea. 'Guesstimates' vary so much and can be so easily influenced by the estimator's own anxieties and personal strategies for coping with an ambiguous, emotionally loaded situation."

A survey of Ithaca College students by Dr. J. David Hammond, administrative director of the college's health center, and Martin Rand, an assistant professor of psychology, underscores this trend. Ithaca, as professor Rand described it to me, "is essentially an upper-middle-class school" and has a co-ed student body of 3,300. Last January slightly over 2,000 students answered a questionnaire framed by Mssrs. Hammond and Rand. The survey results indicate, and not unexpectedly, that 22 per cent of the students have tried marijuana. Broken down by sex, 29 per cent of the males, and 18 per cent of the females at Ithaca College have tried pot smoking. The comparable figures for LSD use are 5 per cent male, 2 per cent female. Of the 22 per cent users, nearly one-fourth tried

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marijuana for the first time in high school and one out of seven in junior high.

The most significant figures to come out of the Ithaca study indicate that there is only a slight increase in use between classes—of the freshmen, 21 per cent were users, 22.5 per cent of the sophomores, and 23 per cent of the junior and senior classes. As professor Rand views it, "this tends to suggest the view that drug users don't necessarily drop out." Another cheery note from the campus drug scene is the report on a group of Cornell seniors who were heavy users last year but have quit now that they are in law school where a bust would end all possibilities of becoming an attorney.

But however you read the figures, they do point to a growth in marijuana use. An informal survey (in spring 1967) by campus correspondents at Princeton indicated that 15 per cent of the undergraduates had experimented with marijuana, hashish, or LSD. Last fall, the student paper at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee reported that 20 per cent of the students admitted to drug use. At that time, nearly 33 per cent of 9,978 UCLA students supposedly turned on with pot. And an Essex County, New Jersey, study of 150 students revealed that more than 25 per cent used Marijuana or amphetamines. It's a growth market, tempting to police and suppliers alike. Nonetheless, there is no strong evidence of Mafia presence, or for that matter of any other monopolist on the campus drug scene. Admittedly, there is money to be made—a pound of grass costing $90, say, in the East Village can bring upward of $130 on campus. A Stony Brook user claimed to know "one person who paid all his college expenses for four years and he's going to graduate school the same way." But most campus sales are by way of accommodation —a student going to town for the weekend will collect cash from his friends to buy all enough pot until the next trip.

As pot smoking increases on campus, there is a corresponding growth of enthusiasm in police circles for the strict enforcement of narcotic laws. "Where else can you make such a good score with so little effort," a cop acquaintance recently told me. For all their alleged distrust of adults, the kids are so very trusting. The narcos' M.O. (Modus Operandi) entails, in most instances, the pickup of a campus chick, then the branching-out for contacts, and the setting-up of drug sales. At Stony Brook, the pot heads continued to deal with the undercover agents despite their student-given nicknames, "Fred, the Fed" and "John, the Cop."

Student busts have risen sharply. There were a handful in 1966 and 1967—5 students at Princeton, 11 at Cornell; Kerrigan Gray, an off-and-on student at Everett Junior College, Washington, who languishes in jail under a 20-year sentence for selling "a friend," a plainclothesman, some pot; and some 28 students and an instructor at Wayne University are among the best known arrests of the period. According to NSA's Chuck Hollander, there were 54 drug "incidents" involving 194 arrested students reported to the NSA for the period of November 2, 1967, through January 19, 1968. Thirteen midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis were dismissed in February after admitting to smoking marijuana in their rooms.

What concerns Hollander, and students, more than the arrests (they do recognize the risks involved in breaking the law), is the growing abuse of student rights. Kangaroo courts, midnight searches, and informer networks figure prominently in student complaints to the NSA. "The process of detection," said Hollander, "has entailed the blatant breach of student civil liberties." He cited the use of student informers at Cornell and Fairleigh Dickenson last year. At Duke, a girl was denied admission to medical school because her roommate allegedly smoked pot; at Amherst, a student was arrested for distributing literature calling for legalization of marijuana (he was charged with disturbing the peace).

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Some of the students and faculty at Stony Brook believe that their raid was prompted by outsiders' response to antidraft activity on campus. True, it wasn't much—an antiwar rally on a stormy December 7 drew 20 students. When the flag in front of the library was lowered because of the rain, a group of construction workers chose to interpret it as a sign that the flag was about to be destroyed by the demonstrators. Four students were beat up, one suffered two broken teeth. *No one* was arrested. When a campus press release mentioned the rally, State Senate Majority Leader Earl E. Brydges (R-Niagara Falls), called for an investigation: "This campus protest is a serious symptom, especially in time of war. This kind of thing is deeper and more disturbing than the normal inclination to question society itself." Campus theoreticians argue that the legislature wanted an investigation and that the raid proferred an all too convenient pretext. That the investigation turned up little, they ascribe to investigative inefficiency or to just plain luck. The inquiry was also stymied by the refusal of nine professors to testify on constitutional grounds. Grand jury investigations, however, are a good deal more worrisome. A refusal to name student users could lead to indictment for contempt and eight Stony Brook faculty members are battling the Suffolk County Grand Jury in the courts on the issue.

THE CRACK-DOWN on so-called campus drug abuse is to student dissent what the war on crime-in-the-streets is to ghetto unrest. Both are equally popular crusades with small-town Americans, using the term in a generic sense. It is a question of control, pacification. Suffolk County Police Commissioner John Barry justified his raid on the grounds that the University administration lacked "control and supervision." The great Stony Brook raid was a police action rooted in ideology, a crusade in fact.

Entrapment is a nasty piece of business but justified in cop eyes by their view, as put in the Suffolk County Police Department Narcotic Squad *In Service Training Manual*, that "the selling of illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs to any person illicitly is one of the most heinous crimes committed by man." The Manual provides such deep information as "Castro supports his government on the proceeds [of the East Coast narcotics traffic]," and practical guides to action, such as the note on the importance of searching refrigerators (LSD, except in powder form, must be refrigerated) and seizing Vodka ("one of the most readily available preservatives for LSD"). The *Manual* also strikes at complacency, "We must remember that throughout

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history, nations have been conquered through the uncontrolled use of narcotics by their people" (China is offered as the most recent, indeed the only example), and it stresses the importance of the campus as a focus for narcotic law enforcement. "Not only is this a lucrative field for organized crime," states the *Manual*, "but it is also a tremendous weapon in the hands of an enemy nation."

Suffolk County, be it admitted, must be one of the last places in the country where local "Support Your Police" groups are still showing that old right-wing favorite, *Subversion U.S.A.* Still, one reason given for the raid by Commissioner Barry was "a failure to cooperate" on the part of university officials in solving the narcotics problem. This failure comes down to the refusal by Stony Brook officials to undertake the Suffolk County Police Department's narcotics educational program. At the core of the program are lessons on how to sniff out the stuff. In short, the cops wanted the faculty to fink on the students, a proposition properly distasteful to university people. Irving Lang, general counsel to the New York State Narcotic Addiction Control Commission, has said that in his opinion university officials are *obligated* to report drug users uncovered by counselors.

If Lang's position carries the day, it would destroy the way many good (in the sense that they are doing the best of possible jobs) colleges now handle the "drug problem." According to the NSA, roughly 60 per cent of our colleges view student drug involvement as a counseling or medical problem. Some universities have established a gentleman's understanding with local narcotic enforcement officers that the police will be called in if and when any drug trafficking comes to their attention. But as one official told me, "there's a big difference between the kids getting the stuff and a real pusher. I don't consider the former trafficking. . . ." Chuck Hollander of NSA considers the University of Vermont program, instituted by students ("mandatory counseling is about as therapeutic as mandatory Sunday school") as good a program for dealing with drug abuse as you can get under present conditions. Student users with serious problems can obtain therapy without fear of reprisal from the police. The university has arranged with *both* state and federal authorities to keep enforcement officers from interfering with those students participating in the program. It's a way, as Hollander says, of avoiding both "over-reaction and no reaction."

Considering that we live in a drug-oriented society—if you don't believe it watch television for an evening—we ought perhaps to re-evaluate the so-called campus drug problem. The youngsters on campus now are the first full-fledged TV generation; for 16 years or more, they have been subjected to the hard-sell plugging of the universal "quick-relief" drug. In that light, are they not to be congratulated that so few—20 to 30 per cent—take to pot, pep pills, or LSD? Let's face it, if the criminal sanctions against possession were eliminated, we would not have a drug problem on campus. Dr. Philip of Columbia says, "There's nothing potentially dangerous in essentially healthy students trying marijuana." And, if that old saw about pot leading directly to perdition, that is, to heroin, were true one would expect some reports of "horse" turning up on campus. But, says Hollander of NSA, "in the 18 months that I have been director of drug studies for USNSA, there have been no such reports." As for myself, I am convinced that pot should be taken off the list of illegal drugs. As it now stands, a lot of kids are likely to get hurt by adult foolishness in trying to enforce unenforceable laws.

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Walter Goodman

Ebony: Biggest Negro Magazine

THE QUESTION, Who speaks for the Negro? invites no satisfactory answer in these rhetoric-drenched times. Or, rather, it invites so many answers that none of them can be satisfactory. No large city is without its complement of lusty-lunged fellows who present themselves as spokesmen not only for all of America's Negroes but for the colored populations of the entire globe, and not only for Negroes now living but for large numbers of the long dead. That they voice the angers of the ghetto is certain; whether they have a more palpable constituency is not certain at all.

But there is a related question—Who speaks *to* the Negro?—that, thanks to the Audit Bureau of Circulations, one can begin to answer. The circulation of *Ebony* magazine stands now at about a million copies a month; according to a Starch Report, each issue reaches some 4,575,000 readers. It is a prodigy of American publishing, by far the largest Negro publication in our history, and for observers of the racial scene to pass it by their fascination with *Mohammed Speaks* is like scorning the *Ladies Home Journal* in order to explain America by reference to the *East Village Other.*

The first copy of *Ebony,* modeled frankly if falteringly on *Life,* appeared in November 1945, the creation of a 28-year-old, Arkansas-born, Chicago-bred man named John H. Johnson who had made his publishing debut three years before with the pocket-sized *Negro Digest,* modeled frankly on the *Reader's Digest.* Success for *Ebony* came fast. Today publisher Johnson's properties include *Jet,* a minuscule news magazine; *Tan,* a teenage confession magazine ("How to Flirt Without Sexual Come-on"); and the *Negro Digest,* revivified in 1961 after a decade in suspension to print original stories, poems, and essays at a loss to the publisher. Johnson also owns a cosmetics company and is the biggest single stock-holder in the Supreme Life Insurance Company, for which he once worked in a low-level job. Specializing in the Negro market, Supreme grossed $10 million last year.

Johnson today employs about 300 people, including what it amuses him to call "a token" 15 or so whites. Put out along with its lesser cousins from his own building, a spacious former funeral home on Chicago's South Michigan Avenue that reputedly used to service Al Capone and his friends, *Ebony* is the heart of this little empire. It now costs 50 cents a copy, averages 150 pages an issue, and grosses around $12 million a year.

In recent months, *Ebony* has been rubbing in the fact of its success to the part of White America that places advertising, with a series of ads of its own that make rather startling reading on the back page of The *New York Times.* After laying claim to a readership of 2.5 million families, all "spenders" with an average income of $7,000, *Ebony* proceeds: "Because they rarely have a chance to buy handsome homes, they tend to *furnish* the homes they have handsomely. Because they are not sure of their reception in public entertainment places, they entertain bountifully at home. And because they have a healthy vanity, they spend more on personal grooming products than do white families of the same income." And it concludes by warning advertisers that "when a Negro looks at your ad and has to translate white

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faces into black faces you lose something in the translation. And the thing you lose might be his business."

One may take such a passage as a kind of self-irony or as a bitter comment on businessmen, white and black, who purposefully collaborate to wring a dollar out of the misfortunes of America's Negroes—but that surely would be a misreading of the publisher's intention. Irony and bitterness are not at all in the *Ebony* style.

As the first issue of his magazine was about to appear in the fall of 1945, John H. Johnson, declining to become "all hot and bothered about the race question," promised that *Ebony* would "mirror the happier side of Negro life." The cover showed a Negro boy nestled among a half dozen white boys at the Henry Street Settlement, and it was reported within its Sunday-supplement-like pages that Eddie (Rochester) Anderson made more than $150,000 a year and had a house "like the Taj Mahals of other movie stars." An article on Richard Wright noted that his royalties "made a pretty fat bankroll."

The picture of the good life that *Ebony* held up in its early years was appropriate to the season. In the mid-forties, all America was itching to shake off wartime rigors and set forth upon an orgy of consumership. Negroes might be forgiven for suffering from an especially severe itch. Had not many Negro soldiers, as Fighters for Freedom after all, experienced integration of sorts, in the service itself and in foreign lands?

As the nation turned its attention to the softer pleasures of peace, *Ebony's* rhapsodies on Negro performers ("A Day in Hollywood with Lena Horne"), the upbeat pieces on peripheral racial matters ("Cantor and Kaye Break Radio Rules to Star Negroes"), and a monthly potpourri ("Negro and white hat partners prove interracial business pays dividends") directed its readers to look in the same bright direction. Circulation rose to more than 300,000 before the magazine's fourth birthday.

Aiming from the first to be a mass magazine, *Ebony* was subject to all the siren calls that trouble that species. In the early 1950's, it succumbed to the most ancient of these calls and instituted a department named, with exemplary candor, "Sex." Now it took to publishing pieces on the order of "Is It True What They Say About Models?" "Sex in Prison," "The Love Life of Joe Louis," and "How Moral Are Our Coeds?" In authentic popular magazine style, the cover lines promised more than the scrupulously superficial articles revealed—but this venture into what Langston Hughes would later call a "period of occasional cheapness and puerility" did not last long.

THE 1954 RECESSION, during which *Ebony's* newsstand sales dropped abruptly from 500,000 to 400,000, marked a decisive turning point for the magazine; it abetted the cause of virtue by prompting Johnson to rethink his publishing strategy. Now, instead of relying on hard-sell titles ("Do Negro Stars Prefer White Husbands?") he turned to the home subscriber, working through church groups and the like. It was an astute decision. The decade of the fifties, which saw the first furious growth of television, was a difficult time for many magazines. Advertisers fell under the spell of the hypnotic tube and lusted after its spellbound audience of tens of millions, and a number of famous journals expired. But magazines that concentrated on appealing to the special interests of a special part of the population rather than attempting to compete with the TV vaudeville for the *entire* population managed to survive and, in time, to prosper. *Ebony,* which began to look somewhat less like a dime fan magazine during these years, was prominent among them.

Not merely was 1954 a year of recession, it was also the year of the Supreme Court decision on school integration. In its coverage of civil rights for the rest of the decade, *Ebony* exhibited the wishful passivity that

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settled over the country. "Many schools in Southern states have voluntarily ended school segregation," it reported in January 1955, and for many months thereafter its pages were a trove of heartening items, such as that Negroes were being accepted into White House society.

Its tenth anniversary issue, which had Ralph Bunche on the cover, carried a message from John Johnson, in which he took credit unto *Ebony* for promoting interracial understanding by "emphasizing the positive and minimizing the negative aspects of race relations." Some of its positive emphases been written in another age altogether, like the 1956 article, "Democracy Comes to Washington: Capital makes rapid strides in ending Jim Crow"—and some seem to have been written in another age altogether like the 1959 story about a boys' club cutting down vandalism in the Prospect Park section of Brooklyn.

There were, during this time, articles on rising black militancy in Mississippi, on the ordeal of the first Negro student to enter the University of Alabama, and on the coming to leadership of Martin Luther King and others of the sort—but *Ebony's* coverage was less full and less perceptive than articles appearing elsewhere. The bulk of the magazine was still given over to *Entertainment, Sports,* and *Personalities,* including such peculiar items as "Problems of Blond Negroes," and "Tallest Negro in the World." Nor did John Johnson refrain from using his editorial pages to boost his own insurance company. Only with its frequent articles on Africa can it be said to have contributed to the consciousness of black solidarity, then barely stirring among the young—and these articles, long on exotic detail and short on critical analysis, were in the same mode of synthetic journalism that typified *Ebony* throughout its first decade.

The lunchroom-counter sit-downs which began in Greensboro, North Carolina, in February 1960 came as no less of a surprise to the editors of *Ebony* than to the rest of the nation, and beginning at about this time a major new note was struck in its pages. There appeared a fresh emphasis on Negro identity—mainly in articles about the history of the black man in America written by Lerone Bennett, Jr., a young staff member. These articles ask to be judged not as exercises in scholarship, but as frank efforts to build a sense of pride in Negro accomplishment from colonial times onward.

Ebony found it easy to adapt to the era of integrationist good feelings of the early 1960's, when white and black freedom riders and apostles of nonviolence sang and bled together in the South. It had, after all, been preaching Negro-white cooperation for nearly two decades, and it could wholeheartedly cheer on the students who braved the truncheons of Southern sheriffs. An alliance of the good guys against the bad was something *Ebony* had no trouble interpreting to its audience, and its civil rights coverage increased and improved in those years whose lost spirit decent men of both races now mourn.

Like all mass publications, *Ebony* is a popularizer of ideas rather than an innovator; it responds to the prevailing winds. When some very heavy winds began to blow through the Negro communities in the mid-sixties, Ebony's pages showed their impact. Many of its articles of recent years fit incongruously with the young John Johnson's bright and simple premises.

With an issue in August 1965 devoted to *The White Problem,* which contained contributions from Martin Luther King, Carl Rowan, Kenneth Clark, Louis Lomax, and James Baldwin playing a reprise of his white-man's-burden number, *Ebony* began a series of annual special issues given over to reports and essays on some momentous theme. In August of 1967 the subject was *Negro Youth in America*—the toughest issue in the magazine's history. Articles on militant students and street gangs now were sympathetic to a fault; the "aimless rampage of

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white collegians" at Fort Lauderdale was contrasted to the "grim protest" of Black Panthers who brought their rifles into the California state capitol in a demonstration against proposed bills to restrict the carrying of guns.

Today Johnson admits to a certain embarrassment over the devotions his magazine once made to Cadillacs and minks, and such artifacts of high living no longer receive much play. But the staples of most issues continue to be individual Negroes who have, in one way or another, made it. In April a Standard Oil clerical manager, a Ford Foundation program officer, a tire production supervisor, a technician supervisor, a hospital office-services chief, and a research director joined the scores of upwardly mobile Negroes who have been presented over the years in the magazine's "Speaking of People" columns.

Ebony's success stories lean heavily toward athletes and entertainers, and these features seem to come straight from the fan clubs, untouched by human editors. But the editors evidently scour the land for less familiar stories, and the results, presented in unfastidious prose, tend to give *Ebony* the appearance of a black-face take-off on what popular magazines were like 20 years ago. A lady from Cleveland reports: "I Was a Spy for the F.B.I." "The Girl Who Wouldn't Give Up" tells of a paralysis victim who "has taught herself to live a useful life though confined to wheelchair." An article on "Lefties—a Maligned Minority" reveals that Bayard Rustin is left-handed. And where else can one find a feature on "Negro Pioneers in Mortgage Banking"?

Ebony, to be sure, has no copyright on the upbeat article. But with items like "Breakthrough on the Airlines—Negro air men join 15,740-man cockpit crew," it performs a special service for its special audience. Kenneth Clark praised this service after the magazine had been in business for about 10 years: "It is almost impossible to measure the morale-lifting value of such a magazine. The mere fact of its existence and success has been an inspiration to the Negro masses. Also, its stories of progress have given insecure and long-inhibited Negroes something to identify with in a difficult period of rapid change."

SO LARGE is *Ebony's* present readership—somewhere between a quarter and a third of the entire adult Negro population, if the advertising department is to be believed—that executive editor Herbert Nipson is without doubt accurate when he says that his magazine is read by both government officials and housemaids. "Every Negro, whether he's an ambassador from Ghana or a wino on 18th and Wabash, has something in common," remarks Nipson drily. The point requires no gloss, yet *Ebony*'s voice is neither that of ambassador nor wino, neither of housemaid nor government official. It is the voice of solid, successful professionals, and its insistent theme is the hope and desirability of success in its more banal manifestations.

Moreover, although *Ebony* is very much a magazine of the inner city, it has never spoken to a cross-section of the Negro masses. More than a third of its readers, as its ad salesmen emphasize, are high-school graduates and nearly a quarter have had some college education—compared to about 10 per cent for the Negro population as a whole. Most of *Ebony's* copies are now sold by subscription, and the median income of the households that receive them is $6,648, which is less than that of white households but $2,000 more than the median income of Negro households. The average reader is 31; beyond the age of student militancy and street gangs, old enough to be settled in family life.

An article on whether parents should push their gifted daughter into a musical career or allow her to have an ordinary happy childhood makes an agreeable kind of problem for lower-middle-class housewives to mull over of an evening, and the accompanying pictures constitute vicarious treats in themselves — handsome families in nicely furn-

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ished homes, entertaining graciously, vacationing luxuriously, enjoying their middle-class problems and amenities. The *Ebony* formula transmits month after month the sense of an orderly and thriving middle-class Negro life in America, a very different sense from the one transmitted by the unsettling columns of our daily newspapers. ("How deeply can one be influenced," asks a recent ad for *Ebony*, "by any medium that shows Negroes mainly when they are disturbing the peace?")

"Before I started *Ebony*," Johnson observed some years ago, "you'd never know from reading other publications that Negroes got married, had beauty contests, gave parties, ran successful businesses, or carried on any normal living activities." Advertisers have done more than merely hasten to profit from this revelation; by the nature of their ads they reinforce the image to which John Johnson has dedicated himself. "Look at the handsome young brownskin couple extolling the delights of Coca Cola in full page color," wrote Langston Hughes in a tribute on *Ebony*'s 20th birthday, "or the good-looking young Negro in the 'Camel Time' ad, the stunning brown girl smoking a Newport, and those wholesome Negro families now pictured getting into sleek and shining cars."

While the ads in *Ebony* still run heavily toward whiskey and beer and hair and skin preparations, the magazine boasts an estimable company of national advertisers who paid $7 million for space in 1967; and many of them go out of their way to deliver John Johnson's message. There in the Greyhound bus—and not in the rear—is a cute Negro child being chummy with a cute white child. There are businesslike life-insurance salesmen and clean-cut Western Electric engineers. There is a Negro homeowner with his Buick Electra and a Negro homemaker with her box of Tide, a Negro girl in her Lovable bra, a Negro baby with his portion of Gerber's, a Negro couple savoring Mogen David concord wine, and Negro newlyweds fenced in by a set of bedroom furniture in French Provincial, white with gold trim. There's Elgin Baylor, captain of the Los Angeles Lakers, sinking a shot in behalf of Carnation Milk, and that's Willy Mays in the Petrocelli suit.

Not surprisingly, young Negro militants, who today dominate the racial scene in display if not in numbers, find a good deal to mock in a magazine edited for people who are hung-up on French Provincial.

A New York photographer whose sympathies lie with SNCC is particularly scornful of "all those flukey jobs they write about, like the cat at IBM who's making seventy-five hundred dollars a year. What the hell are they telling me, man? Everybody *knows* if he was white he'd be making twelve thousand."

Yet despite a steady preference for reporting on the thousands of ascending Negroes rather than the millions of the ghetto-bound, *Ebony* cannot fairly be charged with ignoring the Negro's unending struggle for votes, jobs, and education. SNCC field secretary Julius Lester, who considers the magazine's hair and skin ads "disgusting" and who rejects its "black bourgeois standards," nevertheless considers *Ebony* "must reading." It has covered in its manner the great stories of its time, from the lynching of Emmet Till to last summer's riots. Its manner is as follows: A recent report on the fact that 94 per cent of Negro pupils in the South are still in segregated schools is set between features on a blind TV newsman in Cleveland and a judo black-belt queen in Fresno, California. "We are speaking to the whole black population," explains the house historian Lerone Bennett, Jr., "to people at all levels of readiness and unreadiness. Some of the criticism of *Ebony* is really a criticism of any mass magazine." The point is well taken; in Bennett's comment, so tactfully phrased, one can hear the old lament and rationalization of the bright popular magazine editor, obliged to make his livelihood in association with material that in his heart of hearts he disdains. In this sense, working on *Ebony* is no different from work-

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ing on *TV Guide*; you don't have to be Negro to detest the mass audience.

THE TROUBLE with *Ebony*, in the view of one militant who calls it "the Thurgood Marshall of magazines," is that it "is just not with it. It fails to make a commitment; it doesn't tell black folks where it's really at." Not that militants suffer any discourtesy in *Ebony's* pages. Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, Cassius Clay, Adam Clayton Powell, and lesser heroes receive an undeviatingly kind press. But, to the distress of militants, *Ebony*, even in its present, tougher mood, never singles out anyone as an "Uncle Tom." It has hard words for neither swinger nor square, moderate nor militant, Whitney Young, Stokely Carmichael, or Lew Alcindor. "We feel about all parts of the movement like we feel about religion," says John Johnson. "There are different routes to heaven." Johnson, who is on the board of the National Urban League, has a lot of faith in enlightened members of the White Power Structure like Henry Ford.

In rebuttal to the charge that they are encouraging a petty-bourgeois mentality, *Ebony*'s editors point to their articles on edifying chapters in the history of the black man in America, to the articles on Africa, to the unparochial coverage of all facets of the movement, to the editorial calls on middle-class Negroes to take on more responsibility for their poorer brothers. Such efforts must have had some effect by now (at the very least, *Ebony* has expanded the job market for Negro models), but exactly what effect is not readily measured. Although *Ebony*'s readers, like the magazine itself, are doubtless more militant than they were five years ago, it isn't likely that full-fledged militants make up any great percentage of them. Is it a sign of militancy that half of the readers who responded to a poll conducted by the magazine at the end of last year expressed a preference to be called "Afro-American" and a quarter expressed a preference for "black," while fewer than a tenth were content to be called "Negro"? Or is it a sign of indifference that the holders of only 19 per cent of *Ebony*'s million copies took the trouble to send in a preference (Whereas Lerone Bennett, Jr., the nearest thing to a militant in *Ebony*'s upper echelons, uses "black" exclusively, Johnson himself alternates between "black" and "Negro," depending on whom he's talking to.)

Ebony employs whatever militant jargon is in the air (an article entitled "I'm a Soul Brother" turned out to be about Senator Edward Brooke), but its goals remain the liberal goals of the fifties—integrated education, open housing, good jobs and the universal ballot. Far from despairing of the political process, as many militants proclaim they do, *Ebony* cheered last year's Negro mayoralty victories in Cleveland and Gary, and it expressed doubts about the effectiveness of further street demonstrations.

The magazine supported President Johnson editorially in 1964 and later described him as "well on his way to becoming a permanent figure in civil rights history." Publisher Johnson believes that we shouldn't have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place, but now that we're there we are obligated to "support the government in all its efforts." There seem to be differences of opinion around the office: a SNCC writer who submitted an article to *Ebony* which was based on a trip to North Vietnam blames John Johnson for rejecting it over the recommendations of staff members that it be accepted. To judge by the letters to the editor, *Ebony*'s readership contains its share of both hawks and doves, people who protest and people who dislike protesters. The magazine gets very few critical letters, and the prevailing tone is far from militant.

Ebony's own attitude toward contemporary militancy was nicely displayed last December by an article on "Natural Hair—New Symbol of Race Pride." For years *Ebony* has prospered on ads for products like Silky Strate

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hair straightener, Royal Crown hair relaxer, Nadinola bleaching cream, Dr. Fred Palmer's skin whitener, and Posner Kintona—"Darling, I've never seen your skin look so light, so bright—so lovely!" John Johnson's cosmetics sideline is centered around Ultra Sheen permanent creme relaxer and Raveen hair conditioner and Duke greaseless hair pomade. Yet in December he ran the paean to natural hair, featuring such eminent symbols of the mode as Harry Belafonte, Sidney Poitier, and the lately converted Sammy Davis. Along with this story could be found strategically placed announcements for new Johnson products—Duke Natural Easy Comb and Duke Natural Hair Sheen, as well as Raveen Au Naturelle, "the perfect answer for the woman who wears her hair in the natural style." Nor is this schizophrenia. The dissatisfaction of the black militants with *Ebony* is rooted in much the same fact of commercial life that has often confounded white radicals trying to fathom the American businessman: he is beyond ideology.

In a certain widely preached belief, not untouched by condescension, life in the black ghetto retains a kind of spontaneity and naturalness, of *realness* that the suburban householder has exchanged for comfort, conformity, and a pervasive ennui. The songs piped by *Ebony*, however, are the good old tunes of achievement, recognition, and success—the rewarding job, the pleasant surroundings, the college-destined kids. These, Johnson maintains, and not any vision of an African renaissance, are the goals that motivate Negroes as well as whites in this country. The difference is only that Negroes have been denied a fair shot at them. In reply to criticism that he is missing some essence of black America, Johnson says, "We try to deal with things as we find them, not as we'd like to find them. In spite of all the things that we might like to be, we still act like Americans."

It is understandable that people who have no hope of enjoying the flaunted fruits of this society may be driven to burn down the trees. It is understandable that people who have found the fruits tasteless or indigestable may propose redoing the orchards. *Ebony*'s success reminds us that there are millions of Negroes who, in the fabled national tradition, have had a taste of the fruits and want more. This may disappoint militants like the critic of *Ebony* who told me, "We can't be white so why should we try?" and it will surely disappoint whites who look to a mythologized black, speaking Swahili, to shake white America loose of its various hang-ups. But others may find some encouragement here. It seems to Bayard Rustin, for one, that "at a time when many Negroes are deeply distressed and have lost faith in the system, *Ebony* makes a contribution by showing over and over that great numbers of Negroes have been accepted in many areas."

It is risky to draw large conclusions about the character or values of the readers of a magazine from the magazine's pages. But if *Ebony*'s pages indicate anything about its readers it is that they are not about to redeem American society, or to show the rest of us how to purify ourselves or our air or how to bring peace to the world. *Ebony* has only one fundamental criticism to make of this society—that it is streaked with racism. Otherwise it rejoices in the common values. The magazine's message to white America is simply, "Open up and let us in." The message to black America is that getting in is possible and worth the effort. Optimistic messages, to be sure, and dated and not altogether inspiring. But *Ebony* speaks a language that both Negroes and whites can understand and act upon, and that is no little thing in a troubled territory whose *lingua franca* seems to be deteriorating into yawps of hatred and yowls of apocalypse.

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Barry Bluestone

The Poor Who *Have* Jobs

LIBERAL ANALYSTS of the economy leapfrog from one plan for abolishing poverty to another. Currently, the spotlight beams on manpower training and development as the answer to the misery of the urban ghetto and the rural wasteland. The hypothesis here is that the uneducated and unskilled poor have been left behind in a rapidly advancing and automated technology and hence have failed to compete successfully in the newly emerging job market. But the fact is that the Triple Revolution theorists were wrong, or at least premature in their pronouncement. Dire predictions of cybernetic joblessness have not been fulfilled, and even the less radical "structural unemployment" argument remains relevant for only the most extremely disadvantaged of the poor. The problem of poverty for at least a great many, often overlooked by those who peer into crystal balls instead of onto ghetto streets, is not so simple as the failure of the unskilled to meet the new requirements of America's supertechnological society. *Rather, the problem is that many people with adequate skills are simply not being provided with adequate jobs.*

Poverty stereotypes of the ADC mother, the aged, the infirm, the small farmer, the handicapped, the unemployed, the underemployed, and the undereducated often mask the fact that *nearly a third of all families living in poverty in* 1964 *were headed by a person who worked* 50-52 *weeks a year at a full-time job.* Unlike unemployment, the problem of the working poor, perhaps because it seems less dramatic, is less documented and their plight is less understood. Yet the problem is highly complex, for it is not simply the result of any one major cause—sickness, illiteracy, lack of jobs, or discrimination. The working poor are the product of a confrontation between individuals with little opportunity, and economic markets with little realized potential. And to understand the individuals who are America's working poor—to know their educational, familial, and historical characteristics—is not sufficient basis for explaining the persistence of low-wage employment. To understand low-wage employment means to understand the dynamics of product and labor-market forces which generate the structure of wages and jobs in the nation.

The trials of poverty indeed are oppressive for the working poor. For meager reward they spend nearly half of their waking hours at jobs often arduous, numbingly repetitious, and devoid of opportunity for occupational mobility. In the best of times, with the economy booming, they can hope for full workweeks and for wage increases which *may* keep pace with inflation. In the worst of times, the fear of losing their pittance of a wage haunts them. Whether the economy comes up heads or tails, the working poor lose.

Who are the Working Poor?

POVERTY is not easily defined, even in quantitative terms. Government statistics have traditionally placed the poverty "line" at around $3,000 a year for a family of four; to be precise, $3,130 in 1964.[1] The poverty line varies with family size and geographical location. In one form, it is computed on the basis

[1] Office of Economic Opportunity, *Dimensions of Poverty*, December 1965, p. 8.

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of family needs allowing for a minimal "economy" diet, housing, clothing, and other bare necessities. But calculated in this manner (or in any other finite way, for that matter), the poverty line should not be taken seriously. It is nonsense to assume that once a family's income exceeds the poverty line by a few dollars it is out of the woods.

Poverty considered in this light must be measured on a *relative* rather than an absolute scale. Compared with the standard of living in the underdeveloped countries of the world, the American "poor" fare quite well, and indeed, the living standard of the average impoverished citizen of the 1960's surpasses that of his counterpart in the last century. Yet compared with today's average factory worker, let alone the professionals and entrepreneurs, the employed poor share very little of the total economic product. In dealing with the working poor it is necessary to examine the level of their wages not only in absolute terms (i.e., at a $3,000 standard), but also relative to the general wage distribution or wage level in industry.

In 1963, 8.5 million people in the United States worked throughout the year at full-time jobs yet earned less than $3,000 for their effort.[2] They comprised nearly one-fifth of the total full-time employed labor force in that year. Of these low-wage workers, 2.1 million were family breadwinners, and an additional 1.1 million were single individuals.

The working poor made up then, and continue to make up, a sizable fraction of the total labor force. Of all full-time working family *heads*, 6.9 per cent earned a poverty wage. In addition, 30 per cent of all unrelated individuals earned a working-poor annual income. The rest of the 8.5 million were in families with total income above the poverty line: others in the family helped to provide a livelihood.

As a segment of the indigent of America, the number who work full-time is substantial. In 1963, one-fifth of all families in the United States were counted as poor, but of these, more than one in four had a full-time working breadwinner. Indeed that year, in the majority of poor families at least one person was working either part-time or full-time the year around.[3] *The men and women (family heads) who worked full-time all year in* 1964 *and yet received a poverty wage were the parents of a full two-fifths of the nation's poor children.* Nine out of ten such families were headed by men.[4] This does not account for those who attempted to work full-time during the year but were laid off because of a slack in their occupations.

Agriculture shows the highest incidence of poverty in America, but other sectors of the economy account for the substantial majority of employed poor. Although most hired farm workers were not employed full-time in 1965, 400,000 were counted as such. They earned an average of $2,791 for a full year's work, averaging 327 days per year.[5]

In 1963, of the employed heads of poor families 30 per cent worked in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. The remaining 70 per cent of employed poor families owed their meager livelihood to urban occupations and industries:[6]

15 per cent were in manufacturing;
15 per cent were in retail trade;
10 per cent were in personal services;
9 per cent were in construction;
21 per cent were in miscellaneous other nonagricultural employment.

In terms of occupation, the working poor are operatives, service workers, laborers, and farmers. Sales workers, clerical employees, and private household workers make up another 12 per cent. In general, the skill requirements for working-poor jobs, although below average, are the same as those for

[2] Mollie Orshansky, "More about the Poor in 1964," *Social Security Bulletin*, May 1966, p. 5+.
[3] Laurie D. Cummings, "The Employed Poor: Their Characteristics and Occupations." *Monthly Labor Review*, July 1965, p. 828.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] U.S. Department of Labor, *Manpower Report of the President*, 1967, p. 108.
[6] Cummings, *op. cit.*, p. 828.

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many jobs in high-wage industries, in retail trade, and in personal service.

Who are the working poor and why have particular individuals been doomed to poverty jobs?

RACE—Approximately one-third of working-poor families are Negro.[7] Yet roughly equal percentages of white and nonwhite poor are full-time workers.[8] When one considers only male heads of households, however, the story changes drastically. In 1963, 73 per cent of male Negro breadwinners in poor families were employed, and more than two-fifths of them worked full-time all year long. Yet for the white male family earner the percentages were much smaller. Only 56 per cent worked at all that year and no more than a third were full-time workers.[9]

For the labor force as a whole, a disproportionately large number of Negroes are in low-wage jobs, but Negro women fare relatively better than their male counterparts. Whereas Negro women account for one out of eight working women, they comprise one out of six women in low-wage occupations. For Negro men the situation is much worse; whereas they represent but one-twelfth of the nonagricultural male workforce, they hold one out of four low-wage jobs. For identical levels of education, the Negro male can expect to earn only about 60 per cent of the income of his white counterpart.[10]

Although some progress has recently been made toward eliminating racial discrimination in hiring practices and in internal firm mobility, discrimination remains pervasive. Discrimination and lesser educational opportunity, as manifestations of racism, result in high unemployment rates for Negroes, in the high percentage of full-time Negro working poor, and in the extremely high proportion of low-wage jobs held by Negro men and women.

Nevertheless, because of their greater numbers, white workers still predominate in low-wage occupations and industries.[11] Race discrimination and lower educational opportunities for Negroes are major factors in the allocation of low-wage jobs, but whites are not automatically exempt from the worst jobs America has to offer.

AGE—One might expect to find the working poor clustered in the younger and older age groups—those under 25 and over 55—for these are the age groups with the lowest incomes. But this is not so. In 1964, over half of all unrelated individuals among the working poor were between 25 and 54; for family heads the percentage was even larger, with over three-fourths in the prime age group.[12] This distribution compares with the nonagricultural civilian labor force as a whole. By and large, the working poor are of prime age.

SEX—Women are particularly likely to have low-wage jobs. Although women comprise only one-third of the labor force, they account for more than one-half of all persons with incomes below $3,000. Yet 90 per cent of all families among the working poor are headed by men. In 1964, in almost one-fifth of these male-headed households where the wife was present, the wife also worked at least part-time. Still, for some families with two wage earners, the sum total of their effort failed to raise the family income above the poverty threshold.[13]

EDUCATION—Income correlates highly with education. Similarly, correlation between broad occupational groups and education ap-

[7] Cummings, *op. cit.*, p. 828.
[8] Orshansky, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13.
[9] Mollie Orshansky, "Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile," in L. Ferman, J. Kornbluh, and A. Haber, eds., *Poverty in America*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965, p. 70.
[10] Tom Kahn, "The Economics of Equality," New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1964.
[11] Cummings, *op. cit.*, p. 831.
[12] Orshansky, "More about the Poor in 1964," p. 8.
[13] Dawn Wachte, *The Working Poor*, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Michigan and Wayne State University, mimeographed, 1967.

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pears high. Professionals, on the average, are better educated than clerical workers and accordingly receive higher incomes. Foremen and craftsmen are generally more educated than operatives and laborers and again, the difference is reflected in higher earnings for the more educated.

Within occupational categories, the relationship between education and wage rate is not, however, so clear. Operatives in the high-wage industries appear to have almost the same educational histories as many of their low-wage groups and those in above poverty-incomes either in the same industry (located possibly in a different region of the country) or in different industries. Delehanty and Evans found that, among operative occupations in manufacturing industry, the difference in educational attainment between most workers in low-wage groups and those in above poverty-line wage operations stood at less than six-tenths of a year in 1963, the median years of school completed being 9.6 for all operatives.[14] They also found that the six major poverty wage clerical occupations divide into three equal groups with educational levels which bracket the over-all median.[15]

Of the 29 service worker occupations, 21 fall into the low-wage category, but the educational level of workers in 15 of these 21 either exceeds or is not more than one-half year below the 9.7 year median educational level for all service employees.[16] Consequently, we can hardly characterize the working poor as illiterate, unschooled, or for that matter, educationally inferior to workers in comparable occupations in high-wage industries. Education can explain why engineers earn more than janitors; but educational level alone cannot explain why a janitor in one industry fares so much better than one in the low-wage sector. Manpower training and development is not a sufficient answer for the problems of millions of poor people.

SKILL—Although education usually serves as a proxy for job skill, the two are not perfectly interchangeable. Agility and speed on a repetitious operation are not necessarily the byproducts of school attendance. Nevertheless, it appears likely that the conclusion regarding education and low-wage occupations can be extended to job skills. There is little reason to believe that an assembler in the high-wage auto industry is more skilled than the operative in a Southern sawmill or textile plant.

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION — The working poor are located in every state in the union, but the heaviest concentration of employed poor is found in the South. In 1964 over half of all working poor families and a third of all fully-employed unrelated individuals lived in the Southern states. While a good number live in the "pockets of poverty" of the Ozark Plateau, the Down East section of the eastern coastline, and the cutover region of the Upper Great Lakes, a still greater number are crowded into the industrial ghettos of the Northern and West Coast cities.

LABOR MOBILITY—One would expect that workers in low-wage occupations and industries would be eager to seek improvement of their lot by moving to high-wage areas of the country. To some extent empirical studies support this expectation, for there is a close relationship between median income levels and interstate migration patterns.

This movement, however, is not necessarily associated with poor workers in search of better wages. Rather, geographical mobility rates are associated with education, age, and race; in general, migration rates are higher for people with more education and in younger age groups. Yet, even mobility does not necessarily indicate escape from poverty. Although low-wage industries have greater labor quit-rates than industries which pay

[14] George E. Delehanty and Robert Evans, Jr., "Low-Wage Employment: An Inventory and an Assessment," Northwestern University, mimeographed, no date, p. 33.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

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higher wages, the high mobility of persons in low-wage jobs is not solely a reflection of job improvement: studies by the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that only roughly one-third of job changes by low-wage workers resulted in improved wages.[17]

Lack of mobility of the working poor accounts for a good measure of the continuing poverty of low-wage industry workers. While some refuse to move to higher-wage industries because of ties to family and region, many others cannot move because they lack means. For many, movement to another area appears risky, especially if it means forfeiture of an already existing full-time job, even if it is a low-wage job. Furthermore, the economic climate may be such that industries in high-wage areas have few jobs open for newcomers and refuse to expand employment because of fixed wage floors. Educational requirements pose another barrier for some of the employed poor who possess the will to advance to higher wage areas but lack the educational background to change occupations. In any case, wherever mobility of the working poor is restricted, the opportunity for escaping poverty is reduced.

We now have a pretty good idea of who is most likely doomed to poverty employment—Negroes, women, the immobile, and those who live in the South. Yet we have little indication of what produces low-wage jobs in the first place. The explanation that people are paid low wages because they are inherently less productive and therefore worth only a low wage fails under too many diverse circumstances to be of value as a general theory of low-wage employment. Hence, attention must be focused on the low-wage industries themselves in order to understand the existence of poverty income jobs and the root causes of the working poor.

Low-Wage Industries

THE WORKING POOR, as expected, are not spread evenly throughout industries. Employed indigents are concentrated in a number of industries which, for one reason or another, have failed to provide a living wage for many of their employees. Isolating these industries from all others provides some insight into the characteristics of low-wage firms.

There is little trace of low-wage employment in mining and construction, transportation and public utilities, wholesale trade, and finance. Poverty employment is found throughout the manufacturing sector (especially in nondurable goods production), in retail trade, and in service industries. Based on a relative income standard of 60 per cent of the average earnings in all manufacturing, the following partial listing of low-wage industries gives some idea of where the working poor can be found.[18] (See opposite page.)

It is in these industries that the bulk of the working poor are found. To a lesser extent, the working poor are scattered through many industries where their concentration is smaller but their conditions are just as intolerable.

The situation of workers in these industries is not improving. Not only are these millions of workers impoverished today, but they are losing ground relative to all other workers. The average hourly earnings in construction rose by 149 per cent between 1947 and 1966, 122 per cent in all manufacturing, and 133 per cent in durable manufacturing. Over this same period average wages rose only 88 per cent in textile-mill products, 63 per cent in apparel, 87 per cent in leather products, 100 per cent in furniture manufacturing, and 108 per cent in lumber and wood products. In retail trade, where the growth of employ-

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

[18] The 60 per cent criterion is only used as a rough standard of poverty employment as we stick to our belief that any finite poverty standard should not be taken literally. What the 60 per cent standard means is that all workers earning under 60 per cent of the average wage in manufacturing as a whole are counted as working poor. Hence any worker who earned less than $1.60 an hour in 1966 is considered poor since the average wage for all manufacturing workers in that year was $2.71. Other criteria also would isolate the same set of industries as low-wage.

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Low-Wage Industries in the 1960's

Industry	*Average Hourly Earnings* (for all workers in industry)	*Low-wage* (average percentages)
Southern Sawmills and Planing Mills	$1.25	88.2
Nursing Homes and Related Facilities	1.19	86.3
Work Clothing	1.24	77.1
Children's Hosiery Mills	1.33	76.9
Men's and Boys' Shirts	1.26	75.5
Laundries and Cleaning Services	1.26	75.4
Men's Hosiery Mills	1.37	71.7
Synthetic Textiles	1.57	55.5
Cigar Manufacturing	1.39	55.4
Cotton Textiles	1.53	54.5
Wood Household Furniture	1.57	50.8
Footwear	1.64	49.3
Women's Hosiery Mills	1.55	50.0
Fertilizer Manufacture	1.67	41.7
Hospitals	1.86	41.2
Candy and Other Confectionery	1.87	34.2
Brick and Structural Clay Tile	1.91	33.9
Wool Textiles	1.59	32.7
Structural Clay Products	2.08	20.8
Miscellaneous Plastic Products	1.95	19.9
Men's and Boys' Suits and Coats	2.12	19.5
Textile Dyeing and Finishing	1.96	16.7
Retail Trade		
Limited Price Variety Stores	1.31	87.9
Eating and Drinking Places	1.14	79.4
Hotels and Motels	1.17	76.1
Drug and Proprietory Stores	1.56	71.3
Gasoline Service Stations	1.52	66.7
Apparel and Accessory Stores	1.70	59.7
Department Stores	1.75	59.6
Miscellaneous Retail Stores	1.75	58.0
Retail Food Stores	1.91	47.6
Building Equipment and Hardware Dealers	1.98	39.4
Furniture, Furnishings, and Appliances	2.10	38.4
Motor Vehicle Dealers	2.40	28.7

Source: Industry Wage Surveys, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor (1961–1966).

ment was greatest, average wages grew by only 112 per cent, well below the increase in high-wage industries.[19]

A "dual economy" has developed in America. Whereas one sector has expanded rapidly, providing adequate wages and decent working conditions for its workers, another sector has fallen well behind. While the proportion of low-wage workers may be falling because of relatively declining employment in the low-wage sector, those left behind are worse off—and they still number in the millions.

A "character sketch" of the low-wage industries permits some insight into the dynamics of the low-wage sector of the economy. It should help us to understand the economic and social forces making for the

[19] *Manpower Report of the President*, 1967, Tables C–3 and C–6, pp. 250, 253.

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persistence of low-wage employment within an affluent society.

DEMAND FOR LABOR IN LOW-WAGE INDUSTRY —Wages in industries with increasing demand for labor are generally expected to increase at a faster pace than those where labor demand has slackened. Yet, in this regard, empirical evidence regarding low-wage industry appears equivocal. While a number of low-wage industries have had steadily declining employment consistent with slow rather than rapid wage advance, others have had relatively high employment growth rates.

PRODUCTIVITY OF LOW-WAGE INDUSTRIES— When the productivity of a firm increases, wages can presumably be raised, profits increased, and prices lowered—or a combination of the three can occur. In oligopolistic industries, productivity has been rising fairly steadily and the result, at least in part, has been a rising of wages and profits, often at a higher growth rate than that of productivity. When low-wage manufacturing industries are investigated, they usually are found to possess productivity growth rates consistent with the gains in the rest of manufacturing. Nevertheless, absolute productivity in the low-wage sectors appears well below that in the non-low-wage sector.[20]

The low absolute productivity of labor in low-wage industry, no matter whether the cause is too little complementary capital or inefficient management, partly explains the low level of wages in the poverty industries. But the productivity gains in low-wage industry are not reflected in the relative wage-rate changes. Rather than contributing to higher wages, productivity increases are either absorbed as higher profits or are passed on in the form of lower prices due to stiff competition.

PROFITS—Periodically, it is suggested that poverty wages are the result of employee "exploitation" by profit-grubbing firms. Indeed, firms maintaining influence in labor markets can artificially reduce wages below the return due to workers based on their productivity, and thereby accumulate higher profits. In some low-wage industries where the local labor market is dominated by one company, exploitation of this kind no doubt is practiced. Yet, in general, the evidence points to low-profit margins in the bulk of low-wage industry. A study by Delehanty and Evans demonstrates that while the median profit margin for all manufacturing was 7.33 per cent, it was 5.75 per cent for an isolated set of low-wage industries.[21] Thus the working poor are being exploited by the economy as a whole rather than by the individual firms employing them.

CONCENTRATION AND COMPETITION — The degree of market concentration in an industry or market competition determines the ability of a firm to determine prices rather than being subjected to the forces of the market. In some cases, oligopolistic firms may be forced to raise wages even above productivity gains, paying for this by cutting into monopoly profits or by boosting the price of their products. But highly competitive firms are rarely in such a position.

Data from Carl Kaysen's studies indicate that the degree of competitiveness among the low-wage industries is greater than that for the rest of manufacturing, and the same generally holds, probably to a greater extent, for retail trade and services, both in the low-wage sectors.[22] This accounts for the disparity between productivity and wage gains in the low-wage sector compared to the better paying industries. While productivity advances in low-wage industries have kept pace or in some cases exceeded the rest of industry, wages and profits have not risen as quickly because of intense price competition.

Nonetheless, a highly concentrated industry

[20] Delehanty, and Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[22] Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner, *Anti-trust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.

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per se does not guarantee a higher wage scale, for there is nothing inherent in the size of a firm or the absence of product market competition which ensures high wages. Rather, oligopoly provides what has been called a "permissive economic environment" within which other forces can more easily work for higher wages.[23] Needless to say, such an economic climate is nonexistent in the low-wage sector. A permissive economic environment entails capital-intensive production possibilities, the ability to set prices based on product demand, high public visibility, low firm entry, and opportunities for strong unions.

UTILIZATION OF CAPITAL — Where each worker has a great deal of machinery at his command, output per man will be large and the wage bill will be a relatively small fraction of total costs incurred by the producer. Such wages will tend to be higher than where production is labor-intensive. Furthermore, resistence to wage increases will be less in the capital-intensive industry, since wages make up such a small part of total operating costs. Studies have generally shown the amount of capital in low-wage industries to be relatively smaller than in the high-wage industries. This accounts for the lower average productivity in low-wage sectors and possibly for the growing gap in relative incomes between the average worker and the working poor.

PRODUCT DEMAND—There is little data on the demand for various products, but it can be assumed that the demand for many low-wage industry commodities is highly volatile with respect to price. If prices are forced up, demand is apt to fall. Only recently has foreign competition in the heavy-goods industry begun to dent domestic sales and prices in the high-wage sector. In the low-wage sector, however, notably in textiles, apparel, watches and clocks, foreign competition has been fierce and, in some cases, has failed to destroy a comparatively inefficient domestic industry only because of restrictive tariffs. When cigar prices rise, smokers switch to pipes and cigarettes; when domestic textile prices rise, fashions turn to imported fabrics. Consequently, the low-wage firm has little recourse to a price increase as a means of boosting wages or profit margins, for that matter.

PUBLIC VISIBILITY—When General Motors announces net profits in excess of 20 per cent per year, employs over 400,000 workers, and controls prices in a $20 billion-plus industry, the nation cannot help but take notice. The small "invisible" firm, on the other hand, often avoids the sharp eye of the government inspector and does not arouse public opinion. Consequently, low wages and poor working conditions have a much better chance to persist in the industries of the working poor. Similarly, laws are so drawn as to exclude many workers in the low-wage sector. As late as 1963, for instance, minimum-wage laws excluded from coverage over 1.5 million restaurant workers, 489,000 hotel and motel employees, over half a million laundry workers, 700,000 hospital workers, over 3 million retail clerks, millions of farmers, and thousands of loggers and agricultural processing workers.[24] Ironically, the minimum-wage law covers *all* auto, steel, rubber, and aluminum workers where the average wage is over twice the minimum and literally no one earns below one and a half times the legal minimum wage.

UNIONIZATION—Low-wage industry is not as highly unionized as high-wage manufacturing. Unions exist in many low-wage industries, but they are beset by great difficulties.

There is nothing inherent in the nature of oligopolistic industrial giants which explains their actual granting of higher wages. If we are fully to understand why wages in some industries are high and in others low, it is necessary to discuss unionization.

[23] Howard M. Levinson, "Unionism, Concentration, and Wage Changes: Toward a Unified Theory," *Determining Forces in Collective Wage Bargaining*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967.

[24] AFL–CIO, "The Low-Paid Worker," *American Federationist*, August 1964.

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Where an industry is inhabited by a few massive price-setting, highly mechanized, noncompetitive, publicly visible, and highly profitable firms, entry of new firms is indeed quite rare. Consequently unions, once established, are relatively secure from the competition forced on them by an unorganized sector in the industry. Free to press for higher wages without excessive fear of eliminating jobs by pricing their firm's product above unorganized competition, the union can demand for its members their share of productivity and productivity gains. The high profits of the titans of industry present a choice target for union wage demands when bargaining sessions open.

In the low-wage sector, we have found conditions nearly opposite to those existing in the high-wage industrial sector. To a great extent, the low-wage sector represents the result of a "repressive economic environment." Productivity is well below that of all industry; less capital is utilized in production; profit rates are smaller; competition flourishes, and the ability of many low-wage industries to pay adequate wages without drastically cutting employment is impaired. Furthermore, the repressive environment stymies union organization and bargaining for higher wages. Where an industry is so established that entry is free and open to new firms, we can expect weak unions and most probably low wages. Where industries are marked by easy entry, intense competition, highly volatile product demand, low profits, and low productivity, we can be assured of two things: if there is a union at all, it is bound to be ineffective, and there will surely be large numbers of working poor.

WHEREVER the market approaches its theoretical best—in the firms furthest from monopoly and closest to laissez-faire—it cannot supply jobs at wages adequate to feed a man's family. Thus, the inadequate incomes of most of the working poor are not of their own making. In dealing with the millions of working poor it is not enough to consider the problems of individuals—too little schooling, not enough training, inadequate housing and filthy neighborhoods, no hope, and no political power. *We must also change our economic system which continues to propel a poverty-wage sector right into the decade of the* 70's.

What Can Be Done

THE VOGUE solution to the poverty of those able to work but either employed or low-paid has been to inject a dose of retraining and subsequently place the individual back into the labor force, now presumably equipped to function in America's high-speed economy. Yet it should be clear that for many of the working poor (and many of the unemployed) the problem is not so much lack of preparation but the inability of a sector of the economy to furnish an adequate wage. Manpower retraining is needed for those who can benefit by progressing to better paying occupations. But it cannot attack the root causes of low-wage jobs which, given their existence, will inevitably be filled by those least able to take advantage of the affluent sector of the economy.

To eliminate low wages requires a combination of measures sponsored by the government and the labor movement.

(1) Congress must act to repeal Section 14b of the Taft-Hartley Act in order to eliminate the legally sanctioned open shop that plagues union organization. This section of the law has been most effective in the South. Without national support for union organizing, those regions where unionization is needed most will fare the worst.

(2) The trade union movement must take a major initiative in eradicating poverty wage scales. In many ways, the labor movement itself is responsible for the persistence of the unorganized sector. By raising wages, some unions have decreased employment in their industries. Those displaced from the high-wage industries are subsequently added to the

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pool of those seeking employment, and consequently wages in the unorganized sector are forced down due to the added competition for remaining jobs.

Furthermore, unions have to some extent contributed to creating inflation. The unionized sector, due to strong collective bargaining and cost of living arrangements, is partly protected against inflation. The real incomes of those working in the unorganized, unprotected sectors suffer much more. Unions in America have a long-standing debt to the unorganized. If it will mobilize its resources, the labor movement is in the position to pay that debt, a debt which it has so far failed fully to recognize. We can only hope that the complacency of the trade union movement will be shattered, and that it will once again take on the challenge of organizing the unorganized and aid in the establishment of new independent militant unions.

(3) Minimum-wage legislation must continue to be broadened and the floor raised. Industries not covered to date by such legislation must be included and the minimum raised to at least $2.00 per hour immediately and $2.50 over the next few years. While this will assure those working in any industry an above-poverty-line income, it will still leave many with inadequate incomes. To solve the real problem of poverty in America, that of an inequitable income distribution, will take much more far-reaching legislation.

(4) The raising of wages to adequate levels in low-wage industries will necessarily entail cutbacks in employment, sometimes drastic cutbacks. It thus becomes necessary to assure all those who have worked and would work if jobs were available at a guaranteed minimum income. For those who desire work, the government must act as an employer of last resort.

Recent discussions of negative income tax proposals to redistribute income must be seen as crucial to the whole matter of the working poor and poverty in America.

If an industry cannot pay an adequate wage, it should perhaps not be permitted to survive at the cost of maintaining its workers at a poverty level. In the rare instance that such an industry is crucial to the economy, it may be necessary to subsidize it so that it can pay adequate wages without reducing production. Otherwise, inefficient industries or individual firms within an industry should be forced to meet minimum standards for wages and working conditions or leave the market. The end result of such a program will be to reduce the repressiveness of the economic environment. Workers should not suffer for the inefficient operation of these sectors or for the reduction in employment as they are forced from the market.

(5) In the long run we must turn our attention to the whole question of work and its place in society. We must create jobs which not only give a man and his family a fair share in the economic pie, but which call upon man's creativity. Eventually a job must not be judged on its efficiency alone, but on its ability to enhance man's dignity and control over his environment.

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Éléna de La Souchère

Bolivia: Why Guevara Failed

BOLIVIA'S RECENT GUERRILLA episodes, whose protagonists and victims were Che Guevara and Régis Debray, are notable less for their cruelty—to which we have become only too accustomed—than for their chaos and confusion. A gratuitious incoherence permeates all the upheavals in a country which, in the twentieth century, is still struggling to emerge from medieval conditions, and where a new regime, weak yet authoritarian, is subject to diverse and contradictory pressures.

The "mystery of Che Guevara" puts us face to face with the mystery of Bolivia, and the tribulations of Régis Debray offer us clues to an understanding of present-day Bolivia.

BOLIVIA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE derives less from the raw material deposits in its subsoil—the tin of the Altiplano, the oil of Camiri—than from its geographic position, at the southern end of the large Indian-populated area embracing Colombia, Equador, and Peru. Castro indeed was tempted to attack Bolivia, at the southern border of this Indian Cordillera—which he hoped to convert into the Sierra Maestro of South America—though Colombian and Venezuelan guerrillas were already attacking the area in the north. If Castro were to conquer the mountain stronghold of the Bolivian Andes, he would spread insurrection to the Peruvian Andes, and on to the Brazilian Matto Grosso.

The Bolivian Andes is the poorest and the most vulnerable region in Latin America. Bolivia was neglected by the Spanish colonizers who viewed it merely as an area with mining prospects, to be left behind as quickly as possible for Lima, their city of pleasure. And in the last century Bolivia was treated even worse by her sister republics: a war with Chile deprived her of the port of Antofagasta and of a share in the Pacific shore.

Bolivia is separated from its northern neighbors by the dense forests of Amazonas and the semitropical, unarable savannas of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, two areas that cover 70 per cent of the national territory. Bolivia's arable land is confined to the Altiplano, a plateau whose average altitude is 14,000 feet and which is ceaselessly swept by icy winds. Bolivia's population is less than 4 million for a territory of 400,000 square miles—twice the size of France. The principal population centers are in the *yungas* (the valleys of the Altiplano), concentrated in several high basins as that of Cochabamba (alt. 8,000 feet), and especially in the mining areas of the Cordillera (alt. 13,000 to 20,000 feet). Mining is the only natural resource of this poor country. Tin, which brings in 75 per cent of the country's foreign trade, is exported in its raw state. This exclusive reliance on a single export item places the whole economy at the mercy of the slightest fluctuation of the world tin market.

It is not surprising, under these conditions, that the per-capita income produced is among the lowest in the Western Hemisphere: $150 a year. Bolivia's industrialization is only in its first phase; agriculture employs three-quarters of the working population. Most agricultural workers are Quechua and Aymara Indians, not integrated in the

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country's Spanish civilization. Despite an important literacy campagin during the national revolutionary period of the 1950's, the illiteracy rate is still 82 per cent. In 1961 the country had only 5,295 rural schools, with 7,190 teachers who were almost all recently hired and without diploma. In 1962 Bolivia had 284 nurses, 67 midwives, and 895 doctors—one for every 4,000 inhabitants.

In this environment the tin-mining industry has created a proletariat of 70,000 miners which is concentrated in a few areas. The miners have a strong desire for change; they were the fighting vanguard that ensured the victory of the nationalist revolution in 1952. Today, guerrilla leaders still hope that the old shock troops of the mining union will give them the final victory; for the miners have been disillusioned by the cautiousness of the nationalist revolutionary regime and the failure of its revolution.

THE FAILURE of the revolution is best explained by the split between the two social forces whose cooperation had made revolution possible in 1952: the mining proletariat—and the middle class which, in Bolivia as in other Latin-American countries, is now in a state of development that is unrelated to the present economic changes. Bolivia's middle class, consisting mainly of Spanish-Indian mestizos, forms 26 per cent of the urban population. Guillermo Lora, the Trotskyist theoretician, has emphasized the importance of this class as a revolutionary factor, for its numbers and aspirations exceed its employment opportunities. In his *Thesis of Pulacayo* Lora asserts that the "democratic-bourgeois revolution" will eventually bring about the overthrow of the landlord-mineowner oligarchy: it will lead to an alliance between the middle class and the proletariat—and is therefore the prologue to proletarian revolution. In that spirit, a tactical alliance was concluded between the miners' union (strongly influenced by the POR group of Trotskyist intellectuals) and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR). This alliance was led by economist Victor Paz Estenssoro. It brought Estenssoro to power in 1952 and enabled him to effect a number of structural reforms: new agrarian laws, nationalization of mines and railroads, and the creation of a government oil agency to work the Camiri oil fields.

Both the POR opposition and the MNR government party fought for control of the miners' and peasants' unions. But the workers were not sufficiently dissatisfied to break with the MNR government, and their support kept it in power for several years. The break in this coalition was finally caused by poverty: Bolivia, unlike Venezuela, did not have the necessary resources to finance reforms. Paradoxically, one might say that Bolivia did not have the means to support a revolution. Its experience—and that of other poor countries — proves that in the short run a revolution is a costly undertaking. The situation was exacerbated by the disorganized, inefficient administration of the mines, the undisciplined conduct of the miners (whose armed militias were practically beyond the government's control), and the flight of foreign capital and technicians, which produced a drop in production. Production fell off, from 33,000 tons in 1951 to 27,000 tons in 1955, when the world tin prices collapsed after the end of the Korean War.

Foreign currency became scarce; the fall in agricultural production, after the land reform, forced the government to import food on a very large scale; the balance of trade deteriorated from bad to worse. To satisfy the voters, the government had to act as an employment agency for middle-class bureaucrats. COMIBOL (the government's tin commission) employed one official for every three miners. The proliferation of civil servants, the inefficient and fraudulent public services, all badly in need of reform—all this had to be financed by ever larger issues of banknotes. The result was a chaotic infla-

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tion: under Hernan Siles Suazo, who succeeded Paz Estenssoro, the dollar was worth 11,950 bolivianos.

The unbalanced economy placed Paz Estenssoro, who was reelected for the 1960-64 term, before an agonizing choice. Should he pursue a demagogic policy that would please his MNR voters but might ruin the country —or should he take drastic measures that would throw many of his supporters into opposition? Paz, a responsible economist, could not but choose the second solution. In the winter of 1960-61 the crisis that was to determine the future course of events came to a head. To deal with the situation, a ten-year development plan, 30 per cent of which was financed by the U.S., was put into effect. U.S. aid helped to restore the country's financial balance and to create a new currency unit, the peso, worth 1,000 old bolivianos. To raise tin production, the government signed, on June 11, 1961, a three-way agreement with the United States, West Germany, and the Inter-American Development Bank. This agreement gave Bolivia $37 million worth of credit. In exchange, the creditors demanded a reorganization of COMIBOL and the dismissal of surplus government personnel.

These dismissals, and the transfer of expendable workers to the Santa Cruz-Camiri oil region, roused the mining population against the Paz Estenssoro regime; for to the Indians of the Altiplano, the tropical savanna is a hell of fevers and reptiles.

In response to the people's indignation, Juan Lechin, the leader of the miners' union and Vice-President of the Republic, now joined the opposition—the small Castroite and Communist groups. In addition, the MNR was weakened by the numerous middle-class malcontents who defected to join a new opposition party, the PRA—the extremist right-wing "Socialist Falange," formed by feudal landlords who had been ruined through the land reform. Against what emerged as a de facto alliance of Falangist rebels, Castroite students, and miners, the Paz Estenssoro government could only field a small army of 10,000 men. To ensure the support of the army, the MNR leader Estenssoro, running and re-elected for a third term in January 1964, chose for his Vice-President a young air force general, René Barrientos.

But the army, which now had become the government's major support, decided to take over: on November 4, 1964, it overthrew Paz Estenssoro and put an end to the nationalist revolution.

THE NEW JUNTA, led by General Barrientos, soon broke with the left-wing groups that had helped bring it to power. It destroyed the miners' strongholds in two successive attacks in May and September of 1965. After bloody fighting, the miners' milita men had to surrender their arms. Many militant opponents of the new government were arrested and put into the unsanitary prison camps in the Amazonian forests of the El Beni region. This repression, in turn, brought more guerrillas — students, exiled unionists, and fugitives from the El Beni camps—into Bolivia's resistance movement.

The guerrillas' hopes were, of course, founded on the weakness of the government's program. To be sure, on July 3, 1966, Barrientos legalized his position through a Presidential election—under military control. But now the two government parties—the Popular Christian Movement, founded last year by the President, and the PRA, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Walter Guevara Arce — are like general staffs without armies. But the opposition movements are no better off. The Falange (right-wing), the remaining members of the MNR (center), the PRIN led by Lechin (Left), the Communist party (now split into five groups), the Trotskyist POR, and the small Castroite groups are only active in intellectual circles and have practically no

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influence among the masses of the population. And so far they have failed to unite against the military regime.

The Castroite theoreticians note, not without justification, that in a society as unstructured as that of Bolivia, any coherent minority could rule. In such a context a few hundred guerrillas are not a negligible force. Bolivia's guerrillas were ensconced in the savanna, at the foot of the magnificent winding mountain road that joins Santa Cruz to the Altiplano. From there they hoped to join up with the miners of Catavi and Oruro, to revive the old rebellion of the mining strongholds. This was the plan of the guerrillas. And one must admit that in no other Latin-American country have guerrillas enjoyed the support of such an important proletarian nucleus.

BUT THERE ARE some gaps in this scheme, and they explain the defeat of the rebellion. To begin with, the guerrillas underestimated the strength of the Bolivian army. Thus, in the fighting of May and September in 1965, the army managed to take the strongholds of the miners, the essential revolutionary base without which the guerrillas may endure but cannot conquer. In these circumstances, rebellion can triumph only with the aid of the country's third major force: the peasant militias. Indeed, Che Guevara's concept of revolutionary guerrillas was founded upon the hypothesis of a peasant rebellion. But in Bolivia, as in almost all Latin-American countries, it is the peasantry which supplies the decisive support of the nationalist regime. The peasantry is dominated by the fear of repression and a superstitious respect for power — rooted in the old Inca tradition which deified the Chief. And only when these two brakes cease to operate, do the masses begin to move. In 1952, when the Bolivian peasants learned that Paz Estenssoro was about to proclaim a land reform, they threw themselves upon the haciendas. (Just as the Peruvian peasants have done more recently, with the tacit consent of *Viracocha Belaunde*— "Our Lord Belaunde." The Peruvian peasants, race brothers of the Quechuas and Aymaras of Bolivia, liken their President to a divinity of the Inca pantheon.)

In Bolivia, the invasions of the haciendas were encouraged by the Trotskyist POR militants. In his book *The Bolivian Revolution,* Guillermo Lora, leader and ideologist of that party, advocates a total expropriation, without indemnity, of the big haciendas, and their collective exploitation. He accuses Paz Estenssoro of sabotaging the land reform by the decree-law of August 2, 1953, which set up a system of expropriation by stages, with indemnity, and the division of land into family-size lots. Actually, the decree-law was passed, not to respect the rights of the landlords, but to ensure the maintenance of production in a large rural sector.

It was a wise precaution, if we may judge by the collapse of production in the agrarian reform zones. Lora ascribes this to the efforts of the government to force the peasants to evacuate lands not included in the expropriation plan and to the long legal actions which followed. But the decline of production can also be explained by the lack of seed and farm machinery, the ignorance of the Indians, and their ancestral habits. Accustomed to a subsistence economy, they work first and foremost to feed their families.

The miserable living standard of the new peasant owners and the interminable litigations concerning their lands would seem to foster agitation in the countryside. But Lora accuses the government of having robbed the POR of its control over the peasant unions. "Agriculture," he says, "is the last bastion of the MNR."

To understand this development, we must recall the *colonato* system which existed in Bolivia before the reform of 1953. The *colono* was allowed to cultivate a small piece

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of his *patrón's* land for his own family; in exchange he had to give three days of work each week without pay. The *patrón* could hire out the *colono*'s services to a third party. The *colono* was tied to the land by his debts, and to the *tienda de raya* (company store), which was the only store in the village and also belonged to the *patrón*—just like the soil and the subsoil, the water and the trees, the house and the animals. And any attempted flight led to beatings or imprisonment—for the judge and the police also were ruled by the *patrón.*

The land-reform law of 1953 freed the Indian from forced labor and the threat of imprisonment—by giving him the land he worked. Bolivia's Indian peasant now moved from the condition of de facto serfdom worthy of the twelfth century to that of the poorest peasants of Brittany or Galicia at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Though his new property did not give the Indian peasant affluence, at least it gave him freedom. The land title became to him the instrument and symbol of his liberation. And he now showed an unexpected attachment to his individual property—to the detriment of both the *aylus* (the old Indian village communities) and the agrarian cooperatives which the MNR tried to set up. Thus, to the peasants, Paz Estenssoro became the founder of the land reform and the guarantor of the new distribution of land. The Indian who fought for him felt that he was defending his land and freedom.

Considering the miserable condition of most of the 152,610 families among whom the MNR distributed 5 million hectares of land (about a quarter of the total area of the big haciendas), it may seem astonishing that the peasants have not made new revolutionary demands. But this generation, which has lived through the history of seven centuries in the span of seven years of battles and demonstrations, might well have lost the strength for making new revolutionary demands. Hope and necessity need a second wind. The MNR, of course, found its most solid support among that minority of peasants which profited most by the land distribution. This minority soon became a distinct group, separate from the mass of the poor and wretched, and had begun to produce for the market by the end of Paz Estenssoro's second Presidential term. This development has resulted in increased production of such export crops as cotton and sugar, usually grown on big plantations, but also of food crops, which are now practically monopolized by Bolivia's Indian peasant farmers. Between 1950 and 1963 (the year before the fall of Paz Estenssoro), wheat production rose from 45,652 to 78,400 tons and potato production from 189,384 to 700,000 tons; and during this period the corn crop doubled.

Most of these relatively affluent peasants live in the high basin of Cochabamba, the most fertile part of the country. There around 1964, a movement favoring General Barrientos has developed among the peasant unions of this area. Once again, the Indian peasants did not passively submit to any influence: collectively they intervened in political life. In the summer and fall of 1965, a projected alliance between Barrientos and the right-wing Falange provoked steady agitation in the countryside. The regular army half-heartedly launched a disarmament action but abandoned it soon; for the peasant militias refused to yield their arms. In October, thousands of armed peasants invaded the city of Cochabamba, where the Falange was holding its party congress.

The Barrientos regime had to make a decisive choice. Torn between the Falange which offered Barrientos alliance, and the peasants who besieged him with their demands and warnings—Barrientos chose the peasants. He had put an end to the nationalist revolution, but he wanted to preserve its basic objective—not to restore the old regime. Barrientos' turn toward the peasants probably saved his government: to the peasants

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he became the successor of Paz Estenssoro in his dual role as guarantor of small property—and the living incarnation of deified power. His hold on the peasants was demonstrated in January 1966, when he entrusted the Presidency temporarily to General Ovando, to devote himself to his election campaign. The peasants became frightened and sent one delegation after another to the capital, and the interim President had to offer reassurances. A few months later, on July 3, 1966, the peasants gave Barrientos their votes. Today, peasants' militias stand ready to fight for the Barrientos regime, whenever that may be necessary. And under these conditions the activities of the guerrillas must seem a hopeless adventure.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION was equally unfavorable. The element of surprise, which did so much for the Cuban guerrillas in 1959, no longer existed. An encircling wall of vigilance is tightening around Bolivia, as around all countries which are open to the temptation of revolution. The United States has sent to Bolivia intelligence experts and advisers trained at an anti-guerrilla school in Panama. But Washington need not contemplate overt intervention; such action would most likely be undertaken by Bolivia's neighbor countries. Brazil fears a guerrilla intervention in the Matto Grosso; it would not tolerate Castroite control of the 800 kilometer railroad line that joins the Bolivian oil area of Camiri to the Brazilian river port of Corumba on the Paraguay River.

Peru fears, and not without reason, repercussions of Bolivian guerrilla activities in the Peruvian Andes, for links have been established between the revolutionaries of both countries. And last July the Lima newspaper *Ultima Hora* reported that three Peruvian army lieutenants had joined Che Guevara in his Nacahazu camp in southeastern Bolivia.

Argentina is the least threatened of Bolivia's neighbors, yet the most vigilant. In 1967, after a special meeting of the heads of the three branches of Argentina's armed forces and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, President Ongania reinforced the border garrisons. And a trainload of food provisions—and probably arms—was sent to Bolivia under strong Argentine army guard.

This kind of intervention will probably be favored by agreements on defense cooperation such as the last OAS conference (September 22-24, 1967) recommended between neighboring countries. But such plans for cooperation have also been criticized as an infringement upon the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of one country by another. They do represent a danger, just like the general guerrilla war advocated by Cuba, or the inter-American intervention force proposed by Washington. A limited border agreement between two neighboring countries could indeed make it easier to expel guerrillas, and thus deprive the U.S. of a pretext for intervention. But a border agreement of this kind might still enable a government which is a satellite of Washington to suppress a nationalist and democratic emancipation movement in a neighboring country The result might be another Santo Domingo achieved through an intermediary nation.

In the particular case of Bolivia, such an agreement would be at most a pretext and a justification. With or without it, it is most unlikely that Brazil, Peru, or Argentina would have, or will, tolerate a Castroite takeover of the natural stronghold of the Bolivian Andes. And the disproportion of forces between little Bolivia and her powerful neighbors leaves no doubt as to the outcome of such an intervention.

Under such conditions how could General Barrientos believe in the Castroite danger? And if he does not believe in it, how can his propaganda offensive be explained?

There *was* fear in La Paz; but the guerrillas had little to do with it. Barrientos and his friends feared the success of the negotia-

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tion, started, broken off, and resumed again on a number of occasions, between the MNR and the miners' leader Juan Lechin, to reconstitute the coalition of 1952. The military regime, which had come to power through the split in this coalition, would have little chance of survival if a united front of the middle class and the proletariat were reestablished—especially if it were led by an MNR leader like Siles Suazo, who would not be opposed by Washington or by Bolivia's neighbors.

Such a coalition would also enjoy at least tacit support of the orthodox Communists, who, in Bolivia as elsewhere in Latin America, favor "united fronts." This Communist attitude dates from the summer of 1965, when Moscow celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress (July-August 1935), which started the European "United Fronts." In the last two years, the orthodox Communists of Latin America have bitterly denounced the tactic of armed struggle, and the two factions clashed violently at the Havana Conference last August.

In Brazil and Argentina, united fronts are already being formed with the open or tacit support of the Communists. The Soviet Union supports these tactics and seems determined to bring about a rapprochement with the democratic governments of Latin America. It has recently signed trade agreements with some of them, especially with Chile. This turn in Soviet policies can be explained by an awareness of the danger that Castro's line represents for Moscow. The sectarianism of Havana, by pushing the middle-class oposition to the Right, has indeed encouraged throughout Latin America military dictatorships, often closely tied to the United States. The Castroite guerrillas have contributed heavily to the disintegration of the Left and have been a providential alibi for military regimes. Barrientos, for example, started a giant propaganda operation around them as soon as he felt menaced by the possible reconstitution of the "United Front." He created a psychosis of terror: It had to be shown that little Bolivia was about to be assaulted by a vast international conspiracy—with ramifications in Moscow and Peking, Havana and St. Germain-des-Prés. A feeble democratic government, it was implied, would not be able to resist this menace —and Bolivia could be saved only by General Barrientos and his heroic army.

Will the joint efforts of the guerrillas and the regime's propagandists give the specter of revolution enough substance to consolidate the Barrientos government? Or will a united front take over the country? Bolivia's choice will be a test case for all Latin America. More than a battlefield, Bolivia is, today as yesterday, a laboratory for Latin-American political experiments. It was the scene of the most radical of nationalist revolutions, then of its fall through a tacit coalition between two extremes. Now it is the scene of the clearest clash between the two factions of the Latin-American Left: the revolutionary guerrillas and the united front of progressive forces.

Translated by I. A. LANGNAS

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Dennis H. Wrong

Identity: Problem and Catchword

LIONEL TRILLING'S STORY "Of This Time, Of That Place" begins with a young English professor assigning to his freshman class as their first theme the writing of an essay on "Who I am and Why I came to Dwight College." The first of the student papers the professor examines is that of a tall, gawky, badly-dressed but passionately if confusedly eloquent boy who has previously caught his attention. It begins: "I think, therefore I am, but who am I? Tertan I am, but what is Tertan? Of this time, of that place, of some parentage, what does it matter?" After puzzling a few minutes over the strange mixture of fractured syntax and verbal richness of Tertan's essay, Professor Howe picks up a second student paper and proceeds to read: "I am Arthur J. Casebeer, Jr. My father is Arthur J. Casebeer and my grandfather was Arthur J. Casebeer before him. My mother is Nina Wimble Casebeer. Both of them are college graduates and my father is in insurance. I was born in St. Louis eighteen years ago and we still make our residence there."

Trilling's story was published in 1943 before the terms "identity" and "identity crisis" had joined "neurosis," "alienation," and "mass society" as semantic beacons of our time, verbal emblems expressing our discontent with modern life and modern society. In his latest book, Erik H. Erikson, the creator of "identity" as a distinctive psychoanalytic and social psychological concept, has brought together in revised and reworked form all of his major papers on the subject.[1] Commenting on the promiscuous popularity the concept has achieved, he observes that adolescents these days know that "they are supposed to have" an identity crisis and compares the "strenuous overtness" of their search for identity with the earlier emergence into general awareness of sexual wishes that formerly remained unconscious and gave rise to hysterical symptoms.[2] Almost unavoidably, one today sees Trilling's two student protagonists as having arrived, tentatively at least, at contrasting solutions to the problem of identity. Tertan rejects the socially established coordinates of time and place and even of family, and seeks a deeper, more individual and at the same time less history-bound definition of himself. Casebeer, while "less interesting" than Tertan, "at least knows who he is," reflects Trilling's professor. The contemporary reader is likely to see Tertan as a seeker after "authentic selfhood," a quest that for him, as Trilling brilliantly shows, verges on the psychotic; Casebeer, on the other hand, is obviously a conformist, a square, a budding "organization man," who buries his true self by identifying himself totally with his social roles as scion of the Casebeer family, son of college graduates and a potential graduate himself, heir of a respected businessman, urban Midwesterner.

Such a facile response to the contrast between the two students is little more than an ideological reflex that does scant justice to the subtlety and moral ambiguity of Trilling's fictional exploration of Tertan's fate in the prosaic setting of an American college. I call it "ideological," using the word pejoratively, because "identity crisis," "authentic selfhood," and "conformism" belong to a whole language of social criticism that has recently

[1] Erik H. Erikson, *Identity, Youth and Crisis*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1968.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.

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become widely diffused in our society, reaching well beyond academic, literary, and psychoanalytic circles. "Alienation," "anomie," "mass society," "the loss of community," "the overdeveloped society," "organization man," "status-seeking," "soulless bureaucracy" are other terms in this language. I am not objecting to these terms as such—we owe most of them to our very greatest thinkers in the social sciences and they have become popular precisely because they truly convey something of the quality of life in modern society and express live historical emotions. What E. V. Walter has said of the idea of mass society applies more broadly to our language of fundamental social criticism as a whole:

> It cultivates the muddle ground between fact and supposition that is frequently occupied by metaphysic and myth. . . . It is a sensitive indicator of changes dimly perceived, and perhaps it is a proto-scientific formulation of truth, bringing to consciousness features of reality not yet substantial enough to be grasped by the methods of science.[3]

But this language is able, because of the very evocative power it possesses, to elicit indiscriminate negative responses to modern life. Nowadays its separate words frequently blur into a general hum of lamentation about the fate of man in modern society, in which each individual word loses its conceptual clarity in contributing to an overall tonal effect. Any stick to beat a dog with. That each concept has a rich and varied intellectual and ideological pedigree is forgotten. That the accusations leveled at modern society are inconsistent with each other is overlooked. Thus our society is charged with destroying the primordial bonds of community among men, while at the same time it is pilloried for promoting conformity and "togetherness"; man is said to be alienated, rootless, and drifting in contemporary America; but simultaneously he is too tightly controlled by giant bureaucracies and manipulated by the mass media. Our consumption-centered economy encourages Americans to retreat into a "privatized" life of affluence in which they are apathetic about public affairs, yet modern society is also seen as the seedbed of fanatical mass movements whose followers willingly submerge their private lives in dedication to a collective goal.

Now all of these charges may be true and their inconsistency apparent rather than real. Different charges may describe the behavior and attitudes of different segments of the population; or there may be a temporal dialectic in which a particular response when played out is succeeded by an alternative reaction to basically unchanged social conditions. But popular social criticism, indiscriminately brandishing as weapons such terms as "alienation" or "materialism," rarely dispels the impression of inconsistency by systematically analyzing these possible connections between the various counts of the indictment drawn up against American society. A word like "alienation" with its peculiarly rich sociological and philosophical heritage has become virtually shapeless in its current intellectual usage. And now the same fate threatens "identity" and "identity crisis," initially defined and analyzed so carefully and acutely by Erikson.

I do not think the solution is to abandon words that have become blurred as a result of wide and rapid circulation. The history of the social sciences sufficiently attests to the disastrous consequences of efforts to create a hygienic would-be "scientific" vocabulary free of all ideological overtones. And, anyway, communication between social scientists and a larger public is so rapid and extensive today that even the most arid neologisms quickly reach a wide audience. As Erikson notes, the classic psychoanalytic terms are themselves subject to changing historical connotations "which range from what Freud called the 'age-old ideologies of the Super-Ego' to the

[3] E. V. Walter, "Mass Society: The Late Stages of an Idea," *Social Research*, XXXI (Winter, 1964), pp. 409–410.

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influence of contemporary ideologies."[4] Far from advocating the avoidance of "richly suggestive terms," he suggests that "an awareness of the changing connotation of its most important terms is one of the requirements of a 'self-analytic' psychosocial orientation."[5]

What we must try to do is restore something of the analytical precision of the original terms; while simultaneously taking into account the resonance they have acquired, as their creators obviously could not. By analyzing the very cheapening process to which the language has been subject as an intellectual and social phenomenon in its own right, we may be able to arrest it and thereby advance the debate over the situation of man in our time.

WHY DO PEOPLE suffer from identity crisis or identity confusion in modern industrial society? One common answer is that society fails to provide them with stable social roles in which they can take pride and invest a large portion of their emotional energies and self-respect. Work roles are increasingly perceived as routines that fail to relate the worker to the larger community in any significant way; the emphasis on the consumption of trivia and the commercial provision of unimportant services and time-killing leisure pursuits that characterizes our advanced, "tertiary-stage" industrial economy, makes many occupational activities seem intrinsically debasing—one thinks of advertising executives, cocktail waitresses, or change-makers in Nevada gambling casinos. The difficulty of achieving stable identity is increased by the sharp discontinuities in the life-cycle of Americans that result from rapid social change, from mobility, and from an imposed age-graded schedule of involvement in successive specialized and segregated institutional milieus—school, college, military service, work. Moreover, exposure to the mass media means exposure to constantly shifting fashions in life-styles. Even traditional sexual and familial roles become ambiguous, while depressions, wars, and cold wars destroy continuity of understanding between generations.

The diagnosis is familiar. In effect, it equates identity with *social identity* and delineates the features of modern industrial society that prevent the establishment of firm, preferably life-long, social identities. Social identity is the social psychological counterpart of social role—the role as viewed from the perspective of its incumbent rather than in relation to the larger system of roles to which it belongs. The failure of society to provide the individual with "secure anchorage," as it is often put, in a social role is seen as the cause of the anxieties and identity crises from which we suffer. True, it is a sociological commonplace that men play multiple social roles in modern society. But they are likely to lack firm attachment (or anchorage) to any one of them, nor do they possess a secure total status in society cutting across their various "situated,"[6] or segmental roles, such as that of "aristocrat" or "peasant" in the more rigidly stratified society of the past. Thus some social analysts have treated the decline of hereditary social classes and the increase in mobility aspirations as the major cause of the individual's uncertain and fluctuating identity in modern society.[7] Earlier writers, including Durkheim, more often stressed the decline of a common, deeply experienced religious faith uniting people who differed widely in status, wealth, occupation, and even language.

II

WHEN VIEWED in this manner, the concept of identity becomes almost a synonym for "identification," with which it shares a common linguistic origin. At most, social identity is

[4] Erikson, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 230.
[6] Erving Goffman uses the term "situated roles" in *Encounters*, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961, p. 96.
[7] Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger, "Social Mobility and Personal Identity," *European Journal of Sociology*, V (1964), pp. 331–344.

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the result of successful identification with another person, group, social role, or movement. Sociologists have perhaps preferred to adopt the term identity, not merely because it is briefer and more economical—such considerations hardly seem to have influenced their terminological habits in general—but because it lacks the special psychoanalytic connotation of identification. However, even in psychoanalytic theory, identification is a socializing mechanism, in fact the primary socializing mechanism through which the superego itself is shaped and stabilized.

Yet Erikson rejects the equation of identity and identification from the standpoint of psychoanalytic theory.[8] He regards identity-formation as a distinct psychic mechanism that "begins where the usefulness of identification ends."[9] Identity is the unique selection made by the individual from all of the significant identifications of his past. "It arises from the selective repudiation and mutual assimilation of childhood identifications and their absorption in a new configuration."[10] Erikson goes on to observe that identity requires confirmation by the society to which the individual belongs. He makes it plain, however, that he does not mean confirmation of the individual's membership in a group or recognition that he has attained a new social role, but rather confirmation of the unique being that the individual has forged out of the identifications of his childhood and adolescence. Identity to Erikson means *personal* identity and is something more than mere social identity or the subjective reflection of a social role.

Personal identity is roughly synonymous with *individuality*. An important connotation that it has in common with individuality is that of referring to an objective attribute of the person rather than solely to the idea he has of himself. Identity, therefore, is not the same thing as "self-concept" or "self-image," although many writers have dealt with it as if it were. Self-image is more changeable than identity, lacking the "genetic continuity" Erikson ascribes to the latter.[11] Also, self-image is closer to consciousness, whereas identity, while including "the conscious sense of individual identity," refers also to an "unconscious striving for a continuity of experience."[12] If I understand Erikson correctly, identity includes both what the person really is—*how* in psychoanalytic terms his ego has synthesized his previous identifications and social roles—and his perception of himself, whether positive or negative.

That a sense of identity is something more than a favorable self-conception needs stressing because identity has tended to become a value-charged, almost a charismatic, term, with its secure achievement regarded as equivalent to personal salvation. It has acquired the same aura that clings to "mental health" or "normality" in popular usage. Even the experiencing of identity crisis is interpreted as a mark of spiritual depth: Erikson reports that "on occasion I find myself asking a student who claims that he is in an 'identity crisis' whether he is complaining or boasting."[13] Yet, surely, one may wryly or ruefully accept one's identity. A sense of identity may include a regretful recognition of limits: recognition that the self one has become precludes some experiences, some kinds of mastery, has closed off what were once open possibilities as now lying beyond the range of personal capability. Opportunities for mobility and the array of life-styles popularized by the mass media are often held responsible for delaying the achievement of secure personal identity by keeping modern men in a state of perpetual adolescence, fostering an illusory sense of limitless possibilities that survives well into the adult years.

Existentialist discussions of identity appear to be at sharp variance with the sociological

[8] Erikson, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–159.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 159.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 209.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 208.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 314.

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perspective that stresses the lack of consensus, the fragmented social structure, and the discontinuities in individual growth of modern society. Existentialist writers are primarily concerned with personal identity. Far from seeing identification with a social role as a prerequisite for identity, they see it as the ultimate death of authentic selfhood. To Sartre, the man who identifies himself totally with his social role is guilty of "bad faith" in seeking to destroy the freedom of his "being-for-itself" by grasping at an illusory "being-in-itself." Such men have handed their lives over to others when they imprison themselves in the "dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they endeavour to persuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, an auctioneer, a tailor."[14] Their betrayal of identity lies in their effort to *be* their social role in the same way that "this inkwell is an inkwell, or the glass is a glass."[15] Sartre calls the man who thus tries to escape from his freedom and individuality a *"salaud"*—a French colloquialism which, it seems to me, is most accurately translated in this usage as "square." The square is he who fails to realize the arbitrariness, the humanly invented character, of all social codes. He is blind to the fact that his social role is truly a role in the theatrical sense—something one plays at, not something that exhausts the definition of what one is.

Writers influenced by existentialism complain that modern society, far from preventing identity-formation by failing to provide secure social roles, depersonalizes the individual by forcing him into standardized roles and treating him as an altogether replaceable integer in a mass. He becomes the mere appendage of a technical-bureaucratic machine. Political propaganda, mass production, and the mass media presuppose a public that is merely an aggregate of identical consumers or "little men" and thus they promote conformism. Such protests are, of course, by no means confined to existentialists. Like existentialism, however, they stem from an antinomian, romantic individualist tradition that sees social controls and collectively-imposed patterns of conduct as the enemies of personal identity. This tradition appears to be directly at odds with the sociological critique that regards identity as the result of anchorage in a group or social role and condemns the atomization, rootlessness and anomie of modern life. Yet popular social criticism borrows freely from both perspectives, seemingly unaware of the contradictions between them. In its purer forms existentialism, however, purports to describe not merely man as victimized by modern society, but the human condition in general. Thus appropriations of the language of existentialism for attacks on the specifics of contemporary life are of doubtful justification. For to the existentialist *all* social roles, *all* institutions, mores, and group loyalties are threats to personal identity—the rituals of the tribesman and the allegiances of serf and nobleman as much as the "alienated" work routines of the organization man or the frantic sociability of the suburban housewife. All social identities are masks, false-faces that stifle the lonely freedom and uniqueness of the person. As John Schaar observes:

> With all its richness of sociological and psychological detail, the philosophical theory of alienation refuses to concede that alienation can be reduced to an exclusively sociological problem and understood solely in sociological terms.[16]

If one similarly pushes the sociological critique of modern society to its limits, it is hard to see why the writers who make use of it so frequently deplore conformism, organization men, and the search for roots in suburbia. For if identity is the result of firm group attachments and rootedness in established social roles, what is wrong with efforts

[14] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* New York: Philosophical Library, 1956, p. 59.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] John H. Schaar, *Escape from Authority,* New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964, p. 225.

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to create a master loyalty to the corporation or the suburban community? Was the feudal vassal's loyalty to his liege different in kind from that of the modern executive to his company? For that matter, why object, now that religious faith has lost its hold over men, to establishing a new consensus based on a secular ideology interpreted by a priesthood of state officials? Indeed, both David Riesman and William H. Whyte have understood, unlike many of those who parrot them, that other-direction as a way of life and managerial efforts to create loyal organization men owe a great deal to popularization and application of the findings and principles of modern social science.

III

ULTIMATELY, there is a fundamental moral and philosophical conflict between the antinomian individualist and the sociological positions. But having drawn as sharply as possible the contrast between their critical perspectives on modern society, I shall now explore the sense in which both are true and complement one another.

Social analysts have often observed that greater individuality, a heightened sense of identity, and a richer inner life may flourish where social constraints are more binding and inescapable than under the regime of aimless freedom enjoyed by so many contemporary Americans. Maurice Stein, a sociologist, remarks that: "It almost seems as if community in the anthropological sense is necessary before human maturity or individuation can be achieved. . . ."[17] Although David Riesman has frequently protested such an interpretation, readers of *The Lonely Crowd* have often understood it as an attack on other-direction and a eulogy of inner-direction. Yet our Victorian grandfathers were models of inner-direction, while the entire modern movement in the arts, social sciences, psychiatry, education, child-rearing, and attitudes toward sexuality have been an assault on the repressiveness, narrowness, intolerance, and hypocrisy of the faiths and moral codes by which they lived.

Erikson observes that "the concept or at least the term identity seems to pervade much of the literature on the Negro Revolution in this country."[18] While he concerns himself chiefly with problems of Negro identity, he also recognizes that the survival of racial oppression poses a challenge to white identities and provides opportunities to reshape them: "there is, in fact, more than poetic justice in the historical fact that many young white people who feel deeply deprived *because* of their family's 'culture' find an identity and a solidarity in living and working with those who are said to be deprived for lack of such culture."[19] The attitude of some writers and intellectuals toward the Negro is also instructive. Norman Mailer and Jack Kerouac are only the most extreme and most publicized celebrants of the greater vitality, inner freedom, and personal integrity often attributed to Negro life and personality.

Yet Negro writers have protested, like Ralph Ellison, that the Negro is the "invisible man," or, like James Baldwin, that "nobody knows my name." Negro identity in America is, of course, a negative identity in Erikson's terms, and, without accepting the romanticism of Mailer and Kerouac, it may for that very reason be for some of its bearers less stifling of personal identity than approved roles. Under the worst conditions of oppression in the South it often became no more than a self-conscious mask worn in encounters with whites.

The fragmentation of the civil rights movement, however, reflects (among other things) growing conflict between the claims of personal and social identity among Negroes themselves. The civil rights movement initially seemed to promise viability and iden-

[17] Maurice R. Stein, *The Eclipse of Community*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 248.

[18] Erikson, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 304.

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tity to Negroes as individual human beings. Its failures and the shift in the focus of protest from segregation in the South to conditions in the urban ghettos of the North have intensified efforts by Negroes to replace a negative group identity with a positive one, efforts that seemed exotic and cultist even a few years ago when the Black Muslims first received national publicity. Today someone like Ralph Ellison, with his passionate insistence on his right to his own individuality as it has been shaped by the cultural resources of Western civilization as a whole, strikes black power militants as being positively old-fashioned and out of touch—if they do not simply dismiss him as an Uncle Tom.[20]

Hereditary statuses, precisely because they represent an unalterable social fate for the individual, may threaten personal identity less than statuses that are subject to the tensions and agonies of choice and for which the individual, having chosen, must prepare himself in advance by what sociologists have called "anticipatory socialization."[21] Also, frequent and intimate personal contacts between members of different social classes and status groups have often been the rule where status rank is hereditary, as Philippe Ariès and Philip Mason have recently shown to have been the case in Medieval Europe and 18th-century England respectively.[22] Thus in contrast to the negative racial identities of modern times, the person of low social rank in these societies was less likely to become invisible and nameless behind a derogatory stereotype.

A sense of personal identity is more easily safeguarded by formal manners and strict rules of etiquette governing one's relations with others than by the ready friendliness, lack of reserve, and casual intimacy with strangers that have long been recognized as characteristically American. The very rigidity and artificiality of formal manners permits the individual to maintain his inner life intact behind the barrier they present and gives an unmistakable significance to breakthroughs to intimacy (recall the meaning of achieving a linguistic "thee-thou" relationship with someone in the great 19th-century European novels). In America, on the other hand, quite apart from the blatant commercial exploitation of pretended intimacy (pseudo-*Gemeinschaft*, as Merton has called it[23]), an apparently intimate rapport is established so quickly that one cannot be certain it means anything beyond the moment.

IV

CONSIDERATIONS such as these have been advanced by ideological conservatives in defense of hereditary social hierarchies and restrictions on personal freedom. As has often been pointed out, much of both the language and the substance of modern social criticism is derived from, or is at least continuous with, the conservative critique of democracy and equality developed in the aftermath of the French Revolution. And the usual riposte by defenders of contemporary American life is to label the critics reactionaries whose nostalgia for the past prevents them from enthusing over the vastly increased opportunities for freedom and individuality made available to all men, rather than to an upper-class elite alone, by democratization and technical progress. This rebuttal is unconvincing, not merely because analysts who hold a wide variety of theoretical and ideological positions agree on essentially the same diagnosis of the ills of American society, but because the fact that greater freedom and individuality are *possible* under conditions of relative class-

[20] See Ellison's intense discussion of this issue in *Shadow and Act*, New York: Random House, 1964, especially in the essay "The World and the Jug," pp. 107–143.

[21] Luckmann and Berger, *op. cit.*, pp. 338–339.

[22] Phillipe Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, pp. 207, 411–415; Philip Mason, *Prospero's Magic: Some Thoughts on Class and Race*, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962.

[23] Robert K. Merton, *Mass Persuasion*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946, p. 142.

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lessness, democratic culture, and high living standards is not the same thing as their *actual* realization. Moreover, if these values have truly been maximized, how account for the swelling chorus of discontent? To attribute complaints about modern life to disgruntled conservatives, disillusioned ex-Marxists, literary snobs, Europeans with an aristocratic bias or, more generally, "alienated intellectuals," is to ignore the resonance of the complaints in much wider circles. After all, books of social criticism have been best-sellers and have often found an audience among the very groups whose way of life they attack—suburbanites, junior executives, the metropolitan middle class in general.

Conservatives and radicals, to be sure, often agree that equality of opportunity and material abundance have led to identity crisis, dehumanization, and cultural mediocrity rather than to freer, more creative, and more individualized lives for the majority of the population. Comparing two recent philosophical works analyzing modern technological society—Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* and Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man*—one is struck by the underlying similarity of outlook shared by the authors in spite of obvious contrasts between their theoretical positions. Arendt is full of misgivings about the world created by modern science and technology when contrasted with the preindustrial societies of classical antiquity and Medieval Christendom where men preserved a sense of limits in a world they did not regard as entirely of their own making; she fears that "it is quite conceivable that the modern age—which began with such an unprecedented and promising outburst of human activity—may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known."[24] Marcuse, too, is aware of the loss of psychological depth in our "one-dimensional" world dominated by a purely functional rationality of anonymous and impersonal social controls, in which even the formerly explosive, reality-transcending energies of sexuality and artistic creativity are tamed in the service of a system that becomes all the more difficult to challenge because it tolerates them. But Marcuse insists that man must complete his "technological project" by realizing the historical alternative to the present: "the planned utilization of resources for the satisfaction of vital needs with a minimum of toil, the transformation of leisure into free time, the pacification of the struggle for existence."[25]

Arendt is more concerned with what has been lost in the passage from the stable, stratified, faith-centered societies of the past, while Marcuse's central aim is to reassert the liberating potentialities of science and technology—including social science—that have been used to create weapons of destruction, useless consumers' goods, and bureaucratic monoliths. The thrust of Arendt's argument is "conservative" while Marcuse's is "radical," although such simplifying labels do both writers an injustice.

Personal identity may have been less threatened by the more custom-bound societies of the past in which social institutions and norms retained an aura of sacredness and "charisma" than by today's self-evidently man-made world of technological rationality and planned social organization. But we cannot—even if we wished to—restore the mystery and absolutism of social control for the sake of enhancing identity, nor for the sake of anything else. What Max Weber called the "disenchantment of the world" applies to the realm of society as well as to the realm of nature:

> There are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play but rather . . . one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. . . . One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such

[24] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959, p. 295.

[25] Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964, pp. 252–253.

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mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service.[26]

Social science itself has made no small contribution to the de-mystification of social processes and, like the physical sciences, it has often been used to promote ends and to justify moral and political creeds at odds with those cherished by its creators. George Orwell once remarked that, even if one concedes the truth of the most extreme accusations of ugliness and human and natural destructiveness made against machine civilization, one nevertheless cannot travel to London by ox-cart with automobiles whizzing past and planes droning overhead, at least not in the same spirit that was possible before the invention of modern transportation. The very consciousness of the existence of alternatives that are faster and mechanically more efficient alters the experience, no matter how intensely the wider social consequences of the alternatives may be deplored. Thus, Orwell argued, the self-conscious effort of Medievalist and agrarian ideologues to eliminate modern technology from their lives and to live by handicrafts, relying only on human and animal labor power, is absurd.

The same applies to efforts to recreate social ties and identities that have the emotional power of the pre-bureaucratic past. Thus those sociologists, who argue for the necessity of stable social roles, binding consensus, and firm intermediate group loyalties, are not in the end inconsistent when many of them refuse to applaud contemporary conformism, organization men, suburban sociability, and the "engineered consent" of the mass media or of totalitarian methods of control. The loyalty of the executive to his company is ultimately either a compulsive, willed loyalty or a qualified and provisional one that is different in kind from the loyalty of the vassal to his liege. We have lost the capacity to believe, or even to achieve a "willing suspension of disbelief" in the transcendental authority of society, just as we some time ago lost the capacity to believe in supernatural authority—which Nietzsche understood when he proclaimed the death of God. Nor is the existentialist who asserts that all socially-imposed conduct is alienating as ahistorical as he appears to be. For he knows that only in the modern world of de-mystified instrumentalized social structures could he gain such insight into the human condition.

Social identity no longer provides a protective barrier for personal identity. Nor does it destroy personal identity by eliminating choice and the possibility of "role distance."[28] With the important exception of racially persecuted minorities and the underclass of the permanently poor and unemployed, the absorption of individuality by social role is not an irresistible process but one that depends on the complicity of the individual himself: he *chooses* to be an eager role-player, to wear the uniform of the organization man, the happy consumer, or the hippie. We know now that even totalitarian regimes are less successful in reshaping men in their own ideological image than we once thought. The existentialist insistence that man makes himself by his choices has never been more apposite than to the situation of modern man. Yet the existentialist, while actively engaging himself in protests against social injustice and political oppression, usually describes only in negative terms the social order that might encourage men to make the most authentic choices. The sociologist, on the other hand, has been unable to advance much beyond specifying the formal requirements such an order must meet: minimal consensus, a degree of continuity in socialization, the regulation of potentially destructive group conflicts, etc. Can we create a society that does not mythologize its own processes of social control and allows men to choose their own identities without making life appear a senseless routine?

[26] Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, transl. and introd. by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 139.

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George Charney

Out of the Communist Past

The following sketches are taken from A Long Journey,* *a memoir that attempts to sum up a lifetime of experience in the American Communist party. The locale of these sketches is New England in the* 30's.

Throughout all the years in the "movement," I and many of my friends cherished the Party as the vanguard, and the Soviet Union as the "key" to history. These beliefs, that held fast despite the repressions of the Cold War, could not survive the impact of the revelations of the 20th Party Congress and the role of Stalin. The revelations and the events that followed in Poland and Hungary led to the exodus of thousands from the Party. In the latter years, as the state chairman of the CP in New York, I was actively embroiled with John Gates and others in the internal struggle to reform the Party. We were dubbed the "revisionists." Our efforts failed, and I joined the exodus in 1958.

The Par-tee

PHIL CAME TO BOSTON in the midsummer of 1935. He was the district organizer of the Communist party. His arrival was fortuitous. It coincided with the meeting of the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern and the emergence of a new Party line. His predecessor in leadership was plodding and introspective, one of the Yeshiva brand of Marxists. Phil, on the contrary, was dynamic and brilliant, born to leadership. The two opposite personalities symbolized the transition or leap from the old line of the Party to the new.

The Dimitrov report to the World Congress on the United and Peoples' Front instantly captured the imagination of the party membership, especially of my generation. Everything seemed right; the emphasis on unity in the battle against fascism, the inspiration to achieve the broadest alliances on all issues that affected the lives of the people.

We adjusted overnight in our evaluation of Roosevelt and the New Deal, though some of the old-timers argued that FDR started out as a demagogue and a reactionary but was compelled to modify his policies under the pressure of the "masses," or some such nonsense. Where we had been prone to damn all institutions in American life, we were now reassured that patriotism was not necessarily the "last refuge of scoundrels," that there was a difference between bourgeois democracy and fascism.

Yesterday we had been a small, isolated sect. And now the new program, enunciated in bold American terms by Earl Browder, helped to unleash the creative energies of the Party. We were American Communists; though it would be rash to say that we were Americans first and Communists second. The primary tie was still ideology, the main outlook, internationalist. Nevertheless we had a new awareness of our American roots and we were readily convinced that the two were not only compatible, but inseparable.

We became Jeffersonians, students of American history and as we rediscovered our revolutionary origins, we reinterpreted them in Marxist terms. We had caught up with Americana, though compelled to garnish it

* *A Long Journey* will be published by Quadrangle Books of Chicago this fall.

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with our own ideas. We even projected a flamboyant slogan—"Communism is 20th-century Americanism"—to dramatize our new approach and to suggest the historical link between democracy and Communism; but this was stretching a point. These ideas, however exaggerated or dressed up, molded the thinking of the members and spread their influence to the rippling circles around the Party.

The decisive event in reshaping and building the Party was the rise of the CIO under John L. Lewis. It gave our forces in the unions, especially the small, isolated segments of the Trade Union Unity League (TUUL), a breathtaking opportunity to join in the massive drive to build the CIO in such industries as auto, steel, and rubber, and thereby gain citizenship in the labor movement. Jack Stachel, the chief Party spokesman on trade union matters, at a national conference described the CIO as the "TUUL with muscle." That the CIO had muscle there was no doubt; that it resembled the TUUL was again stretching a point.

Thus the spirit of unity and national identification was instilled in the Party ranks and spread in all directions to influence even the mores and customs of the Party. Once Browder was seen helping his wife put on her coat in a restaurant; the word spread and helped to set a new style of manners in the Party. It was even rumored that 1905'ers in Chicago followed the fortunes of the White Sox with consuming passion and were known to miss meetings to listen to a game on the radio.

IT WAS AT THIS POINT that Phil came to Boston to guide the activities of the Party. I served as organization secretary, his closest co-worker. Some of the old-timers warned that he was a "toughie," but we welcomed him. He was of medium height, powerfully built, like a county sheriff or a commissar in the movies, with flashing black eyes that expressed a lively intelligence as well as an unruly temper. True, he was hard, but he was also compassionate and the first to take responsibility for error. These qualities appealed to me. And he had talent for leadership. That, combined with his tremendous energy, inspired the Party to activity unprecedented for staid old Boston. It more than made up for his rough spots. These faults were in part due to his nature, but in greater part to his being so much a product of the Party and its peculiar mores. He had a way, in common with the made-in-Russia cadre, of placing the emphasis on the last syllable, Par-*tee*, to invest it with greater unction and to give grace to those who had enlisted in its cause. He came to Boston, a picaresque figure, smoking Pittsburgh stogies that gave off a horrible stench and using a rough and ready lingo, mixed with the Party jargon to convey the image of a proletarian leader. It was just a hangover of the past, of caps and leather jackets in the popular romantic image of Lenin and his followers of 1917.

Poor Phil probably fretted that he came from the lower middle class and worked as a postal clerk and not as a coal miner. He hoped that the Pittsburgh stogies and his tough manner would alter his image. A man's status in the Party was often determined by "composition" or class origin. Like Abraham, father of the Jews, who, according to some historians, came of a wealthy Babylonian merchant family—though to others the Bible presents him as a humble sheepherder. So Phil, like many of us, tried to make up for a dubious class origin. He had a habit at meetings of pounding the table when least expected, to summarize the debate—and this long before Khrushchev—as though he had artfully studied the mannerisms of the "iron-willed Bolshevik." A colleague once said of our relationship that we complemented each other. Phil would knock them down and I would pick them up and dust them off. Phil had imagination but very often came up with erratic ideas that would cause consternation. He didn't mind. He hungered for recognition; and if

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his ideas did not inspire praise, they did compel attention. At a national meeting Phil once delivered a fiery speech studded with half-baked adventurous ideas. Browder took issue with Phil, gently but firmly. Phil was sitting, alone, in the back of the room puffing on his cigar, his face slightly flushed, anticipating the polemics, and yet proud that he could command serious commentary by the General Secretary. Phil was also prepared to take on the toughest assignment in the Party, such as Pittsburgh, where most District Organizers had battered their heads against those anthracite walls.

These faults, or shortcomings as we called them, mattered little at the time; besides, Phil was not without humor and could in a quiet hour, when his egotism was not on view, smile ruefully at his own antics. What did matter was that he brought the Party out of its doldrums and fired it to a pitch of enthusiasm, not by eloquence as much as by his dynamic participation with the people in every activity. He could not rest in the rear echelons making policy. He was born to rough-and-tumble combat in the field.

As the United Front movement made progress and modified our harsh class-against-class posture, Phil too, albeit grudgingly, broadened his outlook and switched from his proletarian stogies to a 10c Perfecto; but he still smoked it like a stogie, furiously.

One of Phil's first acts as DO was to move the Party headquarters from its dingy office on Washington Street, near the railroad tracks to Essex Street, in the heart of Boston. It was just the beginning. Within a year the Party doubled its membership, extended its influence in the unions and among the liberals and in the Negro community. We received invitations to speak all over New England, at forums, meetings, churches. It was quite a leap from the soapbox of yesteryear to Ford Hall Forum, from brickbats to applause. In previous years our public meetings were modest affairs of a few hundred or so in Roxbury or Dorchester, where we had a small base in the Jewish community. In the Presidential year of 1936, Phil reached for the stars and we hired the Boston Arena with Earl Browder as the featured speaker. Over 8,000 people attended. Boston, the small Yankee outpost of the Party, had come into its own.

In 1937 the time had come for me to leave Boston. A lovely banquet was held. Phil made a touching speech to culminate our comradeship. I saw Phil thereafter from time to time at national meetings. Following the outbreak of the war, I met him in the winter of 1942 in Seattle, Washington. I was a GI stationed at Fort Lewis, near Olympia, Washington. He was now the district organizer in the Pacific Northwest. Phil was ebullient as ever, blustery, full of piss and vinegar.

Later Phil joined the army but became part of the tattered, ignominious band that lived out the war in rep'l-dep'l camps. His experience was pitiful. Some of us, it is true, who were known as Communists were subjected to harsh and discriminatory treatment; but most of us won the respect of our fellow GI's. Poor Phil had rotten luck—I suspect that he was too cocky, that he had lived too closely within the Party where his authority was unquestioned, to blend with the men and seek a modest place in the ranks.

I SAW PHIL AGAIN long after the war. The world had changed. Our world. The Party had been quickly and harshly reconstituted under Foster. Browder had been ousted from leadership and expelled. The Cold War had replaced the period of unity and the Grand Alliance. The Party was under severe and continuous attack. The national leaders were imprisoned under the Smith Act and hundreds of state and local leaders were picked up throughout the country. I was arrested with the "second string" in New York. The Party was "underground" and only a few of us, temporarily free on bail, conducted the restricted public activities of the Party.

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In this period Phil, too, had changed. For years he had aspired to national leadership but instead was shuttled from district to district like a rep'l-dep'l functionary. His last post was district organizer of Maryland. In the course of time he became restless, discontented, abrasive.

In 1952 the situation was desperate, morale was low. The Party was held in the grip of ultra-leftist policies that deepened its isolation and increased the frustration of the leadership. It was at this junction that Phil, from his post in Baltimore, ventured to attack the policies of the Party. He advanced the view that Truman represented a real fascist menace and that the Party was wrong in directing its main fire against Eisenhower and the GOP. It was an incredible position that outdid Foster. Perhaps he hoped in the turmoil and confusion to achieve the recognition he hungered for. When his position was rejected, Phil lost all restraint and published his views at a meeting in Baltimore. I don't know how much of this nonsense he really believed.

Phil was expelled soon after. He knew the rules, that by publishing his dissenting position, he had breached the discipline of the Party. He was the victim of his unruly nature and of his ambitions. And he was even more the victim of a system in which the demands of "discipline" overrode all other considerations, including that of elementary humanity.

Phil, too, was a Smith Act victim, and in the shortest mockery of a trial on record he was sentenced to a long prison term in Atlanta. The Party was his life and now he went to jail as an outcast from the only life he had known. His term in Atlanta was a ghastly experience. He suffered torment in his desperate effort to prove that he was still a loyal Communist. He was brutally assaulted by inmates and subjected to harsh treatment by the prison authorities. He came out of jail with his sight seriously impaired.

I went to visit Phil on his return from prison. It was after the upheaval that followed the 20th Party Congress. He lived in a dingy flat uptown. I rang the bell and he opened the door. I could hardly recognize him. He was shrunken, his face was disfigured and had a greenish pallor. I had known him in the best days, as a man of leonine appearance, splendidly virile, who commanded life. He was now the figure of death. We embraced in the hallway. His first question was, "How is the Par-*tee*?"

The Highwayman

He was a textile worker in Lawrence, in his early thirties, Irish-American, president of the union local and commander of the Legion post, and proud of his status and popularity. He was warmly greeted in all the taverns where the workers gathered. Our efforts to reach him on union matters in these troubled times were unavailing. He rebuffed us and voiced the anti-Communist slogans of the American Legion and the right-wing leaders of the textile union.

His mill went on strike in 1936. It was one of the last textile strikes of the period. The prospects were bleak. Unemployment was widespread, the union was desperately weak with little support coming from other locals. The industry was moving South, leaving ghost towns throughout New England. At this point we offered what little moral and financial help we could muster. It was readily accepted. In the course of the strike he joined the Party. I issued the Party card and never really knew why he joined. I never asked. It may be that he viewed it as an expression of gratitude. Back in Boston we viewed it as an important event, for he was one of the first native-born Americans in the textile union to join the Party.

Our joy was short-lived. The strike was smashed and he was blacklisted. Many of the union militants left town in search of employment. He was penniless and virtually alone. After a time there was hardly a tav-

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ern in Lawrence where he could get a friendly welcome or a beer.

Rumors came to us in Boston that he was engaged in illicit activities. One day I received a message that he wanted to see me. I went to Lawrence that night. He lived now in a hovel on the edge of town. His wife had lost all her front teeth, the children were in rags. He took me to the attic and told me that he had taken to armed robbery on the road and did not want to compromise the Party.

I still remember the agony of that night when he took out all his belongings: his papers, his pistol, his Party card, which he gave to me. He could hardly speak, and I not at all.

The Mayor of B . . .

HE WAS A FREQUENT VISITOR at the Party bookshop on Essex Street, in Boston. He was a tall, gangly, red-necked Yankee and asked questions about Marxism, and naturally we were suspicious. In that period we were wary of anyone who showed an interest in the movement other than college radicals or Jewish garment workers.

The Seventh World Congress of the Comintern had already taken place, with Dimitrov's famous appeal of 1935 for the United and Peoples' Front against Fascism. We had no appreciation of its favorable impact on the people here at home. We viewed the Party as a tiny but heroic vanguard, surrounded by enemies; hence we were unprepared for the surge of interest evoked by the events of the time.

I was introduced to our Yankee friend on one of his visits to the bookshop. We had a long talk, and I had no doubt that he had a genuine and lively interest in Marxism. I was charmed by his personality, and he was delighted to meet one of the officials of the Party. He turned out to be the mayor of a small town in New England. He made monthly trips to Boston to attend the meeting of the Federal Reserve Bank. These meetings, I learned, served as a convenient pretext for him to come and browse among the classics of Marxism in the bookshop. We got together on each occasion for long and friendly chats. He confided in me that he was the first mayor to levy a tax on the big factory in town that had always enjoyed immunity. He collapsed with laughter as he described the utter bewilderment of the factory management. He also confided, ruefully, that he was obliged to read his Marxist literature surreptitiously, in the barn, because of the violent antipathies of his wife, who derived from a prominent Republican family in the state.

He was a delightful character, with a droll sense of humor. He thoroughly enjoyed his dual role as mayor and anti-mayor, attending august sessions of the Federal Reserve Bank and chuckling over its inevitable downfall in the barn. I lost track of him in the years that followed. I can only hope that he found in Roosevelt and the New Deal at least some of the egalitarian values he cherished. He probably would have found it as difficult to espouse these views to his wife as it had been to acknowledge his conversion to Leninism.

An Obituary

MET JACK WILGUS during the marble workers' strike in 1935. He was a new member, of a wealthy Vermont family, and soon after was assigned to lead the Communist party in that state. At the time I was organizational secretary of the New England district.

Wilgus was a natural. He was the kind of young, native rebel who confirmed all our expectations of the changing American scene —that the Party was destined to emerge as the vanguard of the radical upsurge. Jack reminded us of Marx's comment that the revolutionary movement attracts the best sons of the bourgeoisie, just as the French Revolution had won over the best sons of the feudal nobility. It was not difficult for us to assume that if one of wealthy background joined the Party, he was, of course, "one of the best sons."

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When I first met Wilgus, he was in his late twenties; soft-voiced, with an aristocratic bearing. It was odd but compelling to hear him utter some of the sonorities out of the *Communist Manifesto*, as though he were brilliantly aware that he comprised the class struggle and its ultimate denouncement within his own person.

During the strike Wilgus and I spoke on the town common in Rutland. He appeared before audiences in Boston, in meetings organized to support the strike. He was a popular speaker at college meetings in Vermont and New Hampshire. The strike was eventually lost. The militant strikers were blacklisted, a common custom in New England in those years, and gradually dispersed.

During the following year a change took place in Jack. Perhaps with the end of the strike, the adventure was over. Jack began to live in bohemian style, holed up in a shack at Lake Bomoseen, and came to meetings irregularly. He was known to drink heavily, and the Party eventually expelled him as a drunkard and a wastrel.

At the time, I was asked by the comrades in Barre to attend the meeting and represent the district. The action seemed harsh and puritanical; but the local members were angry and would not abide his erratic behavior. I acceded and gave the decision my approval.

Seventeen years later he appeared as a surprise witness against me in my second Smith Act trial. I learned that in the intervening period he had become a confirmed alcoholic, had landed among the derelicts of the Bowery, and was later rescued by AA.

He now was old and enfeebled. In a voice that was barely audible he described the meeting at which he had been expelled, as evidence of the Party's "iron discipline." That was all. He had to be helped from the stand.

In 1962 I chanced to read the notice of his death in the *New York Times*. It was a small obit, hidden away among the sad fragments that face the editorial page. I was having my lunch in the office and came upon the death notice as I glanced at the page. The one event featured in the obit was the testimony he had given against me in the Federal court. I felt a quiver of emotion and a sadness for his wasted life, for his wasted dreams and mine. In 1935, riding the circuit of the New England towns, the world had belonged to the Utopians—to us.

VOICES FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA *(continued from page 372)*

like internal party opposition—offers a sufficient guarantee of democracy. . . .

Let's be honest. One can talk seriously about democracy only when people have an opportunity to elect those who are to govern them. This, again, presupposes the existence of at least *two comparable alternatives*: two equal and mutually independent political forces, both of which have the same chance of becoming the leading force in the country if the people so decide.

In other words, as long as our country recognizes the existence of the Communist party, the demand for *a second political party* as its full-fledged, dignified, and independent partner in the "competition for power" is also necessary. To my mind, the only truly logical and, in our circumstances, effective way (until someone convinces me of a better one) to reach the ideal of democratic socialism is a regenerated and socialist social structure patterned on the *two-party model*.

—*Literarni Listi* (Prague), April 4, 1968

Ivan Svitak

Revolt or Revolution?

ARE WE EXPERIENCING a revolution or a revolt? Revolution means structural social changes—changes in the relationship between classes, in the structure of the economy and policy, and in the mechanism of power.

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Revolt means a changing of the guard which does not affect the structure of society. Whether we are going through one or the other experience will be decided by us. . . . Events can still turn in either direction.

The possibility of a revolt leaves us completely indifferent. We have no reason to be enthusiastic about a change of persons. Sociologists and philosophers know that "institutions are stronger than people," that without the controlling mechanism of public opinion, every member of an elite, without exception, must degenerate. Antonin Novotny entered the scene as an exponent of liberalization. Polish youth must build barricades at the university against the Polish national hero of 1956.

On the other hand, we are very much interested in the alternative possibility of structural changes because it opens a new road toward an open socialist society, i.e., toward socialist democracy. This [possibility] is, however, very remote, although, at present, there is a nationwide illusion [that it is close at hand], an illusion which springs from the resignation of a few officials. The student has no reason to support these illusions; on the contrary, he must be on the lookout for frauds that will show up during the period when we are deciding on the nature of the state in which we shall live.

If we examine the results of the three-month-old rebirth objectively and critically, we have to conclude that, with the exception of the temporary lapse of censorship, no structural changes have taken place in the mechanism of the totalitarian dictatorship. In Czechoslovakia, one party still has a monopoly in political life, and at present, there exist no procedures, such as are common in a democracy, to express the political will of the people.

The hierarchial concept whereby the state organs and social organizations are all directed from one center endures without change. This is incompatible with democracy whose substance consists precisely in the fact that political decisions are formed by certain social processes in which individual components play a relatively independent role. On the level of ideology [in a democracy], there is competition among ideological values and among political programs. On the level of state power, there is a reciprocal limitation of the powers of the legislative, administrative, and judicial branches (i.e., the parliament, government, and independent judiciary). Finally, in the economic sphere and as regards the civic activities of the population, an independent role is played by the special-interest organizations, the bureaucracy of the apparatus, and by public opinion.

At present, there is one element that justifies our hopes in the democratization process, i.e., the sincere expression of public opinion. The counterattacks of the conservative forces will therefore be concentrated on it in the very near future. They will call for moderation and will offer new economic programs instead of basic political changes. We, on the contrary, must endeavor to make full use of the tolerated freedom and achieve democratic elections as a further step on the road toward a European socialist state.

This goal can be realized only by solving the basic conflict now going on in the Czechoslovak state. This conflict is not a matter of the relationship between the two nations, but of the structure of the totalitarian dictatorship. It is true that the bureaucracy of this dictatorship has destroyed the Stalinist cult, but it has retained unchanged the power structure of Stalinism, including the bureaucratic apparatus and the policy of the cultural whip. *We must liquidate this dictatorship or it will liquidate us.*

The liquidation of totalitarian dictatorship and of totalitarian thinking is a prerequisite for the achievement of democratic socialism. The totalitarian dictatorship is our number one enemy. We have enough heads and hands for the program of socialist freedom, but we are also confronted with the apparatus that obstructs it. If the question is put, "Whence, with whom, and where?" we can answer it briefly: "From Asia, by ourselves, toward Europe."

This means [we must move] from totalitarian dictatorship toward an open society, toward the liquidation of the power monopoly and effective control of the power elite by a free press and public opinion. [We must move] from the bureaucratic control of society and culture by "cutthroats of the official line" (C. Wright Mills's phrase) to the application of the basic human and civil rights, at least to the extent that they existed in the bourgeois democratic Czechoslovakia. [With whom?] With the workers' movement without its bureaucrats, with the middle-class strata without the groups of willing

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collaborationists, and with the intelligentsia at the head. The intellectuals of this country must assert their claim to lead the open socialist society toward democracy and humanism, if the irrational dialectics of despotism and power are to end.

The main characteristic of the present changes is that so far no substantial changes have occurred, that the structure of totalitarian dictatorship has remained untouched. There is only freedom of the press and some kind of hope for democratic elections and a reorganization of the power functions in the state. We are indifferent to the change of cadres who were appointed by an utterly undemocratic system, but we are interested in a lasting democratization process, i.e., in the permanent transformation of totalitarian dictatorship into a European system with a democratic form of government. [Emphasis added—ED.]

—*Student* (Prague), April 10, 1968

Z. Jesenska

How to Guarantee Democracy

I WANT TO SPEAK about democracy. . . . Generally it is thought that democracy means the rule of the majority over the minority. This is only half the truth. Certainly there is no democracy where the minority governs. However, let us make no mistake—there is also no democracy where the rule of the majority is unlimited.

Always and everywhere, whatever the circumstances, democracy must also mean the protection of the weaker from the stronger, the protection of those who happen to be out of power from the capricious rule of those who govern —loosely expressed, this involves protection of the minority. This means not only ethnic, class, or similar minorities. Each of us can belong to the majority in some things and to the minority in others. And only those who are among the weaker in some sphere are entitled to say whether or not democracy exists in this country.

The Czechs cannot be judges of whether the Slovak question was correctly settled in this country; this question must be asked of the Slovaks. Nor can the Czechs say whether the rights of the German minority are protected in Czechoslovakia, a minority which, according to the Constitution, does not exist in this country; the theoretically nonexistent Germans must be asked this. By the same token, in a future federation, the Slovaks alone will not be able to judge whether they have protected the rights of the Hungarian and Ukrainian minorities. The members of the Communist party have no business to declare that the so-called "partyless" have equal rights and that all posts in civil life are open to them; only those who are not members of the Party can assert this. The atheists should not try to convince anyone that full freedom of religion exists in this country; only the believers can confirm this. The so-called Aryans cannot declare that there is no longer any anti-Semitism in this country; it is the citizens of so-called Jewish origin who must be asked about this. . . . And so on, down to the last decimal unit. Under the kind of socialism that we have had to date, those who were more powerful never asked the weaker who held no power how they were faring, whether they were satisfied with the conditions of life established for them.

I believe it is essential in a democracy that the greatest possible variety of societies, associations, and clubs whose origins are free and spontaneous be permitted to exist, allowing every interest its natural representation and unrestricted right to be heard. In February 1948, in the name of the revolution, of unity and preparedness for action, we disrupted and destroyed all kinds of organizations, common-interest association, and groups, such as exist in every normal society and which are continually being formed, or, as the case may be, dissolved. . . .

Of course, political parties are included in these various associations and clubs, societies, and organizations. Although we have been saying for 20 years that a multiparty system exists in this country, not many were deceived. After all, we began by depriving these other parties of their members and programs and of everything that constitutes a political party, and everyone knew that they were merely ciphers. In Slovakia in particular we turned them into frauds. Their small, awkward groups of delegates spoke only

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on certain occasions, offering greetings to the Communist party, which they assured of their full support although, having no strength whatsoever, they had nothing to support it with. . . .

During the past month, I have often heard that some limitation of liberties was inevitable after February 1948, as is the case in every revolution; what was wrong was the fact that the period of dictatorship lasted too long. It is about time that we dropped this self-deception also. Yes, every revolution is an exceptional and temporary state, but in our country no freedoms were abolished temporarily, since the Stalinist model of socialism, or in other words, the police bureaucratic system, established itself permanently. It was not said that freedoms were to be curtailed for a certain period of time. It was stated that "this" was the perfect freedom and that anyone who did not believe it was an enemy of the Czechoslovak people.

Democracy has not yet even started to be introduced in this country and what we have now are no more than intermittent flashes of it. It has not yet become the foundation of our social organization. . . . The conservative forces in this country have been beaten and a simple return to the old conditions is, for the time being, impossible. Today we face another alternative. Either we shall stop halfway and be satisfied with semi-democratization, or we shall go whole hog and install a true democracy. Only in the latter case shall we have what everybody is asking for—guarantees. All sorts of guarantees: constitutional, legal, institutional, and others. And yet, however many gauarantees there are, a shrewd combination of the powerful will always be able to circumvent them and bring them to naught. Only you who listen to me can be the absolute guarantee. . . .

—*Kulturny Zivot* (Bratislava), April 5, 1968

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George Eckstein

Dangerous New Games

AS A FILM-MAKER, Jean-Luc Godard has been uniquely associated with the sensibility of the young; he has given it models to live by and images of at least partial self-approval. From his first and perhaps still his best picture, *Breathless*, through *A Woman Is a Woman, Bande à Part, Masculine-Feminine*, and into his very latest work, he has explored the new life style which now seems a feature of the international scene: its attitudes toward sex, violence, crime, domesticity. With *La Chinoise*, a film that has recently been showing in art theatres throughout the country, Godard has turned to an exclusively—or what seems an exclusively—political theme, the politics of the New Left as seen in France.

A main characteristic of this style is its peculiar kind of detachment; its people are at the same time "with it" and without it. Not unlike Brecht's characters whose *Verfremdung* permitted them to be simultaneously inside and outside their parts as actors in the social drama, Godard's young people detach themselves from their own behavior. Over the years, Godard has developed various techniques for rendering this detachment. A casual mess of voice, word, and gesture in making love or causing death; abrupt cutting or change of pace; the use of music or color as ironical counterpoint; puns, references to other films, books, paintings, public figures; an increasing use of text rather than of pictorial elements; reliance on comment to the point where actors drop their role in order to address the viewer directly.

Such techniques have been used by other exponents of the new style (Francois Truffaut, Richard Lester, Arthur Penn), but no one has pushed them quite as far as Godard, to the point of coming dangerously close to mannerism.

Manner begins to dominate matter in a way that subtly transforms the latter, that erodes it, that creates an ambiguity which makes it often difficult to determine what is serious and what is just a put-on. It would seem Godard wants to have it both ways at once; and this ambiguity becomes a liability when the revolutionary or pseudo-revolutionary politics of the New Left are transferred from the Latin Quarter of the screen to the real Boul' Mich'.

So with the real events of the spring of 1968 in mind, we look at *La Chinoise* which Godard turned out in the spring of 1967.

The "Chinese Girl" is a young French co-ed studying at the suburban branch of the Sorbonne at Nanterre. She is the leader of a Maoist cell of five young people whose summer of communal life in a borrowed Paris apartment forms the subject of the film. There are all the trappings of Maoist politics: the "Little Red Books" of the Chairman, the primitive cartoons, the pseudo-Marxist slogans, the "study groups," the terrorist acts, and all the other little games of sectarian politics.

But in the same ambiguous— half-serious, half-ironical—way as Pop Art treats the comics, soup cans, hamburgers, traffic signs, and other artifacts of industrial mass culture, Godard turns this New Left Politics into what might be called Pop Politics. He takes *its* artifacts and puts them to aesthetic use: the Little Red Books of Mao become decorative accessories to go with the white walls and blue doors; the slogans ("A minority with the correct revolutionary line is no longer a minority," etc.) and the primitive Chinese posters depicting Yankee Imperialism become wall decorations; the "International" blaring from a radio is unable to arouse a pooped group that has plopped on the beds; the study-group lectures turn into boring babble, into a stringing of stock phrases out of Hegel, Lenin, Sartre, Fanon, Ché, and Mao; one of the chaps—in a pseudo-scientific "position paper"—shows himself too friendly to the "revisionist"

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Communist party line of co-existence, and is promptly and mock-ceremoniously expelled. (It is a sign of the greater political sophistication of Western Europe that the CP is now, as a matter of course, considered in alignment with the bourgeois Establishment.)

Godard's ambiguity shows itself most significantly in the way the supreme expression of this kind of politics—the terrorist act—is transformed into a game. Véronique (the "Chinoise" of the title) picks up the address of the visiting Soviet Party-line writer Mikhail Sholokhov, whom they have planned to kill as an example.

But, having read the sheet with directions upside down, she kills the man in apartment 32 instead of the one in Number 23. Realizing her mistake ("zut!"—a simple shrug of shoulders), back she goes into the large building to get her man, while her friend in the getaway car circles playfully in front of the building, and the camera alternately focuses on a small dachshund promenading on a balcony above.

We do not see the murders—as usual, Godard is rather reticent when it comes to showing violence (or sex) on the screen. His frankness tends to be verbal rather than visual. But he is unsurpassed in rendering the casual attitude of this generation in such matters. There is a scene in the film where, to the strains of romantic music, Véronique casually terminates her love affair with Guillaume, the young actor: "I don't even like the colors of your sweaters any more" is her final answer to his meek pleas. And the commitment to the cause is also without passion. Kirilov, the artist, patterned after the character in Dostoevsky's *Possessed*, abruptly commits suicide after changing the wall décor from precise slogans to wavy abstract stripes.

There is, finally, a central scene where Godard seems to abandon both his casualness and his ambiguity (but can one ever be quite sure with him?). In a long discussion, Véronique is confronted with her philosophy teacher at the Sorbonne, the ex-Communist intellectual Francis Jeanson (in person on the screen). A sympathetic old-line radical, he presses her about her political vision, about the purpose of her contemplated terrorist actions, about what the group plans to do after blowing up the Louvre or closing the Sorbonne. Her answer: "We'll worry about that later; first we have to tear down."

This is politics as gesture, an exercise in style, rather than as an answer to pressing social problems. Politics as Pop Politics, the pastime of an uneasy, bored romantic youth in an affluent, tolerant society. Revolution as a happening. But meanwhile, the happening has become serious; Godard, unambiguously for once, sided with the embattled students of the Sorbonne. Their fight has shaken the apparent tranquility of the French factories, the smugness of official uniondom, the lethargy of a benevolent autocratic regime.

All of these reverberations no doubt fed the irresponsible tendencies of a movement which, though wildly incoherent in its aims, has shown considerable ingenuity in its methods—at least at the outset. Once they came up against a still powerful if shaken regime, which would not hesitate to call on the police and the army, the French equivalents of Godard's characters had little to offer except their personal courage. The game became dangerous. Pop politics began to pop. Style was tested by stubborn social realities. To succeed, La Chinoise will have to become French.

Meanwhile, we can wonder at the way the ambiguities of art and life interweave in the twentieth century, with an intimacy perhaps unprecedented: you can't always be sure where a movie ends and a demonstration begins.

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Tom Milstein

"New" vs. "Left" In the SDS

THE STUDENTS for a Democratic Society held its annual convention June 9-15 at Michigan State University, and delegates witnessed some dramatic new developments without precedent in the history of the organization. "Old-timers" who held out so much hope for the SDS in the early sixties will soon discover, if they have not already done so, that very little is left of that unique spirit of innocent idealism which then characterized the group. SDS has come the full circle from other-worldliness to under-worldliness.

The convention proper was preceded by three days of workshops on such staples of "the movement" as "GI Organizing," "Marcuse and (Norman O.) Brown," "White Racism," "Movement Media, including Underground Papers, Radio Free People, etc.," and so on. Interspersed among these relatively noncontroversial (in the New Left) topics were a few—"Progressive Labor party and the SDS"—that foretold of the important issues to be debated at the convention, but the substantive issues everybody knew to be at stake were at most only obliquely reflected in the workshops. This generated an atmosphere of frustration and irritability that dominated the rest of the proceedings.

By the time things actually got underway, tensions were acute. Wednesday evening was taken up by a plenary session devoted to a panel and discussion on the "black liberation struggle." Four persons (SDS requested that no one be quoted by name in the press) delivered talks on the subject. The first was a rather mundane exhortation to the delegates to support the Peace and Freedom party on the basis of that party's work with the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. The second was an entertaining account of a young radical's life with proletarians in a farm-implement factory. The speaker gave a lively description of the difficulties involved in raising the workers from economic consciousness to class consciousness, and he dwelt at length on the phenomenon of racist, white, skilled workers and their vested interest in holding down black unskilled labor, even within the same union. The third speaker was a Progressive Labor party SDS'er; he took up this implied challenge to PL's working-class orientation by noting that "fascism" was not restricted to the working class—there is such a thing as middle-class student fascism, as exemplified by certain features of the recent San Francisco State College fracas. This speaker was (to me) the surprise of the evening. He went on to describe the counterproductive consequences of the San Francisco State incident, and sounded quite chastised by the whole affair. Imagine that—a chastised Maoist! He had just finished criticizing the Kerner report for its wholesale indictment of "white society and white racism" as being responsible for Negro oppression—when this potentially fruitful controversy was interrupted by a floor demonstration.

The "anarchist" contingent at the convention, consisting primarily of members of the "Up Against the Wall, Motherfucker" chapter of SDS, of the Lower East Side, New York, continually disrupted the convention proceedings with planned "spontaneous" demonstrations, perhaps a case of chickens coming home to roost. These young people are a demoralized collection of acid-heads and sociopaths with a flair for surpassing in their personal and "political" conduct every gutter-level smear hurled at the Left by reactionaries. When they broke into the developing controversy on race and radicalism, by means of Algerian war-cries and unbelievable profanity, they effectively terminated intelligent discussion and nearly provoked a physical struggle. Passions grew quite heated as the delegates polarized between the ideologues of all persuasions who wanted to carry on the discussion, and the nihilists of no persuasions who feel automatically excluded whenever rational debate threatens to break out. Convention observers began edging toward the exits, but the conflict was resolved short of violence —after all, these are college students—by allowing a Motherfucker to present his views on the subject of racism after the panel had concluded.

But the atmosphere of the convention was no longer conducive to a joining of the issues. The rest of the evening was taken up with speeches. One speaker dealt with "racism in the Left" and cited Harold Cruse, the Negro intellectual who believes that Jewish Communists are re-

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sponsible for the emasculation of black manhood in America. He concluded by saying that the principal contradiction in American society is not class, but race. This pessimistic conclusion was joyously affirmed by the Motherfuckers' speaker, who carried the logic one step further. It was absurd, he said, for white radicals to discuss ways of "supporting the Black Liberation struggle." Such "support" is itself racist. When the war begins, "the color of your skin will be your uniform, and if you're carrying food to the guerrillas, well, I hope they get it when you drop it." A PL spokesman rose to comment that it was such views which were themselves "racist." Only one thing seemed clear to both sides: SDS is full of "objective" racists.

THE FORMAL SESSION began with outgoing national officers' reports. The immediate past was characterized as one in which SDS had evolved an "anticapitalist" perspective. The rottenness in America was gradually revealing itself to be the rottenness *of* America—not atypical, but essential. The enemy was not "corporate liberalism," which is a euphemism, but "fascism." The blatant rightist repression, which everyone in SDS regards as coming, should be welcomed, even stimulated: the true beastiality that is America will, when no longer obscured, provoke a universal confrontation.

Following that, the "Program Proposals" document was taken up by the convention. This document was explained to me as proposing the reorganizing of SDS along centralist lines, and the transformation of the membership into a vanguardist, disciplined cadre. It was written in a clotted organizational mandarin, and I could not clearly discern these features. Also, during the first two hours the debate on the proposition was conducted in SDS-speak, which is difficult to describe to anyone who has never heard it. It consists of the ritualistic repetition of certain catchphrases like "organize people to take control of the conditions that determine their lives," "structure radical life-styles outside the system," "constituency-based organization leading to regional program exposing the corporate interrelationships among the processing apparatus of the establishment," etc. These phrases are woven together and declaimed in the most passionate style. The audience divides into two factions upon receipt of the message: those who lack self-confidence because of newness to SDS and who hide their failure to comprehend what is being said by mimicking the responses of those around them, occasionally even taking the floor to try stringing together a few phrases on their own—and those who do not hide their inability to comprehend, but who restrict themselves to muttering "bullshit." These latter are the ideologues; they refrain from popping the bubble because to do so usually provokes an enraged counterattack by the non-ideologues on "Old Leftism" in the SDS.

The debate on the "Program Proposals" document went on and produced its corresponding behavioral reaction: a rise in the anxiety level of the convention. The pretense that important things are being hashed out becomes more difficult to maintain after the discussion has droned on for several hours without any apparent resolution. It is at this point that the SDS elite, capitalizing on the exhaustion of the delegates, tries to pass whatever is the object of the discussion.

This discussion was different, however. A Progressive Labor speaker rose to denounce a section of the document which reflected the influence of Herbert Marcuse's ideas on the revolutionary bankruptcy of the proletariat in modern capitalist society. This shrewd move took the supporters of the document by surprise. At last the convention had something *real* to discuss.

The "Program Proposals" document was a product of the "National Office" grouping within SDS. This faction is a conglomeration that claims to represent the true spirit of New Leftism against the depredations of PL and other "external cadre." The fact is that the original spirit of "participatory democracy" has all but disappeared from the organization, and the National Office grouping, as will be made clear, waged its fight against PL in an obscurantist and manipulative fashion. Their aim in centralizing SDS by means of the "Program Proposals" was, pure and simple, to purge PL and consolidate their power as the only organized faction in SDS. Nothing was said of this in the document, however. There, the sole motivation for centralization was that the "revolutionary situation in America" demanded a "revolutionary vanguard" organization.

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In order to portray themselves as authentic heirs to the SDS tradition, the National Office faction must mount an effective critique of PL's Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, and forward an alternative radical ideology. By their own admission, they are capable of doing neither "at this time." So when PL attacked the document, not for its ostensible purpose, centralization, nor for its real purpose, to purge SDS, but for its Marcuse-ish contempt of the working class, the National Office faction was caught flat-footed.

The debate that followed, on the role of the working class in contemporary capitalist society, enabled PL and its supporters to claim the events in France as its model. Correspondingly, the recent events at Columbia University, for which the National Office faction takes credit, declined in importance. "The seizure of power in one of the most important links in the structure of establishment power" (Columbia University) didn't look so impressive when contrasted to the proletarian seizure of the means of production in France.

Thus trapped into defending an anti-working-class perspective in the midst of the French events, the National Office faction was smashed in debate. Progressive Labor conducted itself with great polemical skill and actually won a clear majority of the convention—both in opposition to the Program Proposals document and to a big piece of its ideology. The longer the debate continued, the more PL's prestige grew. Large numbers of delegates who had come to the convention uncommitted rose to announce that they "couldn't buy this Marcuse crap about the workers."

Hoping to rescue something of its position, the National Office faction made a hasty decision to bring its politics out into the open. A spokesman for the "Program Proposals" document stated that he was sorry that the debate had confused people about the meaning of his document, but that since Progressive Labor had seen fit to utilize its elite cadre to distort and smear, there was nothing honest participatory democrats could do to stop them.

This news produced an audible gasp among the delegates. Except for a few snide remarks about "external cadre" operating in SDS, no one had dared to bring this matter out in open debate in the history of SDS. This spokesman was followed by speaker after speaker from the National Office faction, each denouncing Progressive Labor more vituperatively than the last. All thought of "non-exclusion," once a cardinal principle of SDS doctrine, was forgotten. As the National Office speakers worked on the convention, seeking to build up resentment against PL to a fever pitch, PL, anticipating a siege, sat tight and confined themselves to hisses and an occasional charge of "red-baiting." They knew the politics of desperation when they saw it.

In the meantime, what can only be described as a lynch spirit was building up among the delegates who supported the National Office faction. As the scene approached its climax, they were literally snarling. I have never witnessed comparable behavior in some years of activity in youth politics. The final speaker concluded with the scream "PL must go!" and this signalled his supporters to begin a floor demonstration. About two-fifths of the delegates rose and began chanting "PL must go," stamping their feet and clapping their hands, and the din grew deafening. The chant lasted five minutes, but it seemed endless. PL sat tight.

The National Office faction was gambling that it could stampede the convention. With only about two-fifths of the delegates, they needed support from the SDS center. But their effort to lynch PL, coming on the heels of a weak performance in the debate on the role of the working class, was such a radical departure from SDS tradition (which, while not democratic, was at least not totalitarian) that it backfired and produced only stunned disbelief among the swing delegates. But you can't intimidate a disciplined cadre like PL with a chant, no matter how intimidating it sounds, and when it became apparent that the convention wasn't going to stampede, the demonstration petered out. What would have happened if the National Office faction had managed to isolate PL, I shudder to imagine.

AFTER THIS remarkable event, all was anticlimactic. Progressive Labor rode out the storm in a manner that did credit to their discipline and strategic abilities. They succeeded, not because they are totalitarians (although they are), but because their opposition was even more totalitarian. As a result, Progressive Labor was the clear victor at the 1968 SDS convention.

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Because PL placed none of its cadre in the SDS national office, the National Office faction and its supporters in the radical and liberal press have claimed the victory. The fact is, however, that PL only ran one candidate for national office, and he lost not so much because he lacked support as because of a poorly organized voting system. Progressive Labor is not interested in SDS except as an arena of potential recruits. Least of all is it interested in taking responsibility for such SDS activities as the San Francisco State and Columbia University putsches.

Some myths have arisen among well-wishers of SDS in the adult liberal community, and they ought to be dispelled. One is that SDS's recent conduct is due to the machinations of Progressive Labor, which is viewed as a tiny but incredibly effective band of ultra-leftist Maoist maniacs. Nothing could be farther from the truth. PL has tried to exert a restraining influence on SDS, and was generally regarded as the "Right Wing" of the SDS at the convention. The National Office faction, which claims to represent the authentic SDS and New Left spirit, at all times attacked PL *from the Left*. PL's "labor line" was constantly cited as a major *conservative* influence in the organization. And in fact, it is. Because PL stresses the interests of the working class, it regards university seizures and Black nationalism, which are dear to the hearts of the National Office faction, as irresponsible and (in private) semifascist adventures that can only provoke a rightist reaction and alienate the working class from radicalism. PL seems gradually to be moving toward the Right, away from its earlier Third Period Communism. Its commitment to the working class, even though for the most part cerebral, forces a minimal concept of responsibility for the consequences of action to take hold. The National Office faction, on the other hand, with its half-baked melange of Marcuse, Sorel, Bakunin, Calvin, and Guevara, pridefully sees itself as the revolutionary vehicle, and consequently feels a responsibility for the consequences of its actions to no one and nothing but **History.**

Progressive Labor's achievements at the SDS Convention should be taken as a measure of the current state of the SDS, rather than as an indication of political superiority. The level of political sophistication within SDS has been severely debased by romanticism and anti-anti-Communism, and virtually any well-organized and ideologically coherent political tendency could have triumphed. PL, burdened with its surreal commitment to "the red, red sun of the East," its glorification of Stalin, and its willingness to fight the war in Vietnam to the last Vietnamese, could only flourish in the hermetic environment such as the New Left provides.

Where SDS will go in the future is difficult to predict, because its conventions are not very representative of the SDS membership. Although split wide open, it is quite conceivable that it will continue to grow, since no other organization exists to absorb New Left youth. Something very profound and basic is occuring within the upper-middle-class strata from which SDS recruits, and it must be said that the National Office faction's brand of radicalism more accurately reflects this mood than does PL. If SDS does disintegrate or become moribund, we still may expect further outbursts of middle-class radicalism, expressed through different channels.

On the other hand, events can kill movements. Nothing has done more damage to SDS than the McCarthy campaign and the opening of peace negotiations. These events have hit SDS where it lives—on the campuses. The outcome of the French "revolution"—Gaullist victory on an unprecedented scale—will hit SDS also. The important question is whether the current wave of middle-class radicalism can survive the cumulative effect of these events, or whether it will dissolve back into the suburbias which hatched it.

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Arthur Efron

In Defense of Norman O. Brown

LIONEL ABEL'S "Important Nonsense: Norman O. Brown" (DISSENT, March-April 1968) proves only that Abel calls "nonsense" anything that won't squeeze into his preconceptions. Brown's work just doesn't fit the squeeze, and so it cannot be fairly described—much less criticized—in Abel's terms. Abel has to distort and mangle in order to get the appearance of a fit at all. His idea that *Love's Body* might somehow "destroy" statements once made by Aristotle is typical of the desperation with which he tries to demolish that book. Discussion would be pointless. But what he does with *Life Against Death* reveals crippling implications in his own approach which must accompany any acceptance of his conclusions.

The big squeeze is evident in Abel's facile equation of a concept of human nature once discussed by Max Scheler with that in Brown's *Life Against Death.* Brown's theory, we are advised, is "a merely rhetorical revision." For Brown's addition of the concepts of sublimation and repression to that theory is only "some slight difference in rhetoric." But in Abel's paraphrase of *Life Against Death*, Brown is saying that "man is a 'disease,' that he has always been ill, and that what we call history is nothing other than the sequence of events motivated by, or symptomatic of, man's illness." Now this amounts to a tolerable jacket blurb for *Life Against Death*, and it could be linked to Scheler's formula; but as apparatus for a serious treatment of what Brown is up to, it soon falls apart. It is *Life Against Death* without the *life.* In Scheler's formula, "man is a complete *deserter from life* . . ." Instead Brown argues (in part) that "the ultimate essence of our being remains in our unconscious secretly faithful to the principle of pleasure, or as Blake called it, delight." In "ultimate essence," man then is not disease; his disease is caused by his failure to develop historically in accordance *with* his essence, but he cannot desert that essence. Scheler, though, describes man's "so-called *ratio*" as "a diseased basic trend of universal life itself." His formula answers the question, "What kind of a thing is man?" (and thus fills Abel's demand for "some decision as to the nature of man which has been taken as essential") by saying "Man is *the* dead-end road of life altogether." This is something Abel can attack, but it happens not to be Brown's position. In fact, Brown believes that a reformulation of psychoanalytic insights into childhood gives support to a Romantic vision of the "history of mankind" in which man once was *not* diseased (*Life Against Death,* paperback ed., pp. 31; 81-86). And if Freud argued that religions are "nothing other than" collective neuroses, Brown specifically denies Freud on this (pp. 13–14; 231); but Abel ignores what Brown actually says and simply charges him with having "extended" Freud's suggestion.

True, both Scheler's summary and Brown's argument refer to some sort of Dionysian consciousness as the way out, but in Scheler's summary Dionysian consciousness "excludes the influence of the spirit . . ." Abel assures us that here Scheler "could have been writing about Norman O. Brown." That Brown is plainly not *excluding* the spirit is shown by his statement that "the concept of sublimation is a command to relate the human spirit (and its creations) to the human body" (p. 144). Or, to take another example, notice Brown's approving use of a quotation from Geoffrey Hartman: "for Rilke, the body becomes a spiritual fact" (p. 313).

Preconceptions that can cause this much distortion must be very precious indeed. It is only fair to show that the price Abel pays for "get-

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ting" Brown—or what he takes to be Brown—is exceedingly high in what it would subtract from our equipment for thinking about man.

Abel would hardly care whether the concept of sublimation demands the relating of spirit to body; sublimation for him amounts only to rhetoric. He complains of Brown's failure to cite the theory of sublimation in Freud's *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*,[1] but even if Brown were to do a perfect job of recapitulating Freud—something that he is of course trying *not* to do—he would still be found guilty of "nonsense." For even if the theory of sublimation were perfectly sound, Abel would not allow Brown to use it in his argument. Sublimation is part of a psychological theory, and Abel believes that no psychological theory can have "sufficient generality to be intelligible" as a judgment of "the species man." For while he insists that any concept of "the species man" should be a clear judgment concerning the "nature, structure, and origin of man," he thinks that an essential Man with a "structure" and "nature" not psychological *would* be "intelligible."

Epistemology is here expected to do great tricks, and no doubt it will perform them. But Brown's search for an explanation on scientific grounds of "why man is the restless and discontented animal" necessarily entails, as he points out, the use of the only existing depth psychology which bears directly on this problem (*Life Against Death*, p. 16).

In what Brown is doing, Abel is not interested; indeed his entire discussion treats *only* one brief passage on page 6 of Brown's book and a few others out of chapter 12—just enough to bring out superficial resemblances to what Scheler said. But to be not interested in so total a way is to rule out virtually any empirical inquiry (not just Brown's) into history and into the possibilities for qualitative improvement in the relationship of man to society. In which case, DISSENT might as well close up shop, or turn its affairs over to anti-empirical philosophers of the spirit, such as Scheler.[2]

Perhaps aware that his ruling on the inapplicability of sublimation is dogmatic, Abel devotes more effort to discussing its scientific adequacy. Here the theory is gauged a failure, but not for reasons proper either to science or to Brown's discussion of sublimation. Abel just buys, in the manner of a bargain hunter who can't be critical of what is being offered to him, the objections raised against the theory in 1913 by Scheler and in 1939 by Harry B. Levey. These two provide his only evidence in the matter, and neither is adequate for the conclusion he wishes to draw—unless you take them uncritically the way Abel does. But he is thereby on a par with the following Victorian objection to evolution: "Certainly a theory which requires so many hypothetical props can hardly be deemed itself to have a very secure foundation." (St. George Mivart, in *Lessons from Nature, as Manifested in Mind and Matter*, John Murray, 1876.)

SCHELER, in 1913, could not even have *read Three Contributions* in anything like its final version, and as Abel puts it, that is the "only work in which Freud directly addressed" the problem. Freud did not simply hold onto his theory of sublimation "unchanged, throughout his life," that is, from 1905 on, as Abel thinks. The *Three Contributions* is, according to James Strachey, a repeatedly revised book; particularly "the entire sections on the sexual theories of children and on the pregenital organizations of the libido (both in the second essay) were only added in 1915, 10 years after the book was first published. The same year, too, brought the addition of the section on the libido theory to the third essay." (Avon ed., pp. x–xi.) Scheler, in the quotation given by Abel, talks about the libido as a "mythological entity" without hav-

[1] Abel doesn't mention *why* Brown considers *Three Contributions* not central to his purposes, although Brown makes that clear (*Life Against Death*, p. 111; also pp. 119-20). *Three Contributions* is in any case cited a dozen times or more in the book, despite the impression fostered by Abel.

[2] In *The Nature of Sympathy* (Abel's source), Scheler opposes the theory of sublimation because (among other reasons) "The fact of the matter is that from the outset there are *basically different kinds* of love in which the most elementary qualitative relationships between man and his fellows are prefigured as it were, within the *structure* of the soul itself." Scheler's reasoning in this volume eventually leads him to a proto-fascist theory of love, according to V. J. McGill, in "Scheler's Theory of Sympathy and Love," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, II (March 1942). See also Marvin Farber's chapter, "Max Scheler and the Spiritual Elevation of Man," in *Naturalism and Subjectivism* (Springfield, Ill., 1959), on the incurable spiritualism of Scheler's approach.

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ing seen that section on its theory. Scheler's notion that "the term 'libido' is ultimately meant to include the *whole* field of mental forces" turns out to be clumsy and oversimple, applicable more to Jung than Freud.[3] For in 1915 Freud wrote that libido is to be distinguished, by its sexual origin, "from the energy which must be supposed to underlie mental processes in general . . ." Freud makes a distinction "between libidinal and other sources of psychical energy." And, in a passage added in 1920, he argues against Jung's equating of libido "with psychical instinctual force in general." (Strachey translation, pp. 119–20).

Levey spoke of Freud's "significant contribution" to the theory of sublimation, and listed what he considered to be the "valuable contributions" that Freud had made. *Then* he said that "otherwise" the theory is pretty much a mess. In Abel's paraphrase, this "otherwise" becomes "the theory as a whole." In a later article, Levey recommended that the theory be made part of the basis for a scientific aesthetic; and he argued that Freud's "basic contributions toward understanding the mental process of artistic sublimation are highly significant . . ." ("The Cultural Lag in Aesthetics," *Journal of Aesthetics*, VI, 1947; note that as support he cites his earlier essay). Levey realized that there could be good use for a scientific theory which has serious shortcomings. For Abel (who makes Levey fit into his own desire to have sublimation "disposed of by criticism" in a few pages), the same findings lead to the opposite conclusion: sublimation "is surely no theory on which to base any far-reaching hypothesis." Now there are real grounds for those who take this position: Brown is aware of those grounds and argues against the Freudian revisionists who have accepted them without adequate awareness of what is thereby lost for our concept of human need. Abel doesn't emit a whisper about this; his rejection is that of the amateur critic of science who finds a couple of authoritative statements in print and willingly falls for them.

Far from being rational, Abel is more than likely offering some variant of what is classed as "logic-chopping" by Fearnside and Holther, in their book *Fallacy: the Counterfeit of Argument* (Prentice-Hall, 1959, pp. 64–66). The social sciences are often badgered, they point out, with strictures against vagueness of terms, but these strictures fail to consider the problems involved—for example, the problem of exploring a "situation believed to involve a basic psychological mechanism." The result is "the fallacy of requiring an unnecessary precision." Serviceable terms are thus rejected on irrelevant grounds. "The fallacy is easily recognized in *its* extreme forms: wholesale rejection of vast areas of human inquiry is 'nonsense,'" along with "the ironical bark in discussion, 'I can't understand that! What does that mean!'"

Not having to work within the conditions of genuine inquiry, Abel is delighted to interpret as mere logical circularity the fact that *Life Against Death* explains history psychoanalytically and psychoanalysis historically. Brown is pronounced "hardly conscious" of what a terrific boner this is. No mention is made of Brown's several statements on the need for avoiding circularity in his undertaking. Brown is aware, for example, that you can't explain the origin of repression by deducing an anthropology from psychoanalysis and then invoking that anthropology in order "to cover a gap in psychoanalysis itself" (*Life Against Death*, pp. 124–28; see also pp. 9 and 242 for further attention to circularity). And in chapter 14, Brown clearly recognizes that for a problem in which "the theory of sublimation is at stake," that theory cannot be used as explanation;[4] instead there must be empirical evidence of historical fact to substantiate the theory on the basis of fresh data. The canon against naive logical circularity is no arcane principle unknown to Americans, though Abel's heavily guided tour of European thought concerning theory of history would lead you to believe that it is brand new—and of course something invokable on all occasion.

[3] Farber (*op.cit.*, pp. 306-14) discusses Scheler's normally atrocious handling of scientific theories.

[4] Brown is also quite conscious of theoretical problems within the concept of sublimation, as this passage and others (esp. pp. 135-41) show. Abel's misleading statement that Brown "defines" sublimation in literary terms is supported *only* by a total "contextomy" (Milton Mayer's term) of one particular passage (*Life Against Death*, p. 157). Brown is similarly aware that the concept of a universal neurosis, which Abel dismisses as "obviously . . . unintelligible," is a paradox which must be dealt with. But Abel's quotation from the relevant passage (see p. 6 of *Life Against Death*) is mangled in such a way as to omit the controlling statements.

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REALLY CHALLENGING is the problem (and I think it *is* a *problem*) of when the canon against circularity is misleading. In the logic of John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, circularity was even unapologetically posited as a necessary component of knowledge. Circularity, they wrote, "is in the knowledge." (*Knowing and the Known*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1949; see pp. 63, 66, 291.) In the spirit of their logic, I would suggest that the very broad inquiries of history and psychology have no option but to be pursued as mutual controls, mutual corroborations upon one another, and that it is not only proper, but necessary to avoid any delusion of basing one on the other. (No, you can't just go and plug up a discrete gap by assuming whatever evidence you need, but that isn't what I'm talking about now.) Scheler's admittedly platitudinous observation that a philosophy of history is an "elaboration" of a judgment of the nature of man is converted by Abel into a procedural law which would, he claims, prevent circularity: Brown should have conceded that he is "interpreting" all of his evidence in terms of some "prior-held notion" about the "psychic structure" of man. From this prior-held notion —which is not supposed to be psychological— Brown should have proceeded "in an orderly way . . . to his conclusions about the structure of history."

This procedure is hardly the one followed by Weber, Dilthey and Simmel, Abel's professed models; only Brown is required to jump so arbitrary a hurdle. Yet, what Abel's simplistic formula would accomplish, I suggest, would not be freedom from circularity, but the appearance of such, by means of a certain method of presentation. The relationship between two actually interrelated and huge variables is not clarified by presenting one of them as if it were standing still. A "prior-held notion" through which you strain all of the evidence would most likely become a selective tool that would be prone both to distortion of the evidence and an inability to benefit from the counter-indications in the evidence. Is there the slightest indication —and here is a test case—that Abel's own commitment to the validity of certain traditional notions of the essential nature of man makes him even remotely aware of *possible* counter-evidence that can be discerned in Brown's book?

Abel offers another contribution to the philosophy of history (or rather to the philosophical anthropology which he insists must lie behind it[5]) near the end of his article. There, Brown's nontraditional position is pronounced worthless, because—well, because nontraditional positions are preconceived to be worthless! Abel's pose as the rational mind opposing Brown's emotionalism here wears off entirely, and a conservative ideological commitment becomes unmistakable. For despite his insistence that "there is no genuine philosophy which is not rational," his own position amounts to little more than an assertion that the traditional prior-held views of human nature must somehow be rational. Their validity is ascribed to grounds that would be acceptable to Edmund Burke (for they are backed up by "the power and meaning of historical experience extending through long periods of time"), although Burke was scarcely talking rational philosophy. But Abel implies that "the power and authority of Christian experience" is some sort of rational philosophical ground.

Validity is also asserted in terms reminiscent of Matthew Arnold: "the thought and expression of the greatest minds in the West." Abel does not advise that we choose our concept of human nature on the basis of what human nature actually might in fact be: he instead insists that we choose "because of what we have been." And we must choose a definition which "conforms to or expresses some tradition that has influenced us powerfully." Here again his complaints are just abusive; for even if by some sort of saintly teaching one could convince Abel that Brown is coherent and persuasive in his theory of history, Abel would still totally reject him: "The culminating nonsensicality of Norman O.

[5] This is for Abel a matter of "a moment's reflection . . . ;" but for contrast see Farber's chapter, "Philosophical Anthropology and Human Values," in *Phenomenology and Existence* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967).

In our next issue:

REVISIONIST HISTORIANS
& THE COLD WAR

—by Henry Pachter

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Brown's view is that it refuses to accept any tradition in its judgment of what man is." I wonder if Abel is aware of what a compliment he is paying here; or of how much he sounds like T. S. Eliot fulminating against Thomas Hardy and D. H. Lawrence in *After Strange Gods* (1934)—a book Eliot wisely declined to have reprinted. Despite Burke, Arnold, Eliot, and Abel, the majority vote is no tool for deciding intellectual issues, even if it can be made to seem respectable by appeals to majority decisions (whether of civilizations or of "the greatest minds") made over long periods of time. This is an appeal to authority, not reason.

To be sure, tradition offers important evidence for our consideration, but we are not obliged to settle the "live option" of which concept of human nature (and consequently of ourselves) we shall accept by forcing tradition to do the work that scientific evidence does not do. Why should we choose only from the stacked deck of tradition? No amount of a tradition which has "influenced us powerfully" can be used as a substitute for any amount of the evidence necessary for making such a choice. The two kinds of evidence are not interchangeable.

Their relations are real, though too complex for any brief statement to be satisfactory. But roughly: as Dewey wrote in *The Quest for Certainty*, the experiences of the past give us tools or instrumentalities for judging those values which have been held in the past; but past experiences must be regarded critically. That a certain value was widely held tells us, in itself, nothing about its value to us; what we have to do is gauge critically both what enabled something to become valued at all, and also "what has issued from the fact that we liked it." Brown's assessment of what has issued from the West's liking for certain psychological patterns is a case of critical inquiry, which has a negative outcome. There are no grounds for finding it impermissible. It is in principle rational, while Abel's procedure is in principle rationality limited not by the necessary weaknesses of reason but by a sell-out to authority.

As a one-man Committee on Un-Traditional Thought, Abel needs to condemn Brown. But the shoddy proceedings used for fulfilling that need would soon clamp a tight restraining order on life.

Lionel Abel Replies

FIRST of all I must grant Art Efron something, for there is one matter on which he is partly right—not really right, not meaningfully right, not even half right—but however pointlessly, he is, in any case, partly right. I make this admission right at the start, for after this one pointless point, I mean to concede him nothing.

In my article I did say that Norman O. Brown in the chapters on sublimation in his *Life Against Death* never took up the ideas Freud expressed in the one work he devoted to sublimation, his important essay, "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex." Now in fact Mr. Brown did *not* take up the ideas in that essay anywhere in his book, nor has Mr. Efron shown that he did. So on this matter I do not admit to correction; what I said stands. But I also implied that Mr. Brown did not even quote from Freud's essay. In fact, he did, several times, and in the relevant chapters. The reason I was mistaken is this: the essay is not mentioned by Mr. Brown in the relevant chapters, and is only identified in his reference notes at the back of the book as follows: *BW* (*Sex*). On the other hand, when Mr. Brown referred to other writings of Freud, which do not directly deal with the theory of sublimation, he spelled out the titles boldly: "On Negation," *The Interpretation of Dreams, The Ego and the Id*; these works of Freud are directly named in Brown's chapter on sublimation. The titles do not have to be deciphered from his notes. Why this curious procedure? Is it because the title "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex" had already been mentioned, in an earlier chapter, one not devoted to sublimation? But so were other titles by Freud. Freud's essay "On Negation" is cited in Mr. Brown's book in a chapter preceding the chapters he devoted to sublimation, and in a chapter subsequent to these. In these instances the title is directly given in the text, as it is in one of the two relevant chapters. Let me add that other writers on the theory of sublimation such as Dr. Levey, the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, and Herbert Marcuse, in dealing with Freud's theory of sublimation have directly named his relevant and most important text on the subject. Why didn't Norman O. Brown? I

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think even after Efron's correction this question stands.

2) Efron claims that I claim to have disposed of the theory of sublimation, having picked up a "bargain hunter's" criticism of it from Max Scheler and Dr. Harry B. Levey. It is easier to call me a name that to meet Dr. Levey's argument, and Efron has chosen (I think wisely) the easier course. In any case, I made no claim to dispose of sublimation. Relying on Dr. Levey's criticisms of the theory, I simply indicated that it is far from being a clear one, and that it could hardly provide a basis for far-reaching generalizations about man and society. This is all I was obliged to say in my article. I never pretended to be making a full-dress analysis of the theory, something, in any case, beyond my competence. I do think myself competent, though, to recognize valid arguments against the theory, and Dr. Levey's arguments are even more damaging than I claimed; moreover, I did not have the space to quote as much from his article as I should have liked to. I did not fail to quote, though, Dr. Levey's approval of Freud for having succeeded "in establishing some degree of order in the known facts concerning sublimation." So Efron is simply trying to mislead his readers when he suggests that I did not fairly represent Dr. Levey's attitude toward the theory, insofar as it was not altogether unfavorable. He even implies Levey likes the theory somewhat better than my quotes would show. I shall cite again from Dr. Levey's text:

> There would be no indication today for a critical summary of what Freud wrote in 1905, but for the fact that the later literature about the theory of sublimation has remained essentially unchanged, and does not report any verification based upon observed facts. The theory as formulated is based upon an unproved premise of abnormally strong sexual constitution. A redundant factor of cultural valuation is emphasized. The infantile erogenous zones are predicated to be the source of energy, but no proof is offered. Due to a logical error, the method of modification of the energy involved in the exampled artistic sublimation is not described, but instead, that of reaction-formation substituted. . . . One must, therefore, estimate the original formulation of the theory of sublimation to be a confused and inconsistent recapitulation of empirically known facts, and one for which no clinical evidence was offered . . .

Efron claims that Freud *did* change his theory of sublimation and between 1905 and 1915. He also notes that Max Scheler could not have known of these changes. But in any case, Freud must have known them. Here is Dr. Levey's comment on the continuity of Freud's ideas of sublimation between 1905 and 1923:

> In brief, during the period 1905 to 1923, Freud continued to example sublimation as artistic sublimation, described the method of modification as displacement and offered no clinical data to demonstrate the source of the energy, the method of its modification or the validity of the premise of constitutional disposition. He consistently described the energy as sexual and non-repressed. During this period, the concept of sublimation, from neglect to demonstrate with clinical evidence and from lack of an attitude of tentativeness, could be evaluated scientifically as a descriptive summary of empirical conclusions not yet connected with any of its several propositions by evidence . . .

Evidently the Freudian theory of sublimation has its difficulties, something one would never suspect if one limited one's reading to the amateurish paradoxes of Mr. Brown on the subject in *Life Against Death* or Herbert Marcuse's ideological conjectures in *Eros and Civilization*. The theory obviously has polemical value for an attack on existing institutions even as Marx's theory of surplus value had during the thirties, and those who are today interested in attacking contemporary institutions are reluctant to have the weaknesses of the theory exposed, even as radical Marxists during the thirties were unwilling to concede what was weak in the theory of surplus value.

If we may distinguish three distinct periods in Freud's work (Rapaport does) then I should say the sublimation-theory Freudians belong to the second of these periods, a period Freud went beyond in his 1926 essay: "The Problem of Anxiety," where, as Rapaport says "The ego appears as an independent agent of great power and authority." It was this essay of Freud which inspired the contemporary ego-analysis of Erikson and Hartmann. I suggest that sublimation-theory Freudians are not unlike surplus-value Marxists.

3) According to Efron, I distorted Norman O. Brown's argument in *Life Against Death* because I said that Mr. Brown said man is a disease, whereas, according to Efron, Mr. Brown

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in fact argued that "the ultimate essence of our being remains in our unconscious secretly faithful to the principle of pleasure, or as Blake called it, delight." Efron goes on: " 'in ultimate essence,' man then is not diseased; his disease is caused by his failure to develop historically in accordance *with* his essence but he cannot desert that essence." So man is not a deserter from life as he is held to be in the German anthropology cited by Max Scheler, and which I claim has so much in common with the theory of Mr. Brown.

Now possibly Mr. Brown does not really know what he says half of the time and possibly Efron is not bothered by the fact that what Mr. Brown says half of the time contradicts what he says during the other half. But in any case here is Mr. Brown's own statement of his doctrine in *Life Against Death*: "Neurosis is not an occasional aberration; it is not just in other people; it is in us, and in us all the time . . . or, to put it another way, the doctrine of the universal neurosis of mankind is the psychoanalytic analogue of the theological doctrine of original sin." Now this is surely a funny way of saying that man is essentially well. Certainly it is saying man as he has been, and as he is known to himself to have been, is sick. This analogue to the doctrine of original sin indeed gives history no other content than neurosis, and can envisage any salvation from disease only in an apocalyptic breakthrough from history. But how then does this doctrine differ from the anthropological one cited by Max Scheler? And in what sense can this view of Mr. Brown's be regarded as scientific, empirical doctrine? If all that we know about man tells us that throughout history he has been ill, then how can one remain faithful to empirical evidence and say that in man's "ultimate essence," whatever that be, he is well?

Apparently Efron regards Mr. Brown as some kind of empiricist. I wonder what kind of empirical evidence it would be possible to give for this statement on page 293 of Mr. Brown's *Life Against Death*: "What the child knows consciously, and the adult unconsciously, is that we are nothing but body." The amusing fact is that from the point of view of the natural sciences, of which the behavioral sciences form a part, man is nothing but body. But psychoanalysis cannot possibly find a place within the behavioral sciences, and in all the discussions between behavioral scientists and analysts, it has been the analysts who have been routed. The only possibility of retaining some of the Freudian insights is to regard them as part of those historical studies which regard man not as body at all, but essentially, if not exclusively, as mind.

4) It was no surprise to me that Efron should come up with a defense of circularity, and it was no surprise to me after having talked with him that his defense should amount to little more than to say it has been defended. By whom? By Bentley and Dewey, he says. Well, there is a book—it was actually written by Bentley, though Dewey also signed it—in which there is some defense of circularity. When Efron showed me his quote from it, I told him the quotation was unconvincing and shady, since the book was not actually written by Dewey, and I suggested to him that he himself analyze those circumstances under which circularity is permissible, and those under which it is not. Obviously, it is not permissible under all circumstances, for in that case all one would have to do to win an argument would be to beg the question.

But on the other hand, and this I am perfectly

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willing to grant, there are indeed circumstances in which circularity is permissible and indeed inevitable. The problem may be expressed as follows: if one could never be circular, nothing could be asserted; if one could always be circular, nothing could be disproved. The question brought up in my article was whether Freud was guilty of circularity, as Scheler claimed, and whether Freud's circularity in this particular instance could be justified. Now all Efron has had to say about this is what Bentley and Dewey have said, to wit, that there is circularity "in the knowledge," whatever this may mean. Here let me cite something said to me by Sidney Hook who is something of a Deweyan, not a European, and certainly not an anti-empiricist. Hook pointed out that if you give a reasonable argument for using reason in argument you are both begging the question and entitled to beg it. But this is because there is an impossibility of proving what you are trying to prove. One would also be begging the question in using irrational arguments to defend irrationality. (Here an interesting point comes up: is an irrationalist less true to his vision if he gives rational arguments in favor of irrationality?) In any case, circularity seems unavoidable when we try to prove that which serves as the foundation of our proof. If Efron had understood this, he would have tried to show that what Freud says on the origin of moral norms was not advanced as a proof of any kind. In fact it was. Now as to Mr. Brown: I can see no objection to illuminating history with insights gained from psychoanalysis, or to illuminating psychoanalysis with insights gained from history. But I can see no reasonable sense in the assertion that history and psychoanalysis can each be the *foundation* of the other. Founding, in any case, is not proving. To found, as Paul Ricoeur finely said, is "to elevate to intellectuality," something which to my mind Norman O. Brown has done neither for psychoanalysis nor for history.

5) Finally, on the value of tradition in our judgment of the origin, nature, and destiny of man. Certainly I do not object to any notion about man which can be demonstrated to be true and which has no other authority behind it than that it was demonstrated. Nor did I say anything to imply that I have any objection to any idea, the truth of which could be shown. My assumption, though, is that when we speak of the origin, nature, and destiny of man, we are speaking of a matter about which there is no body of doctrine which can be proved as true. Moreover, we are speaking about a matter of which there are rival notions—there are the judgments of the natural sciences, of philosophy, of the Judaeo-Christian faith. Finally, I suggested there is the judgment of literature, which in my opinion tells us more about humanity than do the sciences, and I associated the existentialist notion of man as that being for whom the world is always a transcendental problem, with the judgment of man which has been presented in our literature. I stand by that judgment, and I assert further that the judgment of man we have in literature is as far beyond the creation of any single intelligence as would be the creation of language. And while each of us can make some contribution to language, I think we can only do this by accepting its authority.

Efron objects to social tradition, in which I see some liberation from all biologisms, including the "new" one of Norman O. Brown. We can no more reduce ethics or customs to biology than we can reduce biology to physics. And tradition is curiously not unlike a biological force. Nicolai Hartmann put it well: "Tradition is to civilization as heredity is to the species."

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N. Gordon Levin, Jr.

After World War One

POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PEACEMAKING, CONTAINMENT AND COUNTERREVOLUTION AT VERSAILLES 1918–1919, by Arno J. Mayer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 893 pp. $15.00.

THIS MASSIVE yet gracefully written book is a definitive political history of Europe during the period of the Paris Peace Conference from November 1918 to June 1919. The work provides a worthy sequel to Mayer's earlier study, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*, 1917–1918, which analyzed European politics and diplomacy in the last two years of World War I. Both books exhibit Mayer's methodological effort to abandon what he has termed "the constricting framework of orthodox diplomatic history" in favor of an emphasis "on the making of foreign policy prior to its being fed into the diplomatic and military machinery, particular care being taken to probe those points at which domestic affairs intersect with foreign policy, military preparedness, and diplomacy." Moving beyond the traditional official sources for diplomatic history, Mayer is particularly concerned with "an investigation of party, pressure, and interest politics; [and] of the social origins, status, and world views of the principal political and foreign policy actors."

Mayer argues that the results of the Paris Peace Conference represented a failure on the part of liberal elements inspired by Woodrow Wilson to ally themselves with the forces of democratic socialism throughout postwar Europe in order to create a new rational and humane world order. Many factors explain why history did not move in this direction in 1918 and 1919. Most basic, according to Mayer, was the decline in the political strength of Left-liberal and democratic socialist elements in all the countries victorious in the War. Mayer exhaustively traces rising conservative power through the Republican victory in the American elections of 1918, the success of the Right in Britain's Khaki election, and the solidification of the conservative power of Clemenceau and Sonnino in France and Italy on the eve of the Paris Conference. Moreover, other factors served to further inhibit the achievement of Wilson's peace program:

> Wilson's principles and aims, like all such pronunciamentos, were destined to be honored in the breach. The conditions that had prompted their formulation and acceptance in early 1918 had passed into history: there was no longer any need to restrain the Soviet government from signing a separate peace with the Central Powers; with the success of the revolution from above in Berlin the rebellion against the Kaiser and Erich Ludendorff no longer required encouragement; and after the Armistice the Allied Governments could dispense with the support of their own forces of movement. Above all, the Alliel cabinets were much less prone to bend to the ideological and diplomatic wishes of the Wilson Administration once victory had drastically reduced their dependence on American military and economic power.

Finally, a special problem was the existence of strongly anti-German and social-patriotic elements within the French and British Left, elements which tended to undercut whatever unified opposition the Allied Left might have been able to offer to anti-German extremism at Paris.

Wilson, of course, was not completely without diplomatic leverage. The Allies needed American economic strength for their own recovery and to help buttress orderly governments

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in the defeated states of Germany, Austria, and Hungary, each of which faced a revolutionary socialist upheaval. American aid was also sought to make viable the pro-Allied successor states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Moreover, the Allies hoped to bind America's political and military power to the defense of the final peace settlement against a potential German effort at revenge, and Allied leaders were willing consequently to make some concessions to Wilson. Ironically, in this last connection, Allied and especially French acceptance of Wilson's League of Nations program in 1919 resulted, in large part, because the League served to tie American power to the maintenance of the anti-German peace settlement.

The point is, then, that Wilson had considerable influence at the Paris Peace Conference, but it was not an influence based upon a broad solidarity with the European non-Bolshevik Left. Rather, Wilson worked for a more moderate peace from a restrained position *within* the inner councils of the victorious Allied powers. Moreover, Wilson also joined the Allies both in supporting anti-German territorial terms in the East (Mayer tends to underestimate the extent to which a punitive attitude toward Germany lived on in Wilson's thinking from the war days) and in placing American-Allied unity and the containment of revolutionary socialism throughout Europe ahead of any vision of a liberal-Left alliance to remake world politics. When Wilson did finally appeal to one of the Allied peoples over the heads of their own government (in his statement to the Italian people on the Fiume question), Mayer shows that the Allied-Left was too weak to rally effectively to Wilson in Italy or elsewhere, and that they tended to view Wilson's effort as a case of too little and too late.

IN MAYER'S VIEW, the greatest evil of the post-World War I period was its obsessive anti-Bolshevism. Opposition to Bolshevism helped to split an already weakened world socialist movement. It led to the Allies' support of reactionary and expansionist tendencies in their client states of Poland and Rumania. In Hungary, the Allied- and American-induced fall of Bela Kun's Hungarian Soviet Republic was followed by a brutal White Terror. In Germany, the Allies and the United States sought to use economic and political influence to check revolutionary socialist tendencies, regardless of the fact that this led to a Center-Right alliance that effectively inhibited the more radical potential of the German Revolution of 1918. Then, having helped to contain the German Left, the Allies and the Americans proceeded to impose a harsh peace which further discredited the German Center-Left forces and accelerated a drift toward the Right in German politics. Yet it should be noted that paradoxically the very threat of Bolshevism in Germany had given Wilson some leverage at Paris in moderating the peace settlement.

As regards the Russian question, Mayer argues that the political weakness of the Allied Left, combined with its own ambivalence on the Bolshevik issue, led to a situation in which the Allied governments, the Allied client successor states of Poland and Rumania—and for a time even the Germans in the Baltic and the Ukraine—were able to support the Russian Whites through a limited program of counter-revolutionary intervention. Moreover, Mayer describes in great detail the manner in which the Russian Whites and their conservative Allied supporters were able successfully to block all Allied-American efforts to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet regime. Commenting at one point on Woodrow Wilson's role in the Russian question, Mayer writes that "Wilson lacked the courage, the political support, and the diplomatic leverage to force a credible effort for accommodation with Lenin; or, failing this, to make the operation essentially *defensive*." This statement implies that Wilson wished to reach an agreement with Lenin but was prevented by other political factors.

Mayer is, I think, much closer to the truth at other moments in the book when he stresses Wilson's anti-Bolshevism and commitment to the eventual reinstatement of the liberal-nationalist values of the March Revolution in Russia. Moreover, Wilson hoped that a unified liberal Russia would enter the League of Nations and help to support an American-inspired system of liberal capitalist stability in Europe and in Asia. These hopes explain Wilson's efforts to negotiate the Bolsheviks out of power, his willingness to maintain America's forces in Siberia throughout 1919, and his attempt to reach an agreement with Admiral Kolchak for a liberal-nationalist solution in Russia in the spring of 1919. Wilson's opposition to armed Allied intervention

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in Russia at crucial moments at Paris never meant that the President was prepared to accept Bolshevik rule in all or part of Russia.

In the last analysis, the value of *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking* lies in the fact that Mayer has shown us how the events of the early months of 1919 contain in microcosm all the basic political questions of the next 50 years. All the elements are already present in 1919: the roots of fascism; evidence of the growing weakness of a schismatic European Left; the beginnings of the ostracism of a hostile Soviet Union; the seeds of appeasement, World War II, and the Cold War. Above all, there moves through Mayer's pages the prophetic figure of Woodrow Wilson. For a time, Wilson's own nation would reject his liberal globalist vision of an American destiny to stabilize the world against threats to international order from either the atavistic Right or the revolutionary Left. In our own time, however, it is clear that we are involved around the world with the ambiguous legacy of the final triumph of the Wilsonian vision in America during World War II and the Cold War which followed.

Kofi Ankomah

African Problems

FALSE START IN AFRICA, by René Dumont. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 320 pp. $7.

THIS BOOK deals with the general problem of African development. It contends that "there is no curse on Black Africa," and it goes on to elucidate the special aspects of African development. The author rightly places blame on the Western powers for their lack of concern with African development. He blames them for certain worthless installations, typified by the many *Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement économique et social,* which independent Africa was forced to inherit. While admitting that African countries are receiving a large amount of public funds from the Western nations, he notes that its usefulness is minimized by the outflow of capital through business and trade imbalances and the sums repatriated by Europeans.

But if Dumont is critical of the old colonialists, he is even less lenient with the "African leaders" who have become *de facto* "neocolonialists" and who in many instances are far more removed from their people than their colonial predecessors were.

Dumont sees as the only legitimate objective for Africa "the honorable battle against hunger and misery, ignorance and sickness, and for dignity of all men, liberated from their diverse forms of servitude." He calls for volunteers to enlist in the struggle against these malignant epidemics, but he is not too clear about the ammunition they should employ. Africa, he rightly notes, can do better with orange juice, which provides the necessary vitamins for hard work, than with the prevailing high consumption of beer, which acts as a deterrent to effective work.

The encouragement of cottage industries may, he contends, prove to be more productive than the grandiose, yet poorly-built steel plants. The techniques he proposes, which include small processing plants for locally grown nuts to alleviate the high cost of foreign processing, the introduction of paper mills to process paper pulp, the planting of shrubs and trees for future marketing, the introduction of modern fisheries, all in the forest regions of Africa, may prove to be good and useful.

Dumont advocates a shift from abstract education, with which Africa is plagued, to a more practical education in science and technology. The need for a revolution in rural education is still more acute. The farm school, according to Dumont, should satisfy two requirements, "basic education and vocational training." I am in agreement with Dumont that in certain areas of Africa "a donkey pulling water from a well could water a large garden and orchard which could supply the school canteen," not discounting the fact that the products can also be sold to improve the schools while giving the students knowledge of practical economics through cooperatives. While strongly criticizing training in schools of administration, whose courses are geared to maintaining "law and order," Dumont advocates the removal of bureaucratic inefficiencies which seem to cripple the new states of Africa. The need for simplification of the legal system to cut down the parasitic notaries, lawyers, and litigants cannot be overemphasized.

Like the late Frantz Fanon, Dumont has great faith in grass-roots organization and believes

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that the development of Africa must have its foundations in mass mobilization and rural activism for a defined objective—which at the moment is lacking. Again like Fanon, Dumont argues against the multiplicity of Lilliputian empires in Africa. He contends that "Africa would be more efficient if unified." This may be true, but Dumont produces no evidence. And like most advocates of a unified Africa, he fails to say how to bring this about.

Lewis Coser

History Askew

AMERICA IN THE SIXTIES, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, by Ronald Berman. New York: Free Press, 291 pp. $7.95.

PROFESSOR BERMAN'S EARLIER *A Reader's Guide to Shakespeare's Plays* may have been helpful. I wouldn't know. His present guide to the intellectual life of the sixties, however, is not of much use.

Both title and subtitle are misleading. This is not an intellectual history of the sixties—it does not even mention major works in the humanities or the social sciences and history that have been of marked influence in the last few years. It is, rather, a collection of literally hundreds of quotes, mainly from the periodical literature of the last few years, with particular attention to publications of the Old and New Left. The author quotes liberally from a wide gamut of journals ranging all the way from *Commentary* and *Dissent* to *Studies on the Left* and *Fuck You, a magazine of the Arts.* Though politically conservative, Professor Berman is guided by very liberal principles of selection.

The profusion of quotations points to a major weakness of the book—it lacks clear criteria of relevance. Given this democracy of quotes, it is impossible to sift the significant from the merely curious. Like botanists in the pre-scientific age, the author seems to have felt that if only he went into the field with a large enough net to catch all the butterflies he would be able to promote knowledge. But this is emphatically not so, as botanists learned long ago. The facts never speak for themselves, in botany or intellectual history.

These hundreds upon hundreds of quotes, once transcribed on Berman's file cards and then aligned on his pages, become stale. They emit a slightly moldy smell. If there is any principle of selection, it seems to follow from the author's strange fascination with the most outrageous and inane products of the New and Far-out Left. Berman seems to be as fascinated with their hysterical outpourings as Anthony Comstock used to be with pornography. But to assert that such methods help "to transmit the tone of a decade" is nonsense.

Professor Berman, writing from his university at San Diego, seems to have had almost no contact with the intellectual milieu he is trying to describe. Ideas are reduced to quotes, and quotes seldom rooted and located. There are only the faintest echoes of the major social and political events of these years, though it should be fairly obvious that many, if not necessarily all, of these ideas can be understood only in response to these events. What is even worse, upon the few occasions in which concrete events are mentioned in some detail, the author resorts to a crude distortion of the issues. He can sum up the debate on Vietnam in these words: "the failure of the anti-war left to counter the strategic arguments of its opponents has been instrumental in its failure to exert opinion. Finally, the appeals of morality of both sides have resulted in acceptance of the idea that morality is positively served by acting against Communism." This is *chutzpa*, not intellectual history.

Professor Berman dislikes liberalism, radicalism, and the intellectual atmosphere of the sixties. He smells corruption everywhere and seems to feel that modern intellectuals are the major source of that corruption. Having abandoned religion, they are adrift on the sea of modernity, hanker after power and lack a proper sense of balance, moderation, and respect for the eternal yesterday. The whole mood of the book reminds one of that of ten years ago with its "Atheists for Niebuhr" and the belated discovery of the Burkean virtues. Berman dislikes the Enlightenment, rationality, secularism, and all that the *philosophes* stood for. They didn't know, it appears, about the "darker side of man's nature." All this, of course, is pretty much old hat by now. American intellectuals have ceased to be impressed by Michael Oakeshott's whistling in Anglican churchyards. And one may doubt that

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the foibles and fashions of the preceding decade provide a good vantage point for critical judgments about the next.

The last part of the book, where the author deals at some length with fiction and comments on some characteristic failures of recent literary writings, are better than the rest. Berman is clearly much more at home in literary criticism than in intellectual history. From time to time he commands an apt and telling formulation, as when he writes of Lionel Trilling that "his essay on Freud praises those biological instincts which resist culture while his essays on culture attack those instincts which refuse to shape themselves to acceptable political forms." But, alas, such pleasures are infrequent. A dreary failure as intellectual history or a critical assessment of the sixties, this book may be handy if you need a reference to some of the inanities of what passes for thought on the Far-out Left.

Donald N. Michael

Techniques of Prediction

THE YEAR 2000, by Herman Kahn and Andrew Wiener. New York: Macmillan. 431 pp. $9.95.

THERE ARE TWO WAYS to read this book: as an extensive compendium of speculations on alternative futures, and as evidence of the conceptual quicksand upon which such speculations are built. Since, as the authors persuasively argue, futurist speculations will increasingly become necessary as a basis for choosing among policies, difficult problems regarding the limits of rational control overarch both the substance of the book and the mood of anticipation among planners and policy-makers which its pages reflect.

As a compendium of many futurists' speculations this is a valuable handbook—actually half a handbook. It has sections on the "methodology" of speculating about the future, the nature of historical change, the 13 "basic long-term multifold trends"; sections on recent and future trends in science and technology, economic growth, and population growth; on the future as a "surprise-free" evolution of the present; on surprising and "nightmarish" futures, international developments, various war producing situations, and on policy research. The writing is almost conversational and is sprinkled with modest and sensible disclaimers regarding the non-definitiveness of these exercises in delineating alternative futures.

Still, the authors reveal an appalling if inadvertent arrogance, so that the result is indeed only half a handbook. Their documentation about both past and present is far too skimpy. In order to look ahead to the year 2000 the authors look back at least to Greece, since understanding how we have gotten where we are is a prerequisite for understanding in what ways we might go on from here. Thus Wiener and Kahn wade in not only as futurists but as encyclopedic interpreters of philosophies, circumstances, and events yesterday and today. They expatiate on classical civilization, *La Belle Époque*, Marx, Keynes, "humanism and the value of time," and why Columbian mechanics are skilled though illiterate. This makes fascinating reading, but the reader doesn't know whether these selections from history are "correct" and, even if correct, whether their interpretations are right for the right reasons. Both historians and observers of the present argue interminably over alternate explanations and over what constitutes validating data—but this indecisiveness does not come through in the book. Wiener and Kahn have chosen *their* world view and, while they are properly cautious about the plausibility, likelihood, or completeness of the projections they offer, they show little diffidence over their interpretations of the past and present from which they extrapolate.

In this light their exercises in deriving futures reveal a serious problem not only for the reader but also for the policy-maker who is the primary target for books of this kind. To see the problem, one begins with an appreciation that:

> . . . if a scenario is to seem plausible to analytic and/or policy-makers it must, of course, relate at the outset to some reasonable version of the present, and must correspond throughout to the way analysts and/or policy-makers are likely to believe decision-makers and others are likely to behave. Since plausibility is a great virtue in a scenario, one should, subject to other considerations, try to achieve it. But it is important not to limit oneself to the *most* plausible, conventional, or probable situations and behavior. History is likely to write scenarios that most observers would find implausible not only prospectively but sometimes, even, in retrospect. . . .

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IN SEVERAL WAYS, then, the policy-maker is dependent on historical (including the present) interpretations. But what can he do with such forecasts? He can reject them, which increasingly will come to mean rejecting a lot of time, money, and scarce, skilled resources. Or he can accept the scenario writer's interpretation of history because it is compatible with his own, or because he has nothing better to go on, being himself ignorant of historical "facts." Or he may accept it, out of expedience—recognizing that the status of Kahn-class futurists, systems analysis, and computers endows this historical interpretation with a validity that in turn adds legitimacy to the proposed future he decides to anticipate and upon whose "reality" he bases his present actions. None of these reasons need have anything to do with a "correct" understanding of the past and present which is necessary for acting wisely with regard to the future. But the combination of these reasons probably makes it more likely that the policy-maker will argue less than he might about appropriate historical bases from which to choose planning options.

Curiously, there is almost nothing in the book about the ends and means of the great socializers: the family, education, and organizational structure. Hence it tells us about what patterns of motives will drive planners and policy-makers to use such feeble but necessary projections. The bind of course is, as with so many of our new technologies, that we must use this one (dangerous as it also is) simply in order to cope with what we have become. As usual, technology (in this case, social technology) is likely to outrun the wisdom and wits of those who must use it.

The present methodological impotence of the futurists—and as one of these I count myself just as impotent—has never been made so clear. On the last page Kahn and Wiener say:

> If there is any single lesson that emerges from the above, it seems to be this: while it would certainly be desirable and might even be helpful to have a better grasp of how social action may lead to unanticipated or unwanted results, it is not likely to be sufficient. Given man's vastly increased power over his internal and external environment, and, in particular, given the unprecedented opportunities for centralization of social control that follow from the economic and technological changes that have occurred and that are likely to occur with ever increasing impact, the effects of social policies—planned or haphazard—are likely to increase drastically, and the consequences of mistakes are likely to grow correspondingly disastrous.

Earlier they also assert that the most surprising thing one could anticipate about a "surprise free" future would be that it had no surprises in it. Rather than buried in context or coming on the very last page, these appreciations should have preceded the body of the text, for these are the proper lenses through which to inspect its tables, curves, and scenarios.

Kahn and Wiener explore these glum premonitions of impotence, but they never come, really, to deal with focal sources of them in their—and other futurists'—methodology. Much of what the authors provide by way of historical justification for selecting plausible futures is based on 13 long-term trends ("most of which can be traced back to the twelfth or eleventh centuries"). But their list subsumes all the unlikely as well as likely events and men that have brought us to our present ambiguous and precarious state. Given these trends, anything from Auschwitz to Zobra becomes *plausible*. What becomes *likely* depends on how exhaustive our analysis can be of possible interactions of these trends, as they are influenced by the fortuitousness of individual humans and unique events.

Scenario writing is one such device for pursuing such analyses, a method particularly associated with Rand and the Hudson Institute. But the methodological rationale for scenarios requires exploration of unnumbered branchings within the scenario, in order to discover unanticipated developments of such significance that people will now undertake actions intended to increase the likelihood of avoiding or embracing these developments later.

To be adequate such methods would have to simulate the general and the particular in history itself. We cannot do this because we cannot keep it all in mind. Or, to put it another way perhaps, because our systematic understanding of men and institutions (or even adequate data to understand them) is lacking and will continue to be lacking, between now and the year 2000. The conceptual crisis, as Kahn and Wiener intimate, is as bad as our social crisis.

Books such as theirs won't get us out of these crises but they do help make clear just how bad things are—and are going to be.

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